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There have been academic endeavors since 1968 among economists 
of the countries surrounding the Pacific Basin to shed light on 
trade and development problems of common interest to their countri-
es and find solutions thereto and make policy recommendations . 
They first met in Tokyo in January 1968 . The Japan Economic Re-
search Center hosted this conference . Next they met in Hawaii in 
January 1969 and for the third time in Sydney, Australia , in August 
1970 . In October 1971 they again got together in Ottawa, Canada . 
These economists came back to Tokyo in January this year for 
their fifth conference . The Japan Economic Research Center and The 
Japan Institute of International Affairs co-hosted the conference . 
The present volume contains the papers and proceedings of this Con-
ference . 
Both institutions hereby express deep gratitude to all the par-
ticipants, especially to those who came from outside Japan, and the 
organizing committee of the Conference chaired by Professor Kiyoshi 
Kojima for the success of the Conference . Acknowledgement is again 
due to Professor Kojima for the editing of this volume and also to 
Professors Peter Drysdale, Ippei Yamasawa, Makoto Ikema and Thomas 
Burlington who assisted him in the work. 
We are also indebted to the Asia Foundation for its financial 
support of the Conference . 
July, 1973 
The Japan Economic Research Center 
Hisao Kanamori, President 
The Japan Institute of International Affairs 
Hisanaga Shimazu, Chairman 
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EDITOR'S PREFACE 
The Fifth Pacific Trade and Development Conference was held in 
Tokyo from 9 to 13 January, 1973 to further the objectives of the 
Conference series. The first Conference in this series was held in 
Tokyo in January 1968; the second in Hawaii in January 1969; the 
third in Sydney in August 1970; and the fourth in Ottawa in October 
1971. The Pacific Trade and Development studies are establishing 
their own influence upon trade and development policies in Pacific 
basin countries . This book contains the papers and proceedings of 
the Fifth Conference, discussion at which focussed on issues related 
to the development of a new world economic order and structural ad-
justrrent in Pacific trade . 
In the corning year, a good rrany of the uncertainties in the in-
ternational rronetary and trading system that have now appeared are 
likely to continue . Planning a new order for the international eco-
norey, in which steady growth and adjustrrent is encouraged, deserves 
high priority . 
Structural adjustrrent and adjustment assistance policies appear 
to be a basic pre-requisite to the rronetary re-alignnents that now 
have to take place, as well as to continuing the trade liberaliza-
tion that is essential to the dynamic expansion of Asian-Pacific 
trade anong developed and developing countries alike. 
The book covers three broad subjects. The first part deals with 
"nonetary re-alignrrents and trade adjustrrent in the world econorey ." 
Professor Harry G. Johnson was expected to introduce the general is-
s.ues involved in trade adjustment and rronetary reform. Due to his 
illness this was not possible. Thus Mr . Royer and Professor Ishikawa 
introduced the problem as it affects the Asian-Pacific economies by 
analysing the impact of the enlarged European Comrrunity and China on 
this region's trade structure and trade growth . 
The second part focusses on export growth in Asian developing 
countries--its role in developrnent and employment progranunes. One 
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pa per a nalyses overall problems of the ent i re developi ng wo r ld f r om 
t he v i ewpoint o f industr ialization pol i cy . Two other papers dea l 
with areal trade and ad j us t ment problems in East and Southeast Asia . 
Another paper look s at the Lat in Arrerican economies . 
The economic development o f developing countries depends very much 
upon their export growth , but this poses problems both of shifts in 
policies from import-substitution to export prorrotion , and determi-
nation of proper industr ial priorities for export . In turn this de-
p e nds , not just on corrparative advantage but on foreign trade pros-
pects and barriers . Thus there is an important interaction between 
development and trade policies in developing countries with trade 
policies and structural adjustments in developed countries . Past ex-
perience , future prospects and difficulties are explored . 
The third part deals with adjustment assistance policies in deve-
loped countries : Japan , Australia, New Zealand , the United States 
and Canada . Th e future structure of world trade are drawn out by 
each writer in order to set the position of each country in perspec-
tive . Structural adjustments are required both to harrronize trade 
with advanced countries and to expand trade with developing countries . 
Adjustment assistance policies are required not only for contract-
ing i nefficient sectors but also for developing efficient and ex-
port sectors . How overall unemployment can be cured is another pro-
blem which relates directly to the degree of felxibility and cost 
of adjustment programmes. Successful and unsuccessful experience 
of structural adjustments and structural adjustment policy is ana-
lyzed . 
As indicated in the Surnnary by Professor Hugh Patrick and the Com-
rrunique issued by the Confe rence , there was intensive disc ussion at 
t h e Conference , but some urgent policy priorities were agreed upon 
in the search for a new world economic order and the successful st-
ructural adjustment of Asian- Latin American- Pacific trade . 
Finally , I would like to express IlTh1 gratitude to all those who 
made possible the success of the Conference and the preparation of 
t h is volume . My special thanks are due to Peter Drysdale, Ippei 
Yamazawa, Makoto Ikerna , Torn Burlington, and Yoko Ota for their as-
sistance with this work . 
July 1973 Kiyoshi Kojima 
Chairman, the Organizing Committee 
for the Fifth Pacific Trade and 
Development Conference 
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C 0 M M U N I Q U E 
The Fifth Pac i f i c Trade and Development Conference has just com-
pleted meetings at the Japan Economic Research Center i n Tokyo to 
discuss the development of a new world economic order and the na-
ture of structural adjustments in Asian- Pacific trade . The Confer-
ence was jointly sponsored by the Japan Economic Research Center 
and the Japan Institute of International Affairs . Participants 
came from Australia, Canada , Europe , Hong Kong , Japan , Mexico , New 
Zealand , the Philippines , Thailand , the United States , the Asian 
Development Bank , the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development , ·and the International Labour Organisation . 
There was discussion of the considerable growth in the interdep-
endence among world economies and the importance of trade and capi-
tal flows for the economic growth and welfare of those in the Asian-
Pacific region in particular . 
Participants expressed great concern over the drift towards pro-
tectionism , especially affecting agricultural and light manufactur-
ed goods , in major trading regions . 
The importance of the corning round of trade negotiations in che-
cking protectionist forces and opening up trade opportuni ties in 
these areas was stressed in this connection . World leaders were 
called upon to adopt a forward- looking approach to trade and econo-
mic pol i cies and to resist pressures to solve domest i c problems by 
policies whi ch sacrifice the considerable gains from international 
specialisation . 
The emergence of the enlarged European Community as a major world 
market was given special attention . There is the danger that the 
enlarged Community will persist with established protectionist poli-
cies towards agriculture and the extension of discriminatory and 
restrictionist trading arrangements affecting the European market 
for processed and manufactured goods most likely to come from deve-
loping countries . The need , therefore , to i nvolve Europe in a mean-
ingful round of comprehensive trade negotiations with the United 
States, Japan , Australia, Canada , New Zealand and other countries 
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was seen to be of significance not only to the welfare of these 
major economic regions but the whole world economy , including the 
smaller Asian- Pacific economies . 
Japan now has new and enlarged responsibilities in world trade 
and economic arrangements . The sheer size of the Japanese economy , 
its wealth , and the nature of its inter-relationships with the rest 
of the world , all dictate a major role for her in the formulation 
of a new world economic order . Whilst recognizing the achievement 
of Japan ' s programmes of trade liberalization , her more flexible 
attitude to monetary adjustments, the growth of her development 
assistance programmes , and her increased importance as a source of 
capital funds , it was felt that a significant re- direction of poli-
cies was still required from the viewpoint of her own interests as 
well as the interests of the rest of the world, especially the smal-
ler economies in the Asian- Pacific region to whom Japan is of such 
growing importance . Alongside the United States , Japan together 
with Australia, Canada, and New Zealand now has a special part to 
play in negotiations over international economic policies designed 
to secure open trading arrangements and through them world prosper-
ity . 
Liberalization of agricultural trade, trade in light manufactur-
ed goods , the extension of aid programmes on more generous terms , 
and leadership in monetary readjustments were seen as major elements 
in this new responsibility in world trade policy . 
An important theme of the Conference was the nature and scale 
of the adjustment processes in economically advanced countries 
where the possibility of structural and regional unemployment may 
slow the process of trade liberalization and encourage protectionism 
i n response to changes in relative competitive positions . The Con-
f erence surveyed the weaknesses and strengths of adjustment assist-
ance programmes in Japan , the United States , Australia , Canada , New 
Zealand , and Europe . Ther e was clearly a need to develop adjust-
ment devices which mitigate any social costs resulting from the 
transfer of resources from inefficient to efficient sectors of 
these economies . Any safeguards should be temporary and designed 
to speed adjustment to new trading conditions and efficient special-
i sation . 
The Conference noted the huge structural and employment problems 
in most developing economies in the Asian-Pacific region . Wider 
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trading opportunities are an important element in the solution of 
these problems . But it was also felt that the industrialization 
strategies of developing countries themselves have frequently thwart-
ed trade and economic growth and that , in consequence , there has 
been a failure to take advantage of trading opportunities that al-
ready exist . Excessive protection and the nature of incentives 
offered to the production of tradable goods in Asian- Pacific deve-
loping nations reduces the efficiency with which both domestic re-
sources and foreign capital resources are used, adversely affect-
ing employment, incomes , and social welfare . 
The development strategies of China and their impact on the Asi-
an-Pacific region was also considered . No firm conclusions were 
reached but it was felt that Chinese participation in future dis-
cussions would be valuable . 
Participants in the Conference stressed the need for public dis-
cussion of these issues in all the countries involved and their 
serious consideration by the governments concerned. The Conference 
welcomed an offer from Dr . Wionczek, of the Center for Economic and 
Monetary Studies in Latin America, to initiate the organisation of 
a further conference in about a year's time in Mexico City. 
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PART I 
PROBLEMS 
IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 
1 
GREATER EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
Jean Royer 
Anong the factors which have required and will require in the fu-
ture structural adjustments in the pattern of production and trade 
of the countries in the world, including those of the Pacific area, 
the process of economic integration in Western Europe can be singl-
ed out as being of major importance as well as unprecedented . Where-
as European integration has probably perturbed the trade flows and 
the world financial balance far less than other trends such as the 
instability of capital noven~nts, the growing nobility of the factors 
of production thanks to the development of nultinational enterprises 
or, for that natter, the spectacular growth of the Japanese econoicy", 
the building-up of a widening trading and financial system based on 
regionalism has raised nore difficulties of a theoretical nature 
and caused nore misgivings than all the other factors taken together . 
This is probably due to the fact that the phenomenon was considered 
as unpredictable in its implications and that it challenged princi-
ples which were believed by many to be perITP.nent conditions for the 
working of a successful system of econon~c cooperation. 
The European Econonic Conmunity - and the European Free Trade As-
sociation - have been in existence for nore than ten years and it is 
now possible to take stock of the situation and to draw sorre conclu-
• sions from the actual record of European integration before an at-
tempt is made to assess the possible consequences for the partner 
countries as well as for outsiders of the enlargement of the EEC 
which will bring together, as from January 1973, the six Members of 
4 JEAN ROYER 
the present Comrrunity and three other West European countries, viz 
the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland as acceding rrerrbers ; to this 
group should be added the fringe of European , Me<literranean and de-
veloping countries from Africa and possibly other continents which 
will be associated in some way with the Comrrunity in a near future . 
I . The results achieved so far by the Comrrunity of the Six 
To assess the achievements of the EEC, one should take into ac-
count both the politic al and economic a.irns of the integration move-
rrent. The relative importance of these aims varied from time to 
time. In the beginning, the political objectives were predorrinant; 
afterwards, the governrrents gave priority to purely economic aspects 
of integration; during the last few years, however, renewed attention 
has been paid to broader policies. 
When the Schuman Plan was adopted and the European Coal and Steel 
Comrrunity was set up, the political overtones were obvious . The in-
tegration of these major sectors of production was intended to knit 
together the interests of enterprises playing an important rnle in 
any warlike activity, to put an end to Franco-Gerrran rivalry and to 
lay down the foundations of the future United States of Europe . As 
the US representative to Luxerrburg explained to me at that time, the 
ECSC institutions were rrodelled on those of the United States of 
Arrerica: the High Authority had to becorre the Federal governrrent, the 
Council of Ministers the Senate of the future Federation , the Assem-
bly was the House of Representatives and the Court was to act as a 
Supreme Court . This view was shared by the staff of the High Autho-
rity who gave priority to constitutional matters. 
This first attempt was not conclusive. while the Coal and Steel 
Corr.nunity achieved its objectives with respect to the integration 
of the industries concerned, it was unable to expand to other sec-
tors and eventually to grow into a federal political unit. When the 
Rorre Treaty was negotiated, the political aspects were not entirely 
discarded, but they were considered as of less immediate importance . 
The executive powers were vested, not in the Commission, but in the 
Council of Ministers whose decisions had to be adopted u~anirnously 
on any point of substance. The Asserrbly and the Court remained part 
of the structure, but their influence cannot be corrpared to that of 
the US institutions. On the other hand, the Corr.rrunity was never con-
sidered only as a trade organization : the Six successfully resisted 
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t he pressure exercized by the United Kingdom and other European coun-
tries to merge the Community into a broader Free Trade Area ; for them, 
integration should go far beyond the removal of trade barriers and 
imply a gradual harmonization of other aspects of government polici-
es; it should lead eventually to a political federation of Western 
Europe . 
The custorrs union The rationale of the Rome Treaty was that the 
rerroval of all trade barriers inside the Comrrunity would increase 
corrpetition arrong producers, lead to a better allocation of resources, 
improve productivity and strengthen the econorries of the Six. The 
prograrr.rre of trade liberalisation was implernented rrore rapidly than 
conterrplated and the rerroval of tariffs and other barriers for rranu-
factured goods was achieved srroothly and with practically no resort 
to the escape clauses which were provided in the Treaty . 
The results of the elimination of trade barriers brought about the 
expected benefits. From 1957 to 1971, intra-Cornrrunity trade increas-
ed rrore than five times (on an fob basis) whereas world trade doubled . 
World 
a) 
b) 
Tab le 1 : Trends in World and intra-EEC trade: 1957-1971 
(in million US dollars, fob) 
1957 1971 Increase 
trade : -
incl. intra-EEC trade 109,740 346,150 215 
excl. intra-EEC trade 101,880 296,930 191 
Intra-EEC trade 7,860 I 49,220 I 526 
Source : GATT, International trade in 1965 and 1971 . 
in % 
In spite of the spectacular expansion of intra-Comrrunity trade, 
the trade of the Six with the rest of the world developed at least 
as rapidly as that of other areas with the exception of Japan. EEC 
imports from non-EEC countries increased by 193 percent and EEC ex-
ports to these countries by 230 percent as against 191 percent for 
total exports and imports of the rest of the world (including Japan) . 
As exports expanded more rapidly than imports, the trade balance of 
the Community improved substantially until 1971 . 
Contrary to what some economists believed, European integration 
did not lead to over-concertratiol! on the soft regional market and 
the EEC significantly increased its share of world rrarkets which ac-
c~unted for 28.6 percent of world exports in 1970 against 15.4 per-
cent in 1950 and 23 . 1 percent in 1960 . 
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Table 2 : Trade balance of the EEC with the rest of the world 
(in million US dollars, fob) 
1957 1960 1971 Increase 57/71 
EEC exports 15,310 19,480 50 , 640 230 % 
EEC imports 15,475 17,375 45,420 193% 
balance -165 +2,105 +5,220 
Source: GATT, International trade, Supra 
Table 3: Trends of export trade of the EEC and of other a reas 
(1957/71 in percentages) 
EEC to the rest of the world 
~orld less EEC 
Industrial areas less EEC 
North America 
Western Europe less EEC 
Japan 
Developing countries 
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa 
Eastern trading area 
230% 
185% 
208% 
155% 
194% 
742% 
140% 
107% 
216~ 
Source : GATT, lac . cit See also Appendix , Table I . 
So much for trade. Production in the EEC also increased more 
rapidly than in other industrial areas , with the exception of Japan . 
The share of the EEC in the aggregate real gross national product 
of the OECD countries moved from 19 percent in 1950 to 23 percent 
in 1960 and to 24 percent in 1970. 1 The structure of production 
changed in line with the trends visible in other industrial countri-
es; the share of labour force in agriculture declined by 37 per.cent 
in the 60's - a figure equal to that of the United States and com-
parable to that of Japan; the share of services in total employment 
also increased, although it is still lower than in North America 
and in the United Kingdom, and even in Japan; but the share of manu-
1 United Stat8s International Economic Policv in an Interdependent 
World, Washington, July 1971, page 3 44 . 
2 OECD, Policy perspective s for i nternationa l trade and econorr~c re-
lations, Paris 1972; Table 13, page 152 . 
3 
OECD, lac.cit ., Table 2, page 139 . 
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facturing industry continues to grow in the EEC - although less 
than in Japan - whereas it has decreased in the United States , in 
Canada and in the United Kingdom . 2 The expanding production of ma-
nufactured goods had to find outlets in the domestic market and in 
the other EEC countries , but also in the rest of the world . 
In the 60's , the share of the EEC industrial production which has 
been exported increased substantially, especially in Italy and in the 
Benelux countries , and that extra share was absorbed by the regional 
rrarket, the share of extra-area trade remaining about the same . 3 
This implies that domestic consumption increased rapidly in the Six, 
as was expected by the negotiators of the Rome Treaty . It is cer-
tain that, as a result of trade liberalisation , the prices of speci-
fic goods such as durab l e consumer goods (refrigerators, washing-
machines and the like) carre down and that the saving rrade incited 
consumers to buy rrore of such or other goods . But even when the price 
reduction was n~t passed on to the consumer but retained by the mid-
dle- man, the economy as a whole was able to enjoy a higher standard 
of living in real terms . This is shown by the figures of per capita 
GNP of industrial countries . With the exception of Japan, the rate 
of increase in France, Germany and Italy was greater than the rate 
in other countries, such as the United Kingdom, the United States and 
Canada . Although the existence of maladjustments in the exchange 
rates and differences in the purchasing powe~ of the national cur-
rencies may sorrewhat distort the picture, the trend is clear enough . 
United 
Canada 
United 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Japan 
Table 4 : Per capita GNP of industrial countries 
(in constant 1970 US dollars) 
ll.5Jl. .l..2_Q_Q_ .lilJ:l Increase 
1950/60 
States 3147 3640 4754 16% 
2143 2624 3650 23% 
Kingdom 1355 1709 2092 26% 
1281 1819 2847 42% 
1019 2105 1016 107% 
650 1071 1684 65% 
427 734 1898 72% 
1960L70 
31% 
39% 
22% 
57% 
43% 
57% 
159% 
Source : US International economic policy , .•.. loc . cit.p . 348 
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8 
The strengthening of the economies of the Six can also be derived 
from data showing the increase of productivi t y , the unit wage cost 
and the export prices of manufactured goods in US dollars . During 
the period 1965- 70, productivity improved more in t he EEC than in the 
united States, Canada and the United Kingdom, though far less than in 
Japan ; the unit wage cost increased less (in national currency) than 
in the three Anglo-Saxon countries, but rrore than in Japan and export 
prices in dollars have increased less than in the United States and 
Japan, but more than in the United Kingdom. 
Table 5 :; Productivity, Unit Wage Cost and Export Prices 
(Indices 1970 : 1965 = 100) 
Productivity Unit Waae Cost "Rxnnr+- PrirP~ 
(Output per (in National (Manuf . goods) 
man-hour) Currency) in US dollars 
United States 113 114 119 
United Kingdom 119 125 110 
Canada 121 118 122 
Germany 130 110 114 
Italy • 130 115 108 
France 141 110 108 
Japan 189 108 114 
Source: Policy perspectives for international trade and economic 
relations, OECD Paris 1972, p . 148 . 
Taken in isolation, these findings might not be conclusive, but 
the convergence of all the trends is a reasonable evidence of the 
steady expansion of the economies of the Six since the EEC was set 
up. While it would still be possible to ascribe part of the achieve-
rrents to other factors, there is no doubt that the integration pro-
cess has contributed largely to the present prosperity of the EEC 
countries . So far we have c onsidered what rr~ght be called the mechan-
ical effects of the customs union, which could have been achieved to a 
large extent by looser forms of association, such as a Free Trade 
Association. The EEC, from the start, was more ambitious and at-
tempted to move from a customs union to an econor:iic union, and later, 
to a political union . 
The progress of economic integration As early as 1948, the Bene-
lux countries found out that the removal of tariffs and other trade 
barriers was not sufficient to guarantee a normal free flow of trade. 
The operation of independent policies in other fields brought about 
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a number of distortions which either h ampered trade br stimulated un-
econorric rroverrents of goods. This applies more particularly to fis-
cal and agricultural policies . For goods which a t tracted very di f -
f erent consumption taxes i n Belgium, Luxerrburg a nd the Netherlands , 
such as spirits and tobacco rrassive speculative exports took place 
from the low-tax to the high-tax country . In t he case of agricultur-
al products , the different level of support prices retarded t he open-
i ng of the frontiers for a long time . 
It became soon apparent that sorre harrronization of tax policies 
had to take place before goods could rrove freely and that sorre rap-
proacherrent would have to be agreed upon in the agricultural field 
before the terrporary safeguards such as minimum import prices could 
be done away with. 
The EEC had the sarr.e experience. The Rorre Treaty had not provid-
e d any detailed blueprint for the liberalization of trade in agri-
cultural products , but it becarne rapidly apparent that free moverre nt 
of staple temperate-zone foodstuffs could not be envisaged if the 
nenber States insisted on rraintaining independent agricultural poli-
cies. To avoid a dea dlock on that issue, the governrrents hammered 
out a ComIIDn agricultural policy which involved joint dec isions on 
support pr ices, export subsidies and plans for structural improve-
ments. This Common policy was adopted and carried out after a 
transitional period and required an elaborate regional administra-
tive rrachinery. This impressive construction, however, proved to be 
vulnerable to exchange fluctuations, since all prices were quoted 
in a cornrron unit of account . When the French franc was devalued , 
the French prices had to be disconnected from the Cornrrunity prices 
to avoid windfall profits for French producers and a complex system 
of border taxes and premia had to be introduced; the system was how-
ever dispensed with after a few years. The situation became far 
more awkward when the Deutsche mark was revalued, because the Ger-
man producers were no t prepared to accept a reduction in their pric-
e s in the ir domestic currency; there again a system of border taxes 
and subsidies had to be re-introduced and the complications became 
nearly unbearable until the Deutsche mark ceased to float against 
other EEC currencies . 
The governrnents becarre aware of the need to harIIDnize their ex-
change policies if they wanted to rraintain the free circulation of 
their a gr icultural products . We shall come back to this point later 
on . 
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Sor far as fiscal policies are concerned, progress has been slow . 
Until now, each governrrent has kept its own system, both as regards 
direct and indirect taxes . Differences in direct taxation do not 
seem to cause excessive distortions to regional trade or to create 
undue advantages to the producers of individual countries . As a 
natter of fact, Swiss producers have been accustoned for rrany years 
to adjust to significant variations in the tax rates of the various 
cantons. In the case of indirect taxes, the solution adcpted for the 
time being was to apply the general rule according to which exports 
are exempted and imports are liable to a border tax equLivalent to the 
consumption tax levied by the importing country on like dorrestic pro-
ducts. This rule ensures the neutrality of the tax, but has the dis-
advantage of rraintaining in existence the custorrs frontiers inside 
the Comrrunity - a situation considered as frustrating by Mr . Man-
sholt, President of the Brussels Comrr~ssion . 
The record is, however, not entirely negative in this field, since 
the Six have agreed on a comIIDn system of indirect taxation , the Tax 
on Value Added. After sorre hesitations, the system is now in force . 
The second stage would be the unific ation of the rates; only then 
will it be possible to let goods move freely and to do 2way with cus-
tons control inside the Community . 
Again with a view to removing distortions hampering intraregional 
trade, the EEC has been active in other forms of policy harnonization. 
A number of regional technical standards have been elaborated by the 
Commission and subrr~tted to the Council of Ministers. Generally 
speaking , these proposals are consitent with the recomrrendations of 
international standardization organizations and independent standards 
are contemplated only when no world-wide formulae have been hammered 
out. Transport regulations and rates have been harnoniz~d to a cer-
tain extent and achievements in other areas have contributed to a 
cleaner, nore transparent competition . 
Moving still further , the Community exarrined the possibility of 
harIIDnizing policies directed to production and to the allocation of 
resources. Although the Rone Treaty relied on increased competition 
to re-orient the distribution of factors of production in the indi-
vidual countries, the govern ment.; ::0em ready now to stimulate the 
reorganization of production units to take advantage of the economies 
of scale . Substantial progress has been made in the replacement of 
srraller units in each country and closer contacts have developed 
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amongproducers in the EEC on a regional basis, but rrergers have been 
mostly confined to the enterprises of the same country. Integration 
moves across the frontiers have been very few, such as the associa-
tion between Agfa and Gevaert in the photographic industry . There 
are many legal and fiscal obstacles to regional rrergers. To over-
corre them, it is contemplated either that a new legal status be set 
up for regional corrpanies or that national laws be closely harmonized . 
Common industrial and energy policies are now under consideration 
which would avoid existing divergences in national practices regard-
ing access of foreign investrrents, incentives to individual sectors, 
location of plants, regional policies, coal, oil and nuclear energy 
corrpetition. Gradually, the scope of harmonized policies should 
reach out to the entire economy. 
Special rrention should be made of exchange and monetary policies . 
The absence of harmonization in this field was felt in relation to 
the comrron agricultural policy, but the chaotic situation of the in-
ternational payrrents system in recent years encouraged the Six to 
accelerate their efforts to build up a comrron rronetary system. Par-
adoxically, the crisis in the US balance of payrrents situation ham-
pered at first these efforts because the Gerrran governrrent believed 
in floating rates as a rreans to adjust to exchange fluctuations 
whereas the French governrrent refused to float the franc and intro-
duced a dual exchange market buttressed by controls on capital move-
rre:o:1ts. Eventually, the Six agreed to maintain fixed exchange rates 
between the EEC currencies and to halve the spread agreed upon in 
Washington in Decerrber last as a first step. The floating of the 
pound introduced a new hazard lately but it is expected that the 
practice will be abandoned in due time. 
So long as a ,",ew international payrrents system is not finally a-
greed upon, the tentative monetary arrangements of the EEC will re-
main vulnerable. The governrrents do not yet see eye to eye with re-
spect to the techniques to be applied to keep the system on an even 
keel and the basic problem of the relative priority of the monetary 
and of the economic policies is still unresolved ; the Gerrran govern-
n~nt sti ll feel that coordinated econorric policies should cone first 
whereas the French insist that harmonized monetary policies should 
be secured before economic policies are unified. In both cases, the 
resistance to a severe limitation of sovereignty rerrains strong. 
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The SurrITTit Conference where the Six and the three acceders dis-
cussed these broad issu8s as well as the possibility of a better co-
ordination of their foreign policies has indicated that there is a -
greerrent on the general objectives but it remains to be seen how 
rapidly the trade integration which has been successfully achieved 
will be followed by an integration of the other aspects of econorric 
life and a close coordination of non-economic policies . 
At the present juncture, it can be said that the experience of the 
EEC - and that of the EFTA leads to the sane conclusion - proves 
that the elimination of trade barriers anong neighbouring countries 
at a comparable level of developrrent and with close con.nercial ties 
leads to a rapid expansion of the foreign trade of the constituent 
parties and to a strengthening of the economic structure of these 
parties. To a sjgnificant extent, however, the trade expansion is 
hampered by the distortions resulting from the existence of independ-
ent and often conflicting policies on other matter. 
The resistance to harnonization of such policies is much greater 
than the reluctance to eliminate corr,rrercial policy obstacles . Pro-
gress has been slow even in the EEC where the governnents accepted 
the principle of comrron policies in many fields . It should not , how-
ever, be under-estimated . No doubt, such progress had been rrade 
possible by the existence of strong regional institutions which were 
able to defend the interests of the Corr.rrunity as a whole and to check 
the centrifugal tendencies of national governrrents . But the EEC, on 
the eve of its enlargerrent, is still far from being the United States 
of Europe which were contemplated sone fifteen years ago . This in-
conclusive record may explain the disappointnent of the United States 
which supported the idea of European integration as a neans of 
strengthening the political stature of Western Europe rather than 
its econorric competitiveness . 
II. The impact of the European Comnunity on world trade 
We have considered so far the advantages which the EEC nembers 
have derived from the setting up of the Comnunity and the conse-
quences for their econorries of the curtailnent of their sovereign 
rights in the field of comnercial and a few other policies. It is 
time now to exanine whether these benefits have no t been obtained 
at the expense of the rest of the world or whether t he sum total of 
advantages is sufficiently high to preserve the interests of non-EEC 
countries. 
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When the Rorne Treaty was concluded, opinions arrong economists and 
policy-rraking officials were divided regarding the probable effects 
of the proposed integration . Sorre contended that a customs union 
(or a free trade area for that natter) was nothing but a rragnified 
preferential agreement and that - as is the case for such agreements 
- the more favourable treatrrent granted to the goods from the member 
countries would have a net trade diverting effect; imports from and 
exports to the outsiders would decline, relatively if not absolute-
ly; in other words, such arrangerrents were bad for third parties. 
Others contended that this glooil¥ view was unjustified. Admittedly, 
a trade-diverting effect would take place and trade arrong the rrembers 
would increase more rapidly than trade with non-rnembers; this was 
precisely the reason why the members were prepared to accept a severe 
limitation of their sovereign rights. But things would not stop 
there; the removal of trade barriers inside the union would stimulate 
competition, bring prices down, raise the purchasing power in real 
terms of the consurrer and quicken the rate of economic growth. This 
process would have a trade-creatilliJ_effect. Increased demand would 
require additional supplies which would be met by regional producers 
but which would also involve larger imports from outside the region. 
Provided the level of protection round the union is not higher or 
rrore restrictive than before, the trade-creating effect should be 
sufficient to balance the trade-diverting effect and no adverse ef-
fect would be felt by outsiders. In other words, the benefits en-
joyed by the members would not be at the expense of other countries 
and there would be a net increase in world welfare. 
After fifteen years of experience, is it possible to determine 
which theory is correct? No final answer can be given because it is 
not possible to compare the actual situation with the situation which 
would have obtained if the Rorre Treaty had not been put into force. 
But it can at least be asserted that if the forrrer theory were cor-
rect, the trade-diverting effect would have rrodified the structure 
and destination of exports of non-EEC countries in such a way as to 
reveal diverging trends in exports to the EEC and to the rest of the 
world . Conversely, if t~xports of non-EEC countries to the Comnunity 
have in effect expanded at least at the sarre rate as exports to other 
areas, there are valid reasons to conclude that the trade-creating 
effect of European integration has been of the sarre magnitude as the 
trade-diverting effect and that the verdict could be of danage not 
proven. 
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Let us look at the export statistics of the various groups of 
ion-EEC countries: 
Table 6: Exports of non-EEC countries 
to the world and to the EEC 
(in million US dollars; fob) 
'rQ the world To the EEC 
ITncrease 1957 /71 Increase 1957/7] 
All non-EEC countries 185% 193% 
Industrial areas less EEC 208% 210% 
North Arreriea 155% 161% 
Western Europe (other 
than EEC) 194% 223% 
Japan 742% 1071% 
Developing countries 140% 173% 
Australia, New Zealand, I I 
South Africa 107% 
I 
9% 
Eastern trading area 216% 396% 
I 
I 
Source : GATT, International Trade. See also Appendix, Table 1 . 
For the world as a whole and for all main trading areas with the 
exception of the semi-industrialized countries (Australia, New Zea-
land and South Africa) and of the sub-group of developing countries 
in South and East Asia, exports to the EEC have expanded nore rapid-
ly than total exports. The difference is small in the case of the 
industrial areas taken as a whole; for North Arrerica, the rate of 
expansion for exports to the EEC has been slightly better than the 
rate recorded for total exports, in spite of the autonotive agree-
nent between the US and Canada which boosted intra-North Arrerican 
trade by several billion dollars . For Western Europe, the EEC rrarket 
has been more dynarric than others, which is natural in view of the 
proximity of such rrarket . The difference is very large in the case 
of Japan and the Eastern trading area; but as the figures of that 
trade in the late 50's were comparatively low, the data can only be 
taken as an indication of the trend . 
In the case of the developing countries , the EEC has, on the whole, 
been a more dynamic rrarket than other areas; this is easily explained 
by the greater dependence of the Comnuni ty o n irr,ports of prirrary pro-
ducts and its rapid economic growth during the period under review; 
as a result, the Third World improved its trade balance with the EEC 
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by nearly 3 billion dollars on a fob basis at a time when its bal -
ance with other industrial areas deteriorated substantially . 
However, the impact was far from uniform. The main beneficiaries 
were the Middle East in Asia because of vast increases in the supply 
of oil and petroleum products and Africa because of the steady de-
nand for ni[,erals and sorre expansion in the consunption of tropical 
products. Latin America whose total exports expanded far less than 
those of other areas cones next. Whereas in all these areas, export-
s to the EEC increased nore than total exports, the reverse was true 
for the countries in South and East Asia. 
In the case of that area, the dissymnetry between the two flows 
of trade resulted from the action of a nurrber of factors apart from 
the setting up of the EEC . The EEC was never an irrportant outlet 
for the products of that area; during the period under review, North 
America and Japan became eager purchasers of prirrary and manufactur-
ed products of that region, and the Eastern trading area also con-
Table 7: Exports of developing areas 
~o the world and to the EEC 
(in rrillion US dollars, fob) 
to the World 
1960 1971 Increase 
Total developing 
countries 27,490 61,140 122% 6, 225 15,260 145% 
Middle East in 
Asia 4, 240 13,500 218% 1, 280 4,300 235% 
Africa 5,390 13, 410 148% 2,320 6,000 158% 
Latin America 8, 610 15,250 77¥; 1,580 3,045 92% 
South and East 
Asia 7, 670 16, 040 109% 845 1, 550 83% 
Source: GATT, loc.cit 
Table 8: Trends of eXPorts of South and East Asia 
in the period 1960/71 
(increase 1960/71 in percentages 1960=100) 
~~~~~~~-. 
Total Indust- North EEC EFTA Japan Develop-
Eastern Australia, 
rializ- America ing trading New Zeal., 
ed area areas area s. Africa 
109% 141% 226% 83% 21% 247% 74% 112% 50% 
Source: GATT loc. cit. 
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eluded large contracts with sone countries in Asia; on the other hand , 
trade with all the other markets such as the UK and other EFTA count-
ries, the group of semi-industrialized countries and the developing 
areas expanded even more slowly than trade with the EEC. 
The only group of countries whose exports to the EEC were practi-
cally stagnant during the 60's corrprises the three serr~-industrializ­
ed countries of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. As these 
countries are mainly exporters of agricultural products, the first 
explanation which corres to the mind is that the Comrron Agricultural 
Policy of the EEC slowed down purchases of foodstuffs from these coun-
tries. There is no doubt that the lack of corrpetition between the 
EEC agricultural producers reduced to a minimum the trade-creating 
effect of integration in that sector; but the effect of that policy 
in the case of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa seems to have 
been negligible . Before the EEC was set up, these countries exported 
marginal guantities of foodstuffs to the EEC, their rrain exports be-
ing wool and ores and non-ferrous metals which are practically duty-
free . As in the case of Asian countries, there has been a striking 
re-orientation of the export trade of that group towards Japan, the 
developing areas and North Anerica; sales to EFTA were a shade rrore 
sticky than sales to the EEC . 
Table 9: Exports of Australia, New Zealand 
and South Africa. 1960/71 
(increase 1960/71; 1960=100) 
Total Indust- North EEC EFTA Japan Develop- Australia Eastern 
rial America ing New Zeal. trading 
area areas S . Africa area 
115% 101% 166% 44% 26% 360% 192% 141% 28% 
Source : GATT, loc.cit. 
From the foregoing analysis can be drawn the conclusion that, on 
the whole, the trade-creating effect of the EEC has been sufficient 
to make-up for the trade-diverting effect which speeded up the intra-
regional rroverrent of goods; the main beneficiaries of the rapid eco-
norric growth of the Community have been rrost developing countries, 
European trading partners and Japan whose exports expanded signifi-
cantly; the other countries held rrore or less their ground . It 
should be rrentioned in this connection that the Comrron External Tar-
iff - and therefore the margins of preference enjoyed by EEC expor~­
ers - was greatly reduced as a result of the Dillon and Kennedy 
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Rounds of negotiations under the auspices of the GATT and that such 
concessions mitigated the trade-diverting effect. 
Although the misgivings of non-EEC countries centered nainly around 
t h e differential treatrrent accorded to the exports of outsiders, the 
EEC brought about other changes in the balance of economic forces . 
A better allocation of resources and , in the agricultural sector, a 
greater readiness to support exports of foodstuffs have increased the 
aggressiveness of EEC exporters . The Comrrunity has captured a bigger 
share of world rrarkets (from 23% to 28 % in the 60' s) 4 and rroved from 
a slight deficit in its balance of trade in 1957 to a surplus of rrore 
t han 5 billion US dollars in 1971 . The improveme nt is remarkable , 
though far less spectacular than in the case of Japan and is rrore 
significant on the European narket than for trade with other regions . 
While the EEC enjoys a J:iefty surplus in Western Europe and exports 
rrore to Eastern Europe than it imports from it, it is still in the 
red with North Arreric a ; except in 1968 and 1971, the deficit ranged 
from one to two billion dollars, on a fob basis; the deficit with 
Japan is also sizeable and we have seen that EEC imports from deve-
loping areas, largely on account of increased energy requirements, 
substantially exceed its exports. 
Table 10: Trade balance of the EEC with its partners in 1971 
(in million US dollars, fob) 
N. America Japan Developing countries 
Advers e with -740 - 700 - 2,570 
Other Eastern Australia, 
W.Europe trading New Zealand Total 
area & s . Africa 
Positive with + 7,560 + 270 + 680 + 5,220 
Source : GATT,loc . cit. 
Trading nations have still other worries with the EEC; they sorre-
times conplain that the administrative set-up is too rigid as a re-
sult of the unanimity rule which is strictly applied when instruc·-
tions have to be given to ~EC negotiators and that the division of 
powers between the Conrrission responsible for tariff natters and the 
individual governments which decide on other natters seriously com-
plicates the process of discussion with the Comrrunity . The bureau-
4 
OECD, lac . cit ., Taole 3, Page 140. 
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cratic structure is indeed formidable in Brussels , but EEC negotia-
tors claim that similar difficulties are faced in other capitals 
such as Moscow and Washington where differences of opinion between 
departrrents may be as frustrating as divergences between individual 
EEC govern rren ts . 
Another source of corrplaint which shall be considered later is 
the tendency of the Corr.nunity to expand along unethical lines 
through preferential agreements and to build up around the Customs 
Union a new trading system which would discard the time-honoured 
principle of the unqualified most-favoured-nation. 
Finally, sorre fear that the economic strength of the EEC may en-
courage the adoption by its Members of policies stressing their in-
dependence vis-a-vis the big powers . Neither Washington nor Moscow 
relishes the prospect of a Third Force which raises its ugly head 
from time to time and which could eventually be far more damaging 
than any foreseeable impact on trade flows . 
III . The enlargerrent of the EEC and its possible effects on the eco-
nomic interests of the Pacific area 
Ever since the EEC was set up, the other West European countries 
tried to work out some form of association with the EEC which 
would provide them with the benefits of free trade in manufactured 
goods but would avoid the broader commitments involved in the Rome 
Treaty. When the Six flatly refused to consider the Maudling scheme 
or any similar formlla, most of these countries retrieved the main 
elements of the European Free Trade project of the United Kingdom 
and organized, among themselves, the EFTA which was considered more 
as a pressure group or a bargaining counter than as a perrranent in-
stitution . Eventually, when the mountain showed no inclinatio n to 
move to Mohammed, Mohammed went to the mountain. The British govern-
rrent, followed by Denmark, Norway and Ireland decided to accede to 
the Rome Treaty; they will become full rrembers in January 1973 
with the exception of Norway whose public opinion was frightened by 
the autocratic (or rather bureaucratic) image of the EEC instituions 
as well as by increased competition from farmers and fishermen of 
other EEC countries . 
For various reasons, mainly political, the other members of EFTA 
were not prepared to accept the terms of accession a nd they negoti-
ated agreements which are very similar to the free trade arrange-
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rrents of the Stock.holm Convention . Thus enlarged, the EEC group 
covers the bulk of Western Europe. When the special agreements which 
have been concluded earlier or which are contemplated with members 
of the British Con.nonwealth are taken into account, the influence of 
the enlarged EEC may reach the whole of Wes tern Europe, the Medi ter-
ranean Basin, a large slice of Africa, part of Asia, the Caribbean 
area and part of the Pacific islands. 
Leaving aside the political implications of this unprecedented 
redeploynent of forces, the countries remaining outside of the group 
rr~y fear a profound upsetting of the world economic and comrrercial 
structure. For them, the enlargement of the Comnuni ty is a shot in 
the dark. The giant may become stronger but it may also acquire 
feet of clay. No doubt, the newcorrers may influence the policies of 
the Corr.nunity in the right direction or soften sorre of the more ob-
noxious features of the institution, such as the Comrron Agricultural 
Policy and the French government was at times shuddering at the 
thought that the United Kingdon, might prove a modern Trojan horse 
teleguided fromWashington . It seems that these fears were exagger-
ated and that, for the time being, Whitehall shows the ardent faith 
of the newly-converted in the European creed. It is clear, however, 
that while the team is larger it will be rrore difficult to keep in 
line. 
Addressing ourselves now to the more pedestrian task of assess-
ing the possible impact of the enlargement of the EEC on the trade 
interests of countries in the Pacific area, we shall be guided by 
the lessons of the experience gained with the original Comnunity of 
Six. It seems fairly well established that regional integration un-
leashes two sets of conflicting forces: a trade-diverting element 
resulting from the preferential treatrrent accorded to the exports of 
the partners and a trade-creating elerrent generated by the quicken-· 
ing of the pace of economic growth which is caused by the removal of 
internal barriers and the increased corrpetition inside the area. If 
the former element is stronger than the latter, the group will be 
inward-looking and degenerate into a closed bloc; if the latter is 
at least as strong as the former, the export interests of outsiders 
will not adversely affected and the integration will have a positive 
effect on world welfare. 
It would appear that, so far at least, the trade-creating and 
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trade-diverting effects of the EEC have been 11icely balanced . This 
rray be due, to a certain extent, to some special factors . The Oil-· 
lon and Kennedy Rounds have greatly checked the trade-diverting tre-
nds and the inflationary atrrosphere of recent years has re-inforced 
the trade - creating undercurrents. Moreover, there are significant 
differences between the former project and the present one . 
In the late fifties, trade with Europe was still hampered by many 
obstacles : tariffs were high in several countries and import con·· 
trols against non-European suppliers were still numerous . Concur-
rently with European integration, trade with other continents made 
continous progress; rrany foreign manufactured goods , especially con-
sumer goods, became freely available to the European consumer or pro-
ducer . Things have changed and there is very little pent-up demand 
for such products; IIDreover, the Cornnunity producers are better equi-
pped to rreet foreign competition and they enjoy a sufficient elasti-
city of production to satisfy a growing demand. It would be safe to 
discount somewhat the positive impact of increased growth on the pro-
pensity to import as compared with recent experience . 
On the other hand, there are some bright points . The alignrrent 
of the 3ritish tariff will lead to a significant lowering of its in-
cidence for non-Commonwealth countries and the disadvantage of Com-
rronwealth preferences for such suppliers will be reduced in many in-
stances . Conversely, the countries enjoying such preferences will 
lose their privileges and find continued access to the British mar-
ket far IIDre difficult than before . Of course, many of the smaller 
ComIIDnwealth developing countries will have the opportunity of nego-
tiating special agreements ' with the enlarged Comnunity; all British 
dependent territories, with the exception of Gibraltar and Hong-kong 
will be offered association under the terms of Part IV of the Treaty 
of Rome; the independent Comrronwealth developing countrie s in Africa, 
the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific will be able to 
choose between association under a renewed Yaounde Convention, sorre 
other form of association (without development aid) or the conclu-
sion of a commercial agreement. 
Apart from the offer to negotiate such agreem0nts and the promise 
to exanine with the Comrronwealth countries concerned any trade pro-
blems which might arise, the only specific safeguards which were se-
cured from the EEC relate to the Comrronwealth sugar agreement and to 
the exports of dairy products by New Zealand . Australia and Canada 
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had to be content with minor concessions affecting lead, wood pro-
ducts and phosphorus . 
The main question-mark, however, is whether accession to the Euro-
pean Comrrunity shoul d revigorate the British economy. This is the 
chief objective of the UK governrrent and there are valid reasons to 
believe that this aim could be achieved . The EFTA arrangements did 
not provide the necessary nedicine to British anoemia; indeed, ex-
ports to Western Europe increased but the EFTA markets were in any 
case limited and with a few exceptions, competition from their part-
ners did not force the British producers to proceed to the necessary 
shake-up. This time, the medicine will be stronger and there are 
signs that British industrialists will meet the challenge . Moreover, 
the entry of the United Kindom into the Comrrunity involves a drastic 
reorientation of British trade . Until now, the United Kingdom was 
less dependent on European markets than its partners and this spe-
cial situation cannot persist in the new environment. Of course, 
the process has already started and accession to the EEC only rreans 
that it will be accelerated; but the impact of such a re-orientation 
of traditional trade flows may be one of the most conspicuous conse-
quences of the enlargement of the European Comrrunity. 
Problems arising out of greater European integration for indivi-
dual countries of the Pacific ar~ 
For the sake of convenience, we shall consider separately the 
case of the developing countries in the area, Australia and New Zea-
land, Japan, China, Canada and the United States 
Developing countries The exports of the developing countries in 
the Pacific area and its hinterland (ranging from Burrra to Fiji) to 
the enlarged EEC amounted to a little less than 2 billion US dollars 
(on a cif basis) in 1970; the Six absorbed 1,238 millions, the Uni-. 
ted Kingdom 604 millions, Denmark 45 and Ireland 10. Whereas the 
British purchases cane predominantly from Comrronwealth suppliers, 
the EEC bought a little more from non-Commonwealth countries. The 
proportion of manufactured goods imported by the UK was greater 
than that of the EEC purchases, but this was mostly accounted for by 
imports from Hong-kong . As in the case of other trade flows, sales 
to the EEC increased rrore than sales to the United Kingdom (by 160 % 
against 84% during the period 1958/70 ) . With the exception of Indo-
china and, since 1965, of Burma and Indonesia, all c~untries and 
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territories shared in the expansion of trade with the EEC , whereas 
exports to UK increased mainly from Hong-kong . 
The EEC as well as the United Kingdom bought raw materials (rub-
ber, jute, wood , oilseeds, tin) , foodstuffs such as vegetables from 
Thailand and Indonesia, roots and tubers from Taiwan , feeding stuffs 
and tropical beverages (coffee for the EEC and tea for the UK) . The 
major imports of :manufactures relate to cotton fabrics, clothing , 
toys, telecom!Til.lnication and other electric equipment, footwear and 
processed :materials such as vegetable oils, wood shaped and veneer.
5 
The enlargement of the EEC is unlikely to check the recent ex-
pansion of exports to the Six, especially if the generalized prefer-
ence scheme continues to operate and the markets of Denmark and Ire-
land are likely to follow the same trends as those of the Six. The 
situation, however , may be different in the case of the United King-
dorr.. The non-Comrronwealth countries which so far have had only a 
toehold on this market may well expand their sales in the absence of 
the existing Comrronwealth preferences . On the other hand , the Com-
monwealth countries, and in particular Hong- kong are likely to 
suffer from the accession of the UK. Admittedly, Hong-kong will be 
eligible for the EEC preferential regime and the UK will probably 
see to it that tariff quotas for sensitive items will be enlarged 
so as to :maintain the present flow of goods; on the other hand , the 
EEC system will be more restrictive than the controls now in force 
in Britain and the other rrembers of the Community will be reluctant 
to let them in by the back-door . This may, to a lesser degree, ap-
ply to Singapore . Fiji's interests as a sugar exporter are covered 
until the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement comes to an end and are like-
ly to be duly taken into account thereafter . The other developing 
Commonwealth countries would benefit from the more rapid growth of 
the British economy which is expected to result from accession . 
Asutralia and New Zealand It was always assumed that Australia 
and New Zealand would be seriously affected by the entry of Britain 
in the Comnon Market. In 1970, Australia exported sligtly nore t o 
the UK than to the EEC and New Zealand exported three times as much 
to the former than to the latter . The bulk of New Zealand ' s exports 
to the UK is made up of meat and d airy products which corre under the 
Comnon Agricultural Policy . Although Austr a lia de pe nds less on ex-
ports of agricultural products, it r emains a maj o r exporter of wheat, 
SS . • ee Appendix, Table II. 
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meat, sugar and fruit to the British market . For both countries, the 
EEC has never provided significant outlets for the export of food-
stuffs, before or after the conclusion of the Rome Treaty . Exports 
to Denmark and Ireland are insignificant (10 and 15 million dollars 
in 1970). 
Table 11: Trade of Australia with the EEC and the UK 
(in million US dollars, cif basis) 
E~orts to EEC fll( 
1958 1970 19SR 
Total 382 567 569 
of which: 
Wool 284 253 175 
Hides and skins 39 69 
Ores n.ferrous 
metals 12 49 I ..., I 
Iron ore - 38 
Cr:ipper 4 30 
Lead, zinc, nickel 2 16 23 
Foodstuffs 22 38 299 
of which 
Meat & prep. 1 3 132 
Butter I - - I 33 
Wheat, barley 14 19 20 
Fruit 7 16 72 
Sugar and honey - - 34 
-
Source: OECD, EEC and UN .import statistics 
i g7n 
622 
63 
34 
87 
327 
69 
47 
92 
66 
44 
During the period 1958/70, Australian e xports to the EEC expanded 
only rroderately, though more than salea to the United Kingdom. Wool 
is still the main export item to the EEC, but its share declined as 
compared with other !l\3.terials, especially ores and non-ferrous metal-
s; foodstuffs remained at a very low level. In the case of the UK, 
sales of wool have contracted substantially; foodstuffs account for 
about the sane values as in 195 8 , even though the cowposition of such 
exports has changed; ores and metals have expanded as in the case of 
the EEC . 
To offset the shrinking of its outlets in the United Kingdom -
and in Western Europe as a whole - Australia looked for other rrar-
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kets and it has already succeeding in diversifying its e~ort trade 
as other semi-industrialized areas (See Table 9, page 16 above). 
Table 12: Trade of New Zealand with the F.F.C and UK 
(in million US dollars, cif basis) 
E~orts to: EEC UK 
1958 1970 1958 1970 
Total 118 153 453 488 
of which: 
Wool 93 90 94 52 
Hides 11 25 5 11 
Chemical products 1 12 3 3 
Meat and Prep. 2 11 170 224 
Butter 109 111 
Cheese 1 - 41 39 
Fruit 6 10 
I 
Source: OECD, EEC, UN import statistics . 
I 
During the early 60's New Zealand's e~orts to the EEC and to the 
UK had increased substantially, but after 1965 they have come down to 
a level close to the 1958 figure; the decline of wool e~orts to the 
UK, however, has been continuous during the whole period. The EEC 
purchases nainly wool, hides and chemical elements; purchases of the 
staple New Zealand agricultural products are negligible. The situ-
ation is very different in the case of the United Kingdom which buys 
nainly meat and dairy products. Dairy products still account for 15 
per cent of New Zealand's e~orts, and 85 per cent of these products 
are sent to Britain. The loss of the preferences and the applica-
tion of the Comrron Agricultural Policy by the enlarged Comnunity 
could involve serious losses for New Zealand. To prevent such an 
adverse effect, special arrangements have been negotiated between UK 
and the EEC which provide at least a valuable breathing space. For 
cheddar cheese which does not compete directly with EEC production, 
the quantities for which a market in the UK is guaranteed will be 
gradually brought down to 20 percent of the present level; for but-
ter, the reduction will be smoother, by 4 percent each year to a 
level of 80 percent after five years . In terms of milk equivalent, 
the total reduction will be of about 30 percent, but returns per 
unit should be more attractive as the guaranteed price will be high-
er than the average of recnt years . So far as lamb is concerned, 
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the 20 percent tariff which will be introduced gradually is not con-
sidered to be a serious obstacle . 
Other commitments and promises have been made to ensure that New 
Zealana's interests would be duly taken into account by the enlarged 
Comnunity. New Zealand whose trade with Western Europe as a whole 
remained rrore or less stagnant during the period under review will 
probably continue to maintain its exports at the present level and 
will therefore have to speed up its policy of diversification of 
markets to reach a reasonable rate of expansion . 
Australia did not obtain any special treatment for its exports 
with the exception of small tariff adjustments for some metals and 
it cannot expect any advantage for its sugar after the Comnonwealth 
Sugar Agreement comes to an end . The loss of preferences is, how-
ever, less dramatic than in the case of New Zealand . The share of 
the UK market in Australia's exports has already gone down to 12 per-
cent and sales to London of Australian wheat, sugar and dairy pro-
ducts c o mprise only 1 per cent of total Australian exports. Meat 
should not raise any serious problem and the booming trade in miner-
als will not be affected. If the rate of production in industrial 
countries continues to grow rapidly, Australia should not suffer 
serious damages as a result of the enlargement of the EEC, but it 
will have to pursue the re-orientation of its foreign trade which is 
already well advanced and look more and rrore in the direction of its 
Pacific neighbours . 
Japan The position of Japan is fundamentally .different from 
that of other industrial countries; the trends of its foreign 
trade were far rrore influenced by internal than by external factors , 
at least until August 1971. Its exports, propelled by a spectacular 
expansion in industrial production, increased at a breath-taking 
pace in all directions ; but the most rapid growth was certainly to 
the EEC (nore than ten times, against an avera ge of seven times). 
The Comnunity which absorbed a little more Japanese goods than the 
United Kindom in 1958 now buys three times more than Britain . Japa-
nese exports to Denmark and Ireland have also expanded substantially 
and anounted in 1970 to 79 and 15 million dollars, respectively. 
The structure of Japanese exports to the EEC and to the UK is 
very similar - and this applies also to exports to other acceders -
but it differs substantially from that of exports to North America; 
I 
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Table 13: Trade of Japan with the EEC and the UK 
(in million US dollars, cif basis) 
Exports to: EEC UK 
1958 1970 1958 1970 
Total 116 1,232 99 317 
of which: 
Fish prepar. 12 58 54 43 
Chemicals 4 47 1 14 
Plastic mat. 37 - 22 
Textile yarns 
and fabrics 23 40 9 10 
Iron and steel 4 175 - 10 
Off ice machines 56 - 15 
Machinery 1 97 - 19 
Telecomrnun. equip . 1 68 - 16 
Electric. ma.chin. I 2 63 - 17 I 
Road rrotor vehicles 53 - 13 
Clothing 4 22 1 5 
Scient. instr. 3 88 - 17 
Musical instr. 
I 
44 - 9 
I Toys and garres. 4 33 - 5 
Source: EEC, OECD and UN import statistics. 
the only main difference between the EEC and the UK concerns iron 
and steel products which represented by far the main EEC import item 
in 1970 and were not of real importance for the UK. Textiles and 
clothing play a minor role as a result of restrictions; new items 
such as plastic materials, office machines made their appearance in 
the 60's whereas scientific instruments (including photographic 
material) and musical instruments are expanding rapidly; machinery 
and electrical equipment have become major export items . 
Is it likely that the enlargement of the EEC will slow down the 
progress of Japanese trade? Apart from fish, all the products ex-
ported are manufactured goods; the tariff advantages wihch European 
producers will enjoy on the enlarged EEC market are not likely to 
blunt the competitive edge of Japanese exporters who have been able 
so far to overcome the protection accorded to the local industria-
lists on their domestic or regional market . The only moot point 
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concerns the "sensitive" items which are subject to import o r ex-
port contols . The degree of restriction in the EEC and in the acced-
ers is not very different and it is probable that the actual situa-
tion will remain unchanged, with or without enlargement of the Com-
munity . In this connection, much will depend on the import policy 
of Japan . European countries complain that a reasonable balance can 
only be restored if Japan increases its imports of manufactured con-
sumer and capital goods . The shares of manufactured consumer goods 
(Sections 6 and 8 of SITC) and of capital goods (Section 7) account 
for 37 and 14 per cent of total US imports; 31 per cent ant 22 per 
cent of EEC purchases, 28 per cent and 17 per cent of British im-
ports; the corresponding figures are 35 and 28 per cent for Denmark 
and 31 and 27 per cent for Ireland . The differences correspond 
either to the lower development level and the smaller size of Den-
mark and Ireland or to the inflationary trends in the US or to the 
relative economic stagnation which influenced industrial investments 
in the United Kingdom. The structure of Japanese imports is very 
different: manufactured goods represent only 18 per cent of imports 
for Sections 6 and 8 and 11 per cent for Section 7; even when the 
very high share of raw materials and the improvement achieved recent-
ly are taken into account the outlets for foreign manufactures are 
still narrow in Japan . It will be difficult for European govern-
ments to relax significantly their present restrictions unless they 
can see the outlets for their manufactures in Japan improve substan-
tially. 
On the other hand , Japan would be anong the major beneficiaries 
of any stimulation of economic growth which would result from the 
enlargement of the EEC. Its main e xport items enjoy a high income-
elasticity of demand, whether they are addressed to the final con-
sumer or the industrialist. 
China Exports of Mainland China remain small; in 1970, sales to 
the EEC were of the order of a quarter billion dollars - about as 
much as those of Hong-kong; those to the United Kingdom reached a 
figure of about 70 million - four times less than those of Hong-kong 
and exports to Denmark and Ireland were marginal. That trade flow 
does not seem to be much influenced by the EEC arrangements; China's 
sales to the Comnunity expanded significantly whereas its exports to 
the UK remained stagnant . The structure of such sales is similar 
for all European destinations : the larger share is taken by raw 
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materials; then a few consurrer goods such as textiles (fabrics and 
carpets) and clothing; the balance is composed of foodstuffs (neat , 
cereals, tea , fruit, fish) , vegetable oils and crude chemical pro-
ducts. 
The future of Chinese trade with Western Europe will depend more 
on the evolution of broad economic and political relations than on 
comrrercial policy rreasures on the part of the enlarged EEC. Indeed 
few of the main Chinese export items are vulnerable to competition 
from European producers. 
Canada As a member of the British Comnonwealth, Canada has a big 
stake in the British market. Although Canadian exports to Britain 
have been sluggish during the period under review, they still ac-
counted in 1970 for more than one and a half billion US dollars, 
aboutone-fourthmore than exports to the EEC; Britain spent in that 
year roughly the sarre amounts in Canada and United States to pur-
chase consurrer goods whereas t:1e EEC spent nearly three times more 
in the US than in Canada. It was of course more advantageous for 
Arrerican firms to sell to Britain through their Canadian subsidiaries 
but, in addition, the bulk of these sales concerned processed local 
materials such as paper and non-ferrous metals. 
From 1958 to 1970, purchases by the EEC from Canada increased 
nore rapidly than those by the UK, in spite of integration, and from 
1965, far more rapidly than its purchases from the US (by 113 per 
cent against 59 per cent). 
If we leave on one side for a morrent trade with Denmark and Ire-
land which absorbed in 1970 respectively 23 and 25 million US dol l ars 
thinly spread over cereals, paper, non-ferrous rretals, wood and fish, 
Canada exports to Western Europe mainly primary products and pro-
cessed goods such as non-ferrous metals and paper, which account f o r 
75-80 per cent of the EEC and UK imports from Canada . The share of 
rretallic ores and rretals has become much larger than that of wood, 
pulp and paper, on the one hand, and of foodstuffs, on the other, 
which are about equal in size in both cases . The share of machinery 
and transport equipment remains small, except for certain deliveries 
of aircraft equipment to the EEC in 1970. 
Exports to the United Kingdom have suffered the sane erosion as 
those of Australia and New Zealand in so far as foodstuffs are con-
cerned; in spite of the substantial increase recorded for ores and 
rretals, the UK only absorbs 9 per cent of Canadian total exports, 
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Exports 
Ta b le 1 4 : Trade o f Canada with the EEC and the UK 
(in mill i on US dollars , cif basis) 
to : EEC UK 
1958 1970 1958 1970 
Total 42 7 1 , 260 864 1 , 593 
Section 0 120 206 312 262 
of which : 
Cereals 113 176 268 168 
Section 1 
(Bev . & tob . ) 2 1 16 40 
Section 2 
(Raw naterials) 146 588 235 436 
of which : 
Wood & pulp 16 195 91 162 
Min . ores 51 132 76 216 
Section 6 & 8 138 300 250 642 
of which : I I 
Po3.per 4 24 68 116 
Non-ferr . met . 71 192 165 398 
Section 7 
(Machinery) 9 126 11 92 
Non-el-nach . 5 35 7 45 
el. nach . 
Aircraft equ . l 3 72 I 2 38 
Source : OECD , EEC and UN import statistics. 
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against 17 per cent in 1960 . The loss of preferences is however not 
so dramatic as might be assumed on the basis of aggregate trade fig-
ures . Nearly one - third of UK ' s purchases of Canadian goods will re-
nain duty-free and special arrangements will maintain a reasonable 
flow of trade at low or zero duty, either indefinitely or for some 
years to come , for major items such as newsprint, plywood, wood pulp, 
phosphorus and aluminium. In the case of cereals exports to Britain 
have already declined substantially and it is likely, as surmised by 
the British gov ernment, that the remaining hard core , i . e . hard 
wheat and malting barley obtained from Canada will not be displaced 
by EEC supplies; this assumption is borne out by the experience gain-
ed so far in the Community. 
Even though less than 10 per cent of Canadian exports go to the 
UK, this flow of trade is worth one and a half billion dollars as 
pointed out earlier , and, in spite of the energetic efforts of the 
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Canadian government to look for other outlets in Latin America, in 
Asia and even in Comnunist countries, alternative outlets are not so 
easy to find if one does not want to be too dependent on the US mar-
ket. 
United States Before examining the possible effects of the en-
largement of the EEC on the trade interests of the US, it is neces-
sary to get the facts straight concerning the impact of the original 
EEC on US exports and imports. According to the High-level OECD 
group, the compound annual rate of growth of US exports to the EEC 
during the period 1960/70, was sl i ghtly higher than the rate for 
total exports (7 . 8% compared with 7.6%) while the rate for EEC ex-
ports to the US and to the world was exactly the sane (11 . 5%); but 
US imports from the EEC increased less than tl,ose from Canada or 
Japan. As regards US exports of agricultural products, the annual 
growth rate from 1960-62 to 1968- 70 was 5 . 1 percent to the EEC and 
4 . 9 percent to the world, so that the EEC absorbed in 1970 a little 
more than 23 percent of total US exports of agricultural products, 
i.e. the same share as in 1960 . On a fob basis, the trade deficit 
of the EEC with North America (essentially with the United States) 
exceeded one billion dollars each year except in 1968 and 1971 and 
reached a figure of more than 2 billions in 1970. To this deficit 
should be added the growing outflow of direct investment income 
which, on the basis of a 20 percent share in total US direct invest-
ments abroad in 1970, was probably of the magnitude of 1.2 billion 
dollars in that year . 
The picture is different in the case of the UK (and EFTA as a 
whole) . The rate of growth of US exports to those countries during 
the 60's was below average (5 . 9% as compared with 7 . 6%) while ex-
ports of EFTA to the US increased rrore rapidly than exports t o other 
destinations, but US imports from that area expanded less than those 
from other areas. The difference is still rrore striking in the case 
of agricultural trade : US exports of such products to the EFTA in-
creased only at the rate of 1 % of a year, much less than US imports 
of such products from EFTA. Tl te trade deficit of the EFTA with 
North America declined substantially since 1964 and exceeded the 
billion nark only in 197~; trade was balanced in 1971 . Moreover, 
the outflow of investment income was less important - about two-
thirds of the EEC figure in 1970, as US direct inve ,; tnent in the UK 
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Table 15 : Trade of the US with the EEC and the UK 
(in million US dollars, cif basis) 
E E C U K 
1958 1965 1970 1958 1965 
Total 2,803 5,688 9,035 988 1,886 
section 0 
(Foodstuffs) 317 955 1,093 221 297 
of which : 
Cereals 206 602 580 154 169 
Fruits, veg . 52 108 112 27 50 
Feedstuffs 68 152 309 
Tobacco 9 123 130 132 96 
section 2 
(Crude materials) 657 863 1,386 179 175 
of which: 
Oilseeds 89 271 500 2 20 
Pulp 31 76 166 22 32 
Wood shaped 13 67 92 
Cotton I 277 110 28 I 97 25 
Crude miner . 3i.1 84 141 
Metal . ores & scrap 114 98 285 28 22 
Section 3 
(Fuels) 529 343 368 55 29 
of which : 
Coal & coke 455 178 276 
Section 5 
(Chemicals) I 250 554 998 I 76 201 of which: 
Elements 106 295 498 29 75 
Med. pharm. 34 109 81 
Plastics 88 180 57 
Sections 6 & 8 
(Manufact. consurrer 
goods) 331 862 1,724 169 457 
of which : 
Paper 13 76 161 21 45 
Iron & steel 51 334 21 
Non-ferrous metals 163 238 378 99 118 
Scient. inst. 
phot . equipments 33 133 263 10 63 
Section 7 
(Machines & transport 
equipment) 549 1,396 2,950 146 558 
of which: 
Non-elect. m. 298 745 1,498 108 355 
(Off. machines) 28 124 468 75 
Electr. machines 87 332 752 22 136 
Transport equip. 164 318 700 15 67 
(Aircraft) 109 228 570 - 29 
Source : OECD , EEC and UN import statistics. 
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1970 
2,754 
2911 
166 
46 
136 
198 
26 
58 
4 
46 
25 
265 
99 
71 
666 
57 
117 
85 
110 
1,132 
674 
270 
259 
199 
167 
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which was of the same magnitude as investrrent in the EEC in the late 
fifties increased less rapidly in the sixties .
6 
To assess future trends, a rrore detailed analysis of the trade in 
the main categories of products is necessary. 
Generally speaking, US exports to the EEC have been more influ-
enced by broad factors affecting the US export trade as a whole than 
by special features of the European integration process; on the other 
hand, the slow economic growth of the United Kingdom during the peri-
od under review played a major role in the evolution of US exports 
to that country . 
Firstly, there is a striking similarity between the rate of grow-
th of the main categories of US exports destined for the EEC and for 
the rest of the world, i .e. less than average for agricultural pro-
ducts, about average for raw materials, and much higher than average 
for manufactured goods, especially for capital goods . 
In addition , the structure of EEC imports frc1rn the US is also 
very similar to that of total EEC imports (including intra-EEC 
Table 16 : Growth of US exports to the EEC and 
to the world bv bro a d cateaor1es 
EEC World An:ra.ual rate 
(1958 - 1970,cif) (1960-70,fob) of growth of 
TT C: exnorts 
Total 222 % 109% 7 . 6% 
of which : • 
Section 0 
+ 22+263 
( agric . prod . ) 137 % 49 % 4.0% 
SeQ:tiQn 2 
- 22-263 
(crude materials) 195 % 92% 7.3% 
SeQ:tiQns 6 & 8 
( consurrer goods) 521 % 104 % 
Section 7 
) 8 . 7% 
(capital goods) 438 % 154 % 
Source: Import statistics and GATT;Tre nds in US merchandise 
trade . 
6
The data and figure quoted in the last two paragraphs are taken or 
derived from OECD , Policy persEectives , etc. Tables SA, 17 and 23 
and GATT, Trends in United States Merchandise Trade 1953- 1970, 
Geneva July 1972; Table 16 and 17). 
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trade); primary products account respectively for 27 and 25 per cent 
and manufactures for 52 and 53 per cent of the total, although the 
share of machinery and transport is higher for US products (33 per 
cent against 22 per cent); the main difference relates to fuels for 
which imports from the US are much smaller . The pattern of UK im-
ports from the US differs far rrore from that of its total imports : 
primary products play a much rrore reduced role (18 per cent as com-
pared with 35 per cent and , in the sector of manufactures, the share 
of capital goods in total is much larger for the US ( 4 0 per cent: 
against 17 per cent) whereas there is very little difference for con-
sumer goods (24 per cent against 28 per cent) . 
US exports to Denmark and Ireland arrounted to 122 and 37 million 
dollars respectively in 1958 (on a cif basis) and reached the levels 
of 327 and 110 in 1970; the increase was slower than in the case of 
the EEC; as a result, the share of these countries in US exports de-
clined during the 60's as for other Western Europe as a whole though 
less than that of the UK, which dropped from 7 . 2 per cent to 5 . 9 per 
cent whereas the importance of the Six for US export trade increased 
slightly from 19.3 per cent to 19 . 5 per cent . 7 
The probabl~~!~cts of the enlargement of the EEC on US trade 
In view of the structure of US exports, the impact of the enlarge-
nent will be different in the various sectors. The sector of capi -
tal goods will probably be least affected in view of the comparative 
advantage enjoyed by US producers in industries which rely to a 
large extent either on research or on economy of scale, unless multi-
national companies substantially increase the rate of transfer of 
producing facilities from North America to Western Europe ; however , 
the pooling of resources in sane sectors such as tra:,sport equipment 
may stimulate a shift to European producers. The consumer goods sec-
tor is more vulnerable, although a large part of the trade with the 
US is related to metals (mainly non-ferrous metals) which will not 
meet a more aggressive competition in the enlarged EEC market, 
with the exception of larger supplies from Norway (if that country 
concludes an association agreement with the group) . The imports of 
chemical products from the US have expanded continuously in all 
countries (EEC, UK, Denmark and Ireland), especially with respect to 
plastics; the trend will probably continue except perhaps in the 
case of pharmaceutical products where British a:id Continental pro-
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ducers are competitive; it should, however , be pointed out that the 
production of such items is largely in the hands of multinational 
companies which have already set up production facilities in the con-
sumer countries of Western Europe to cope with national regulations . 
In the field of raw materials, the UK does not buy rruch more now 
than in the late fifties; on the other hand, the Six and the other 
acceders have more than doubled their purchases from the us. For 
non-agricultural materials, there is very little competition with 
EEC producers, and in any case, these imports usually enter duty-
free. For fuels, the only sizeable item is coal and coke; it is not 
very likely that Britain could displace the remaining EEC imports of 
US coal and petroleum products are of secondary importance . The 
main factor affecting materials and fuels will probably be the rate 
of growth in the enlarged EEC and, especially in the United Kingdom. 
The situation is nore difficult to assess in the case of US agri-
cultural exports. The impact of the EEC on such exports has been 
much less adverse than is sometimes stated. It has already been 
noted that the rate of growth of US exports of agricultural products 
to the EEC over the period under review was slightly higher than 
that for total exports and that the EEC accounts for the same share 
as in 1958. The parallelism is also apparent in the moves up and 
down: an expansion until 1966, then a recession until 1969 and a re-
covery in 1970; the magnitude of the swings is about the same in 
both cases. 
The same applies for individual products . The following table 
shows the trends for the main items during the 60's; with few excep-
tion, the moves were similar and make it difficult to detect the cor-
relation between the variable levies and the trade flows which is 
often considered as of overwhelming importance . It is true that 
oilseeds and cakes have fared better·than other items and that they 
are not subject to variable levies, but US exports of cereals which 
are subject to levies have expanded more in the trade with the EEC 
than in the trade with the rest of world; in 1970 the EEC disbursed 
the same amount of dollars for wheat as in 1966 wherease total sales 
declined nearly by half. No doubt cotton has lost rrore in the case 
of the EEC, but there is no duty, no variable levy and no other re-
striction on .that material . Finally tobacco which is considered as 
7us international economy policy, lac . cit. Chart 32, page 370. 
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Table 17: Growth of US exr:iorts of major agricultural products 
to the EEC and to the world (index 1960 = 100) 
EEC World 
1960 19ti0 1970 1960 1966 1970 
Total agric . exports 100 146 155 100 142 148 
Cereals 100 248 185 100 180 146 
of which : 
Wheat 100 207 212 100 150 108 
Other grains 100 259 178 100 £24 201_1 
Oilseeds and cakes 100 292 458 100 207 319 
Cotton 100 21 6 100 44 38 
Source: GATT loc.cit. Tables 5 and 7. 
a sensitive item followed the same trend as total US exports of the 
product. 
The enlargement of the EEC may affect, on the one hand, the terms 
of competition with acceding countries on the markets of the Si~ and, 
on the other hand, the competition with all EEC members on the UK, 
Danish and Irish markets . So far as the Six are concerned, it is 
unlikely that the terms of competition will change in the near fu-
ture as the acceders are not exporting the same type of goods as 
the US; it is not very likely either that the policies followed by 
the EEC will be very different from the present ones . The British 
government has stated its intention of encouraging an increase in 
British farm output, estimated at some 8 per cent by 1977 as a re-
sult of accession and part at least of that additional supply re-
quires a fairly high level of protection to be maintained around the 
regional market . Clearly, the UK has an interest in influencing the 
EEC policy in the direction of cheaper outside supplies but it is 
doubtful that this could be successful so long as the British govern-
ment is prepared to guarantee a high level of support to its own 
farmers. 
With respect to the UK market, the outlets have shrunk during the 
60's and the US exports less than in 1960 (431 as compared with 527 
million dollars). This was the result of a greater degree of self-
sufficiency achieved through the payment of sizeable deficiency pay-
~n ts to i3 ri ti sh farmers; the impact of protection through subsidies 
has been felt also by other suppliers . After accession, the protec-
tion will not b e less effective and it s hould be difficult for US ex-
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porters to regain the ground lost. In addition, the other EEC mem-
bers will enjoy privileged access to the British market and may dis-
place US exports . In view of the composition of British imports, 
such increased competition would be confined to a few sectors such 
as wheat and fruit; it may be that, as in the case of Canada, the 
varieties of cereals which are usually sold to the United Kingdom 
are not available in Continental Europe and that the area of substi-
tution is therefore limited. In the case of Denmark and Ireland, US 
trade is not large and the main item is oilseeds and cakes since 
sales of cereals have considerably declined in recent years. 
The implications of the enlargement of the EEC are not confined 
to the export trade of the US with the group; a more aggressive ex-
port policy on the part of the Community, especially in the agricul-
tural sector, may adversely affect US interests either through a 
penetration of the US market or as a result of displacement of US ex-
ports on world markets . So far, there has been no special attention 
paid to the US market by the Six who have not taken advantage of its 
high propensity to import, except in a few lines, such as steel . Of 
course, overall EEC exports have been very dynamic and the enlarge-
ment will probably stimulate that trend, but this temporary disequi-
librium should be eliminated if and when US exports regain their 
former competitiveness. 
In the agricultural sector, however, the EEC has increased its ex-
ports to non-EEC countries at the rate of about 6 per cent during 
the 60's . The additional supply generated by high support prices 
cannot always be absorbed by the regional market; part of the sur-
plus concerns products which do not compete with major US exports 
such as sugar and dairy products or are sold to markets such as the 
Communist countries which so far were neglected by US exporters, but 
part of it already competes with US exports to developing countries 
and to Japan. This trend may well continue if production is unduly 
encouraged in the enlarged Community. 
IV. Conclusions 
The enlargement of the EEC will create substantial changes in the 
pattern of world trade and may require painful adjustments for some 
outside countries . Judging from past experience, the direct impact 
of integration may be manageable if there is no recession in the 
future and if the United Kingdom is able to accelerate its rate of 
GREATER EUROPEAN ECONOMI C INTEGRATION 37 
growth. The loss of preferences on the British market is likely to 
be more awkward for Comrronwealth developed countries; the shock may 
well be more psychological than material as the accession may simply 
lead to sorre acceleration of a process which has already started 
some years ago and is well under way . The countries most affected 
such as New Zealand, Canada and Australia will strengthen their eco-
nomic ties with their neighbours and may try to penetrate new mar-
kets in the developing world or in the socialist countries . 
Apart from the accession of three new members, the Community is 
attracting other countries in its orbit ; its influence will be felt 
over practically all Western Europe, the Mediterranean Basin, a 
large part of Africa and other countries in the developing world 
through a variety of a s sociation agreements based on free trade or 
on preferential concessions. Although the effect of such preferen~ 
tial arrangements may be marginal in trade terms - about 4 per cent 
of the total Comrrunity imports, according to some members of the Rey 
group, the multiplication of such agreements is disquieting, because 
it encourages people to think in bloc terms and to rrove away from 
the concept of one yardstick for all . 
In order to reduce the adverse effects of such regional arrange~ 
rrents, it becomes imperative to whittle down the preferential mar-
gins in the course of broad trade negotiations a i ming at a gradual 
elimination of tariff and other barriers. It seems pretty certain 
that the Dillon and Kennedy Rounds e~fectively pr evented the dis-
tortions arising out of the Rome Treaty from causing serious pro~ 
blems to third parties; a new round should do much to protect the 
trade interests of the outsiders in the future . Preferably, this 
negotiation should have a rrore ambitious objective than the preced-
ing rounds; time has come to plan a gradual elimination of trade 
barriers to the flow of manufactures on the basis of reciprocity and 
to extrapolate the European a rrangements on an intercontinental 
basis. 
So much for the trade aspects . As stated in the Treaty .of Rome 
and reaffirrred on many occasions, and in particular at the Summit 
meeting last October, the Community is not planned solely as a means 
to free movements of goods . As Pres~dent Ponpidou put it, it should 
not be a Community of traders , but it should have a soul. In other 
words, integration should cover all aspects of economic and social 
policies and eventually lead to some sort of political federation . 
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The Community liberalization of trade in agricultural products in-
volved the adoption of a comrron agricultural policy; the operation 
of that policy requires rronetary stability and close coordination of 
national monetary decisions; a first step has been taken with the 
setting up of a Monetary Fund which should enable governments to e-
liminate over a period fluctuations between the national currencies . 
Other comrron policies dealing with energy, industry, and taxation 
are already on the drawing-board . The next step would be a gradual 
harrronization of social and foreign policies. 
The building-up of such policies will strengthen the Community 
and enable it to exercise a greater influence over world affairs . 
Some people still fear the possibility of having to face a Third 
Force . This is still far remote and national policies are still 
divergent on many issues; but the impl i cations of a European const-
ruction have already a constra ining e ffect on world policies . In 
the monetary field, for instance , the EEC cannot go too far in the 
direction of flexibility without endangering the Common Agricultural 
Policy which remains a corner-stone of the edifice. The experience 
gained in the reconciliation of different national policies may 
prove beneficial for others if and when a world-wide system becomes 
unavoidable . On the other hand, the need to consult arrong a number 
of European governments before any position paper is adopted and 
negotiations can start will delay proceedings and hamper prompt de-
cisions. In addition, the Community tends to develop into a bureau 
- or rather a Euro-cratic monolithic contraption which stays aloof 
of realities and inspires misgivings to the citizens . This lack of 
confidence in the machine was conspicuous in the Norwegian and Dani-
sh referendum campaigns . 
The European Community is a fact and one has to live with it as 
with other facts; it has good and bad points . Its action has not 
been as positive as some expected nor as negative as others feared . 
It is still in a fluid state and much will depend on the progress to 
be made in the course of the next few years in the streamlining of 
its institutions and in the awareness of its Members of the Commu-
nity's responsibilities as a potential major power . It is not like-
ly that a similar integration system could develop in other parts 
of the world and lead to the formation of conflicting b locs; on the 
other hand, it is highly desirable that the princ iple s of trade lib-
eralization and harmonization of national policies accepted by the 
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EEC be gradually recognized as valid by all developed nations and, 
later on, by other countries when they reach a certain level of de-
velopment with a view to an eventual merger of individual states in-
to a world-wide unit. 
* * * * * * * * * 
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Exports 
A P P E N D I X 
Table I: Exports to the world and to the EEC 
(in million US dollars, fob basis) 
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from To the rest of the world To the EEC 
19S7 1971 Increase 19S7 1971 Increase 
World less EEC 86,S70 246,290 18S% lS,475 4S,420 193'5 
Industrial areas 
less EEC 4S,7SO 140,970 208% 8,280 2S,680 210% 
of which: 
N. America 23,820 60,760 1SS% 3,S9S 9,370 161% 
w. Europe 
less EEC 19,070 S6,120 194% 4,S4S 14,670 223% 
Japan 2,860 24,090 742% 140 1,640 1071% 
Developing coun-
tries 2S,440 61,140 140% S,S90 lS,260 173% 
Australia; New 
Zealand, s. 
Africa 4,090 8,4SO 107% 900 980 9% 
Eastern trading 
area 11,300 3S,730 216% 70S 3,SOO 396% 
Source: GATT International trade in 196S and 1971. 
Table II: Exports of developing countries in the Pacific area 
to the EEC and to the UK (in million US dollars, cif) 
Exports from To the EEC To the UK 
19S8 196S 1970 19S8 196S 1970 
Burma 7 21 13 19 l7 10 
Thailand 26 97 126 10 20 13 
Malaysia 1S2 16S 270 113 93 112 
Singapore 17 6 .40 S7 4S 80 
Laos, Carob. & Vietnam SS 41 21 1 7 3 
Indonesia 123 228 219 31 11 17 
Philippines 71 118 7S 7 11 14 
Hong Kong 19 12S 27S 76 197 300 
Taiwan 6 38' 127 1 4 14 
Korea - 14 69 - 4 17 
Fiji - - 3 14 27 24 
Total 476 8S3 1,238 329 436 604 
Source: OECD, EEC, UN import statistics. 
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COMMENTS AND DISCUSSION OF 
RoYER's PAPER 
Peter Drysdal opened the discussion : Mr. Royer presents a chal-
lenging and optimistic view of the impact of an enlarged European 
Community on the rest of the world economy , even trading opportuni-
ties for countries in the Asian-Pacific Region . Let me say at the 
outset that, unlike some of my countrymen but like Mr . Royer , I be-
lieve that, on balance, the emergence and growth of the European 
Community has been a major positive force in world affairs in the 
postwar period - but perhaps the contributions have been greater to 
non-economic than to economic affairs. Nonetheless, there remain 
for me many difficulties with the view of the Community's role pre-
sented in Mr. Royer ' s paper . 
He argues that European economic integration has been at least 
as trade creating as it has been trade diverting, and the trend in 
his reasoning is that the benefits from integration in Europe itself 
have provided a powerful stimulus to world trade and economic growth 
beyond the Community itself . Surely , some third parties have been 
injured by the protectionist effects of European integration - most 
significantly the semi-industrialised primary product exporters -
but one is left with the impression that even they may have gained 
more than they lost through the growth effect of the union . The en-
largement of the community, so the argument runs, will produce even 
more of the same and roughly in the same direction. 
Of course there are grounds for doubt about this analysis of the 
economic effects of integration and the data available to us here 
do not remove that doubt. The argument that the superior growth 
performance of member countries has, in large measure, been a con-
sequence of economic union is difficult to substantiate . In fact, 
as Mr . Royer concedes on p . 6, a large number of other factors ac-
acount for divergent growth performances and perhaps they were more 
important. Japan, for example, is not yet at least, a member of 
the European Community and she enjoyed high growth rates too . Des-
pite the mountain of literature on the subject , the case remains un-
proven . Anyone who has tried to grapple with the analytic problems 
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of trying to measure the various independent influences of freer 
trade arrangements on trade and income flows will sympathise with 
Mr . Royer on this score. 
Unfortunately the issues are somewhat clouded by the way in which 
certain of the data in the paper are presented . For example, the 
trade growth indices reported in Table C are intended as evidence 
of the trade creating effect of European integration on most major 
trading regions . But this evidence is perfectly consistent with 
the fact that the intensities of trade with the EEC (or relative 
trade shares) of all regions outside Europe, with the exception of 
some Eastern bloc countries and Japan, have declined and , of course, 
the growth of Japan's trade has been from a very small base . More-
over, the apparently impressive growth in developing country trade 
with the European Community dissembles into an impressive growth in 
oil trade and a modest growth in trade with preferred African mar-
kets . 
Mr . Royer is perhaps inclined to underplay the trade diverting 
or protectionist effects of an enlarged Community . This ground has 
been well worked over but let me make one or two brief points . As 
he points out , in the Australian case most of the required adjust-
ments in trade structure have already been effected . But not with-
out economic cost and, perhaps more importantly, cost in terms of 
the retrogressive effects of the closure of Europe on our approach 
to commercial policy, which might be described as Mr . Royer describ-
es CAP, as a very impressive construction: Yet there will still 
have to be more adjustment even in Australia . The statement on 
p . 25 that Australian sales of wheat, sugar, and dairy products sal-
es to the United Kingdom each account for only one percent of total 
Australian exports understates the adjustment problems involved for 
those sectors of the economy . The position of New Ze aland i s , of 
course, much worse , but that is the subject of another session . 
All this aside, Mr . Royer's paper raises more serious questions . 
Let me focus briefly on just two related que stions . They are the 
question of the evolution of Japan ' s economic relations with the 
extended Community and their effect on the world's approach to trade 
and international economic policies . And there is the related ques-
tion of what might be called the potential bloc- extending effects 
of the Community's enlargement and strengthening . 
Again , on both these issues Mr . Royer takes an optimistic view . 
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Indeed, the various possible responses among the world's trade lead-
ers are not explored in his paper . First, he appears confident 
that the extension of the protectionist elements in an enlarged Com-
munity will be constrained or reversed by the coming round of nego-
tiations in Gatt, rather in the same wa~, he argues, in which the 
Dillon and Kennedy Rounds checked the inward-look±ngness of the old 
EEC. This will be a major exercise in commercial diplomacy . Second, 
he believes that the pre-conditions do not exist in other parts of 
the world for the development of a European-type bloc and that the 
emergence of competitive preferential systems is therefore so much 
less likely. 
What will finally emerge is perhaps somewhat more problematic. 
If Japan and Europe were the only two elements in this equation, 
the probabilities are that the sort of trade deal that might be ef-
fected between them would have quite damaging side-effects on Asian 
Pacific trade prospects and a retrogressive effect on world trade 
policies. The temptation of preferential arrangements of some kind 
would be very powerful . Already, of course, the inclination towards 
extra-official market-sharing arrangements is strong and these may 
become an acceptable 'adjustment' measure all round. Moreover, Jap-
an's agricultural policy still has much in common with European ag-
ricultural policy and, to Japan, arrangements with Europe on support-
ed agricultural exports may seem a small price to pay for less res-
tricted entry to the European market . Any of these eventualities 
would have damaging effects on access to manufactured goods markets 
and agricultural markets for developing country and developed coun-
try exporters in the Asian Pacific region alike . 
There are three important factors in the Japanese-European rela-
tion. First, Japan already has substantial trading problems with 
the Community. There remain over 100 discriminatory restrictions 
on Japanese exports to Europe. Second, European sensitivities about 
the accommodation of Japanese trade expansion have been roused, even 
by the relatively modest Japanese penetration of the European market 
to date. The Community still obtains only 1-2 percent of its import 
supplies from Japan whilst Japan herself accounts for around 7 per-
cent of total world import supplies. Third, Europe's bargaining 
position in any trade deal with Japan, independent of multilateral 
negotiations, has been strengthened by enlargement. That is preci-
sely the reason for suspension of the earlier round of preliminary 
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talks. 
Fortunately, Japan and Europe are not the only two elements in 
the equation . The United States may have its difficulties with 
Japan on issues of trade and monetary policies, but she remains a 
major ally of Japan and the smaller traders in dealing with Europe . 
This is really the source of Mr . Royer's optimism . It is doubly 
important therefore that the repercussion costs of American impati-
ence or protectionism be constantly exposed . At least it would ap-
pear wise for those interested in the expansion of opportunities 
for trade and income growth in Asian Pacific countries to be fore-
warned about some of the possible dangers . 
And this raises a very serious question of Mr. Royer's paper . 
His judgement, expressed at several points in the paper and stress-
ed in the conclusion, is that CAP remains the cornerstone of the 
whole European edifice . What grounds are there then for his optimi-
sm that the United States and others will in fact be able to succeed 
in constraining the potential excesses of European protectionism in 
the years immediately ahead, when agriculture is much of what the 
United States wants and has to bargain with? 
No one could disagree with Mr . Royer that the EEC is a fact and 
that one has to live with facts . But there are better and worse 
ways of living with facts . It would seem important to the future 
of world trade policy for Asian Pacific countries to develop their 
leverage against Europe in a more co-ordinated fashion . Failure to 
do this could certainly change , quite dramatically , the long run 
course of Japanese international economic policy , giving strength 
to the small voices for Mongolian trade alliances or stronger ver-
tical arrangements with less developed countries . 
Lawrence Krause continued the commentary : Mr . Royer has given us 
an excellent and generally well balanced paper . Yet there are some 
points on which I disagree with him in terms of emphasis and app-
roach . 
First, I would like to make a point that is only incidentally 
raised by the paper but is felt of some importance . Mr . Royer stat-
ed that the share of manufacturing industries continues to improve 
in the EEC . By "improve" he really means " increase". Unfortunate-
ly some observers really believ e that manufacturin g activity in par-
ticular is good for a country and should- be encouraged, while agri-
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culture and service activity should be discouraged. Presumably 
this belief arises from the expectation that gains in productiv ity 
are easier to achieve in manufacturing . In this respect we may be 
at the mercy of GNP - accountants who are unable to measure produc-
tivity gains in services and therefore, often assume they do not 
exist . I am concerned because encouraging manufacturing activity 
often leads to uneconomic subsidizing of exports of these industri -
es and in turn to international disagreements among countries . 
Second, I would emphasise possibly a bit more than Mr. Royer , 
the other factors than joining a common market as a source of growth 
stimulation for the European countries. Common markets are no as-
surance of faster economic growth . 
The main difference that I have with Mr . Royer concerns agricul-
ture and agricultural policy. He believes that the Common Agricul-
tural Policy (CAP) has been the most important attribute of the EEC 
aside from trade liberalization, and I agree , but I do not believe 
that the CAP deserves very high marks as an economic policy . It 
has led to high and rising agricultural prices that are clearly un-
economic from a social point of view . Also the price structure has 
been rigidif ied so that farmers are not given the proper signals as 
to what to produce. Furthermore, the CAP has complicated the pro-
cess of necessary exchange rate adjustments among member country 
currencies . 
The CAP has also had an important consequence on the internation-
al trade of agricultural products both by restricting excess of im-
ports into the European market and through subsidized exports to 
third country markets. Exports of the United States as well as oth-
er temperate zone producers have been held back as a result . My 
estimate is that U.S . exports alone could be close to $5 billion 
higher in the absence of the restrictive policies (at current pric-
es). This estimate comes from U.S. supply capabilities combined 
with an estimate of European absorptive needs in the absence of CAP 
and U. S . displacement of European exports in the absence of subsidi-
zation (by both the EEC and the U. S . ) . 
I also think Mr. Royer has not g iven enough attention to the dis-
torting effec ts of the preferential trade agreements the EEC has 
been making with a growing number of associated countries . There 
is a point of principle involved as discrimination becomes the gene-
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ral rule rather than the exception in international trade . Also the 
trade potential of many developing countries is much greater than 
current levels of trade and thus future consequences may be more se-
rious than current flows indicate . 
As far as the expansion of the EEC is concerned, I agree with Mr . 
Royer that the major consequence will be on the British economy and 
no one now can be sure exactly what those consequences are likely 
to be . The areas under the CAP will increase and cause further dif-
ficulties in agriculture . Some countries might also be affected 
through the loss of preferences in the British market . 
In conclusion, I think it is fair to say that the EEC has not 
been a disaster for other countries , but it has not been much of a 
benefactor either . The most disappointing aspect of the EEC is that 
it has not developed the sense of responsibility toward world trade 
commensurate with its position as the world ' s largest trader . The 
U. S . waited in vain for Europe to develop an initiative toward more 
liberal commercial policy . Unless Europe becomes more responsive , 
the American initiative that President Nixon has indicated will be 
forthcoming, might end in failure and international trade will seri-
ously suffer under moves toward protectionism by many countries, as 
Drysdale pointed out . 
Subsequent discussion focussed on the effects of the enlargement 
of the European Community on agricultural trade and trade in labour 
intensive manufactures from developing countries . Mr . Royer elabo-
rated other points made in his paper . 
There was a considerable measure of agreement that there was no 
cause for optimism about the effects of the enlargement of the Euro-
pean Community on non-member countries . Several participants agreed 
with the discussants that the European attitude towards the Common 
Agricultural Policy represented a major stumbling block to progress 
in international trade policies . But one participant saw the inc-
reasing tax burden of agricultural policies on European consumers 
as providing an eventual reason for their modification . 
Another participant was concerned about the effect of quantita-
tive restrictions on manufactured goods imports from developing coun-
tries . He suggested that these restrictions had primarily been ado-
pted for protection rather than for adjustment purposes . 
Mr . Royer agreed that Europe had a poor performance in its import-
ing of manufactured goods from developing countries, but argued that 
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there were good historical reasons for that. He stressed that the 
conunon Agricultural Policy could not be assessed merely on economic 
efficiency criteria. And he said that he h ad not intended to imply 
that the European Conununities' policies had not disadvantaged non-
members, but merely that, on balance, the Conununity had had benefi-
cial economic effects for the world economy, 
I. Introduction 
2 
THE IMPACT OF THE EMERGENCE OF CHINA 
ON ASIAN-PACIFIC TRADE* 
Shigeru Ishikawa 
1 . The aim of this paper is to attempt to answer the question: 
What are the likely international economic implications of China's 
errergence as a full-fledged rrember of the international community, 
especially in the Asian-Pacific area? This question is certainly 
much more difficult to answer than a similar question regarding im-
pacts of it upon international politics . I myself am inclined to 
consider that there are a series of possible answers to this ques-
tion which can be sunura.rized as follows: 
(1) China will continue to occupy a relatively minor position at 
least in the near future. Any change towards a larger and nore 
major role , should such a change occur, will only be a gradual 
one . 
(2) Despite this, however, the western industrial powers will not 
be able to abandon their strong expectations of China becoming a 
potentially great market and/or natural-resource base . This will 
bring about a variety of political-economic repercussions in the 
Asian-Pacific area . 
(3) If the Chinese economic policy in its present phase (whichbegan 
in the second half of the 1960's) continues to be successful, and 
*The writer wishes to express his appreciation to Dr . A. Paul, Pro-
fessors D. Hsia, s . Ichimura, H. Kitamura and Dr . M. S . Wionczek 
for their cornrrents made in the conference . He is also grateful to 
Mr . Bill Hall for making corrections of rny English . 
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if the present economic difficulties in many developing countries 
are not resolved by relying on the conventional mechanisms of in-
ternational trade, capital ITDvements and economic aid , China ' s 
economic impact will become more significant in that the Chinese 
model of economic development will gradually be disseminated anong 
these developing countries. This dissemination will be facilitat-
ed by the extension of China's economic aid, which will serve as 
a sort of missionary of the Chinese model. In that event , the 
economic relationships of the industrial powers with these deve-
loping countries will be made similar, at least partly, to that 
with China. 
However, I am not arguing that this series of possibilities will 
be realized even with a reasonable degree of certainty . There are 
a number of unclear and unpredictable elements both inside and out-
side China, which make it necessary to add important reservations 
to these statements. 
2 . Among these various unclear and unpredictable elements, those 
of the domestic aspects are worthy of particular note . To elaborate , 
let me first describe what seem to me to be three major characterist-
ics of the Chinese economy : 
(1) The Chinese economy in its present stage is still an under-deve-
loped economy . Statistically, this is reflected in the very low 
level of per-capita income and in the relatively large weight of 
agricultural output, to take but two aggregative indicators .
1 
(Refer to Appendix Table 1 . ) More importantly , the economy is 
still in the grip of those factors that tend to bring about "st-
ructural imbalances" when a dynamic force emerges and the economy 
begins to develop . These factors may be called "built-in depres-
sors" and in China, as in many other developing countries , the 
"food and agricultural problem, " the "un- and under-employment pro-
blem" and the "foreign trade problem" are aTIDng the most serious 
2 depressors . 
1
My own evaluation of the present state of these aggregative indi-
cators is given in Ishikawa , "Prospects of the Chinese Economy : 
Trends and Cycles," Pacific Community, Jan . 1973 . 
2r have discussed the questions of " structural imbalances" and 
"built-in depressors" in greater detail in Ibid . and in Ishikawa, 
"China's Economic Landscape : 1966 - 1995 ," in J . Bhagwati , ed ., Eco-
nomics and World Order , Macmillan, London , 1971 . 
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(2) The Chinese economy is large in size, and hence, is capable of 
benefiting from the economies of large-scale, once other requisit-
es are effectively met . In actuality, this scale merit has been 
brought into full play : China has by now a well developed system 
of nodern industry equiped with techniques and technologies of 
internationally high standards . 
(3) In contrast to the other developing countries, most of age-old 
institutions and organizations which often act as elements obst-
ructing economic development were effectively eliminated . In 
their place, very efficient but, at the sarre time, quite unique 
administrative, economic and social institutions and organizations 
have been established along the lines which, while socialist, are 
also peculiarly Chinese. 
I consider that any attempt to evaluate the present state as well 
as the future course of China's economic development should be made 
in terms of the interrelationship among these three major character-
istics . This interrelationship is sometimes hard to identify, thus 
resulting in the above unpredictable elements . Yet, some broad out-
lines are clear . Thus, for example, despite the well developed sys-
tem of nodern industry indicated in (2), the prospects for its deve-
lopment seems to be seriously constrained by the prospects for the 
structural problems described in (1) . Next, the effectiveness of 
the new institutions and organizations of (3) has been demostrated 
in their contribution to the establishment of modern industry of 
(2). It has not yet demonstrated, however, with regard to the solu-
tion of the structural problems of (1) . As will be discussed in 
detail, the Chinese governrrent is now endeavoring to tackle the "food 
and agricultural problem" and the un- and under-employment problem" 
with major reliance on intensifying these new institutions and or -
ganizations in the vast area of China ' s countryside. And, it seems 
certain that the success of the former is at least partly on the 
success of the latter . 
The most unclear and unpredictable elements are perhaps involved 
in the individual evaluation of the nature of (1) and (3) above . 
Regarding (1), it is extremely difficult to foresee when and how 
the structural problems will be resolved . Regarding (3), the diffi-
culty of the evaluation comes mainly from the fact that China's 
choic,e of institutions and organizations is not necessarily made 
under the sole criterion of practicability of resolving the structu-
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ral problems of (1) and of accelerating the building-up of modern 
industry of (2). Another and presunably more important criterion 
is to adhere to the ideology of China's economic policy and, with 
it, to the blue-print of the Chinese society that this ideology 
instructs to create. 
3. To elaborate on this last point, two points are essential : 
51 
(1) For the sources of the dynamic force of economic development, 
China's economic policy relies not only upon such conventional 
factors as capital fornation and technological progress, but also 
and heavily upon "human initiatives" (or "subjective activity" in 
China's terminology). Also, as the transmittance apparatus of 
this dynamic force throughout the entire economy, it relies heavi-
ly on the non-economic institutions that are expected to come in-
to play when the human initiatives are in full operation. The 
role of the transmittance apparatus played by the planners' direct 
allocation of resources and, additionally, by the market mechanism 
is to be reduced accordingly . 
(2) China's economic policy regards as a basic objective of econo-
mic development the creation of a society in which the so-called 
"Three Big-Differentials" (between mental and manual labor, be- we 
tween industrial and agricultural labor and between urban and 
rural areas) are eliminated and, with it, huma n creativity is 
brought into full play. This seems primarily to be a long-run 
objective and, hence, can be contrasted to a second objective of 
economic policy which is to raise the productive force of the 
society, an objective which is both immediate and long-run . Yet, 
the former is sometimes also looked upon by the Chinese even as 
the objective to be applied immediately . 
There are many unknowns that should be clarified before one can 
be sure that the institutions and organizations carrying the charac-
teristic described in (1) abov e are firmly established and that the 
objective described in (2) becomes really effective . To be noted es-
pecially are the cases in which reliances upon "hunan initiative" and, 
with it, the elimination of "Three Big Differentials" tend to con-
flict with the productivity objectives . We are not yet sure how the 
these cases will be dealt with effectively by the Chinese government. 
Yet, one must also admit that the "human initiatives" and the elimi-
nation of "Three Big-Differe ntials" are crucial elements that are in 
fact differntiating even the current cours e of China's economic deve-
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lopment from those of other developing countries and the U. S . S . R. as 
well . The three possibilities which I have described earlier regard-
ing China ' s impact on the international economy also arise ultimately 
from these two elements of the Chinese economic policy . 
4 . In the following, I shall in Section 2 analyze in greater detail 
current economic policy in terms of the pattern of the national eco-
nomy it is bringing about . The pattern of China's foreign trade will 
be discussed in Section 3 partly as a corollary of the discussions in 
Section 2. The impact of the emergence of China on Asian- Pacific 
trade will be studied in Section 4 on the basis of the findings deriv-
ed in these discussions . 
II . Economic Structure of "Self-Reliance" 
1 . The e conomic ~olicy and the resulting economic structure to be 
discussed in this section are those which have been formulated and 
built up gradually since the second half of the 1960 ' s . One of the 
prerequisites for a proper understanding of the characteristics of 
thie economic policy and structure is to have a sound knowledge about 
the conditions prior to that period . While we have not sufficient 
space to dwell on them here , it is essential to note that the pre-
sent economic policy and economic structure are the end results of a 
serious trial-and-error process . Two cornrrents are in order . 
(1) For some years after the establishment of the People ' s Republic, 
China followed an economic policy of rapid and large- scale indust-
rialization Irodelled after the pre-war U. S . S . R. pattern . Toward 
the end of the 1950's China adopted the so-called Great-Leap-For -
ward policy which aimed at a nearly corrplete reversal of the pre-.. 
vious Russian type policy, but this policy failed . The current 
economic policy has been formulated since the end of the period 
of economic stagnation following the failure of the Great-Leap 
Forward . The historical period before the adve nt of the People ' s 
Republic was what the Chinese call a "colonial and semi - colonial 
period" in which the modern sector, consisting mainly of foreign 
interests in mining, manufacturing, railways, shipping and banking , 
was imposed as an enclave upon the traditional agricultural sector . 
(See Appendix Table 1 on changes in the e conomic policies of the 
PRC governrrent) • 
(2) China's economic growth in the period of the People ' s Republic 
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seems to be characterized by a "steady growth with the fluctua -
tions of a big anplitude . " The growth of foreign trade has shown 
a similar pattern. (These are illustrated in Appendix Chart 1 . 
In Appendix Table 2 are shown official estimates of national in-
corre which I have inferred for 1957 and 1970.) 
2. In terms of conparative economic systems, the present eco-
nomic policy can be said to rraintain "planners' sovereignty" in 
determining the basic direction of the economy. It, however, has 
altered a decision-making process that had been heavily concent-
rated in the central government, and has transferred much of the 
decision-rraking power to both the local governrrents and the pro-
duction and management units. It has also come to rely upon the 
"hurran initiatives" of. individuals at all levels (rather than to 
rely upon the price mechanisms), in order to make up for the short-
comings of a system of physical directives as the instruments for 
transmitting the planners objectives . 
Detailed analyses of the economic policy under this new econo-
mic system can conveniently be made according to the division of 
the economy into three sectors that have especially become mani-
fest in the course of implementation of the current policy . They 
are, as shown in a triangular diagram of Chart 1, a Central Eco-
nomic (or Industrial) Sector, a Local Industry Sector and an Agri-
cultural sector. (The latter two constitute a Local Economic Sect-
or . ) 
3. Economic Policy with regard to the development of the produc-
tive force of the society seems to consist of three major conponents: 
(1) Agriculture Increase in agricultural output by introducing 
labor-using and land-saving technological progress on the basis 
of the application in an incresing arrount of "rrodern inputs."
3 
(2) Local industry Establishment of a fairly conprehensive and 
self-sustaining system of local industry in each economic region 
and district which aims at supporting the increase in agricultural 
output along the lines indicated in (1). 4 
3
see Ishikawa, "Changes in the Structure of Agricultural Production 
in Mainland China," in W.A.D. Jackson (ed . ), Agrarian Policies and 
Problems in Communist and Non-Comnunist Countries, Univ. of Wash- -
ington Press, 1971 . 
4 
See Ishikawa, "A Note on the Choice of Technology in China," ~ 
nal of Development Studies, Jan . 1973 . 
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Chart 1 Sectoral Division of the National Economy 
under the New Economic Policy 
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Remarks : The demarcation areas of the Local Industry Sector with 
the other sectors are in fact blurred . On the one hand, while 
the Provincial industry is formally part of the local industry 
sector sorre of it is technologically alrrost identical with the 
central industry sector . On the other hand , the factories in the 
People's Comnunes are essentially part of the agricultural sector . 
(3) Central industry Maintaining and strengthening the already 
established system of rrodern manufacturing , mines , public utiliti-
es , transportation and comnunication in the Central Economic Sect-
or . Side by side with this , establishing new industrial branches 
equipped with internationally up- to- date technologies on a select-
ed basis . 5 
The policy priority order over these three sectors differs from 
that of the earlier policy of socialist industrialization following 
the U. S . S . R. pattern . The earlier policy tended to concentrate re-
sources in the establishment and development of central industry 
while sacrificing the development of local industry and even agri-
culture . Utrrost priority is placed on agriculture at present and 
this is reflected in the official expression "agriculture as the 
base of the economy ". This priority stems from the' very serious 
Chinese concern to increase food grain output and is reflected in 
part in recent changes in the price policy in which the producers ' 
5 Illl£.. 
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prices of farm products have been raised and the retail prices of 
manufactured farm inputs reduced . A more important reflection is 
seen in an increasing amount of supplies of these farm inputs . 
The present focus of the policy regarding local industry is the 
establishment of factories, mines and power plants which constitute 
inter-industrially an integral linkage system within the county 
boundary that connects ultimately with local agriculture . Some 
change in the international aspects of the policy toward central 
industry can also be seen. While the policy of domestic development 
under a closed system working through the mechanism of state monopo-
ly of foreign trade still remains in operation, Chinese attitudes 
towards international trade appear to have become much more flexible , 
aiming at introducing into central industry the most up-to-date 
technologies develope~ in the western countries. 
4 . However, the major economic mechanism which transmits the 
policy on agriculture and local industry to the production units 
is after all not the market mechanism. It is, as described earlier, 
the non-economic institutions based on the"human initiatives ." Also, 
profitability , if it does exist as an incentive, appears to be play-
ing a minor role in local industry . Only in the People's Communes 
does it seem to be playing a significant but not decisive role . 
The decisive role here is played by the "human initiative" itself. 
The policy measures to convert the "human initiatives" to an incen-
tive and even a policy transmittance instrument for economic const-
ruction correspond to what is often called the policy of "self-reli-
ance," or the policy to convert each production enterprise or region 
to a "self-reliance" unit . To elaborate : 
(1) People's Conununes Contrary to comnon-place understanding, the 
basic decision-making units regarding production, distribution 
and investment in a People's Commune are at the present stage not 
the overall governing body of the People's Commune, but its Pro-
duction Teams consisting of twenty to thirty farm families i n the 
traditional boundary of natural villages. The upper-level organi-
zations, the Production Brigades and the People's Commune are co-
operatives or jointly operating schemes of the Production Teams. 
These organizational measures appear to be contributing to (a) 
the harmonization of the individual member families' motivation 
to secure family welfare with the motivation to serve the public 
cause and (b) the successful introduction of the new techniques 
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by purchasing on joint-schemes irrigation and drainage pumping 
sets, farm processing rrachinery and even tractors that cannot be 
purchased by individual Production Teams, not to mention by indi-
vidual families . 
(2) Local industrial enterprises Most importantly, the leadership 
of the local government or party officials is playing a critical 
role in establishing and maintaining an expanding inter-industry 
linkage system of local industry in each locality. It is these 
local officials who perceive the emergence of new demand for par-
ticular industrial materials and products as consequences of a 
new agricultural program. They then respond to that demand using 
all the means at their disposal to mobilize the machinery and 
equipment, technicians and skilled workers that are required for 
new factories. Consultation and negotiation with the officials 
of the upper-level government and the subordinate enterprises for 
obtaining these equipment and manpower and the reallocation of 
resources existing within their own local jurisdiction are among 
the methods particulary used . The technologies used in the local 
industrial enterprises may properly be called "intermediate tech-
nologies", a recently fashionable concept in development economics. 
The fact that these technologies are widely diffused can be seen 
from the clearly observable popular dissemination of elementary 
or even secondary-level technical knowledge. Production costs in 
the chemical and metal industries are said to be in general higher 
than prices, thus resulting in losses . Yet , these losses tend to 
be counterbalanced by the surplus in other industries. 6 
5. The effective operation of these new institutions and organiza-
tions in the local economic sector may probably be traced back to 
an activation of the "human initiatives" of the local people, which, 
in turn, must have been inspired by the ideal of creating a new 
society by eliminating the "Three Big Differentials." Now, one im-
portant problem arises from the fact that if these new institutions 
and organizations are to continue, the same principles should be in 
operation in the central economic sector as well . The principle of 
"human initiatives" seems to have been already in operation in vari-
ous forms: a new factory administration system, a wage reform in 
which the previous wage differentials between white and blue color 
6 
A good account is made about these in Jon Sigurdson, "Rural Indus-
trialization - A Travel Report," (Sussex), Feb.1972, mim. 
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workers have significantly been reduced, and the system of the"Three 
Combinations of Managers, Engineers and Workers" in which the former 
two classes must regularly engage in manual labor and the latter have 
a say in management and technical innovations . A recent education1t 
reform which has opened the chance of university enrolment only for 
those workers and the People's Comm.me members who worked three 
years or more may also have been facilitating this principle. These 
reforms and measures must have had an effect in raising the status 
of workers in central industry and of increasing their willingness 
to serve the public cause . The capability of adaptation of western 
technology which the Chinese have exhibited so far (which is equiva-
lent to what the Chinese call a "self-development of technology " or 
"self-reliance" in technological development) may be partly explain-
able by these reforms ·and measures . Yet, as the technical and man-
agement levels required in this sector will continue to rise , it may 
be that the sector will be faced with an increasingly serious task 
of harrronizing this requirement with the organizational principle of 
relying upon "human initiatives" . With regard to the principle of 
eliminating the "Three Big-Differentials ," the problem may become 
even more serious . For it i s yet to be seen how the present pattern 
of up-to-date industrial technology and of the accompanying indust-
rial management can be reconciled with this principle, which is 
af t er all equivalent to the elimination of the present pattern of 
the division of labor in the society . 
6 . Leaving aside for the moment the questins to be tested in the 
future, the economic policy in the present stage can be summarized , 
in terms of a model of contemporary economic development, in the 
following way . It aims to protect the entire national econoil]Y from 
international competition and furthermore, to protect the local in-
dustry from the competition of the central industry. Under these 
conditions, present economic policy aims to initiate economic deve-
lopment by "self-reliance," in each of the central and local eco-
nomic sectors . 
Of particular interest is the fact that by following this model, 
the local economic sector has now come to become viable . The ques-
tion may be raised as to whethe r this rrodel is erroneous, violating 
as it does the doctrine of comparative advantage . Another question 
will be whether the domestic allocation of resources and efforts in 
this rrodel is mistaken, considering that the central economic sect-
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or is a higher- prdoctivity sector whereas the local sector is lower -
productivi ty sector . Perhaps the Chinese government would answer 
to these questions on the basis of their own value judgement . Apart 
from this value judgement issue , however , there is a probability 
that in so far as the vast anount of un- and under- utilized local 
resources has come to be more fully utilized only through following 
this nodel, the allocative efficiency even when judged by western 
criteria is of a high standard . A rigorous evaluation of this 
change , however , is not possible at present . 
As was indicated earlier , the performance of the model in selec-
tive introduction of western technology has so far been satisfactory . 
This point , together with the questions relating to it will be dis -
cussed in the next section . 
III . The Foreign Trade Aspect of Economic Policy 
1 . China ' s foreign trade policy can be understood fundamentarily 
to be a corollery of the economic policy discussed in the last sec-
tion . 7 Two points should be noted in this connection : 
(1) A persistent principle of foreign trade throughout the period 
of the People's Republic has been that the foreign trade be con-
ducted not with the aim of maximizing national welfare in accord-
ance with the doctorine of comparative advantage (what might be 
called a principle of international equilibrium) , but of maximiz -
ing it through establishment and development of a self - contained 
and self - sustaining national economy (a principle of domestic eq-
uilibrium) . This principle has remained unchanged in the present 
stage . 
The Chinese government usually calls this foreign trade policy 
a policy of "Equality and Mutuality , and Filling Each Other ' s 
Needs ." Specifically, this policy aims to satisfy the demand for 
imports under the constraint of export capacity . The demand for 
imports arises mainly from the need for intermediate and capital 
goods for industrialization, which, in turn , can be classified 
into categories : one is those which China does not yet have the 
technological capability to produce , and the other is those for 
which China has that capability , but due to insufficiency in capi-
7I have previously discussed China ' s foreign trade policy in "St-
rategy of Foreign Trade under Planned Economic Development - With 
Special Reference to China's Experience , " Hitotsubashi Journal 
of Economics, Jan . 1965 . 
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tal accumulation, there is excess demand . Because of this policy , 
the ratio of China's exports and imports to national income is very 
low even when compared with other big economies : My tentative esti-
mate of this ratio are 2 . 7 percent for exports and 2.6 percent for 
imports in 1970 . 8 Moreover, this foreign trade dependency ratio 
will tend further to decline with the progress of capital accumula-
tion in the central industry, if China ' s willingness to catch up 
with a continuously advancing technological progress in the western 
countries is not large enough to counterbalance such a tendency . 9 
C2) A significant characteristic of China's foreign trade policy at 
the present stage is that the Chinese government has been active 
in catching up the western technologies in a variety of industrial 
brances. China also made big efforts throughout the 1950 ' s to in-
troduce new technologies from the U. S.S . R., though in that period , 
China had no discretion to choose the technologies to be introduc-
ed, nor the technical capability to exercize such discretion . 
China's willingness to introduce the western technologies was 
first demonstrated by her imports in the second half of the 1960's 
of a series of complete plants in the chemical and metal indust-
ries . These imports were interrupted during the period of the 
Cultural Revolution . The visits to Japan of a number of Chinese 
industrial missions during 1972, however, seem to reflect their 
willingness to reactivate such imports . 
The important question to be faced by the foreign trade planners 
s,eems to be how to deal with the constraints of export capacity if 
and when the demand for those imports outlined in (2) above should 
continue to increase . Explorations of answers to this question form 
the main theme of this section . 
8 
9 
2 . First, let me discuss the constraints of export capacity, 
In estimating this ratio, the arrounts of exports and imports ex-
pressed in foreign prices must be converted to those in domestic 
prices . In my estimates, this was done by using the comparative 
domestic and foreign price data shown in Appendix Table 3 and the 
data on price deflators indicated in Appendix Table 2 . 
I have previously attempted a crude projection for 1975 of China ' s 
foreign trade which focused on changes in the foreign trade depend-
ency ratios . Ishikawa, "Impacts of China ' s Economic Deveropment 
upon the Countries in Southeast Asia," in Japan's Future in South-
east Asia, the Center for Southeast Asian Studies , Kyoto Univer-
sity , 1966 . 
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which is the essential content of what I have referred to in Section 
1 as the "foreign trade problem, " In Table 1 estimates by the U.S. 
government sources are shown of China's exports and imports in re-
cent years by categories of corrmodities. These comnodity categories 
can be rearranged , such as shown in Table 2 , according to the domes-
tic sectors to which imports are destined or from which exports are 
originated. By referring to these tables the following may by noted : 
(1) The import flow to the central industry sector, which should 
be the major flow under China's foreign trade policy , has been re-
duced to only one half of total anount of imports, a very low pro-
portion that has been necessitated by the pressure of a heavy de -
mand for imports of food grains and chemical fertilizers , which 
combine to amount to about one fourth of total imports . 
(2) The major export commodities are still farm products. They 
amounted more than half of total exports. Prospects for the ex-
pansion of such exports are, however, limited . While the produc-
tion structure of agriculture, as we noted earlier , has been signi-
ficantly nodernized , agricultural policy emphasis has continued to 
be on increasing the production of food grains which, in turn, are 
raised mainly as subsistence crops of the producers . (This is es-
pecially the case for Kaoliang and maize produced in the northern 
China which are often expected to emerge as major export corrmodi-
ties to Japan). Even if China's agriculture should develop to the 
extent of attaining import substitution and of producing a suffi-
cient amount of export surplus, the world export market for agri-
cultural comnodities is generally characterized by low income and 
price elasticities of demand . 
(3) Mineral products , especially iron ore and coal, were until re -
cently China ' s major export comrrodities side by side with farm pro-
ducts . With the progress of industrialization, however , these ex-
ports have declined drastically . Unless China is willing to ac-
cept a "development export" formula frequently offered in recent 
years by the industrial powers to the resource~rich developing 
countries, China will no longer have a significant export surplus 
in mineral resources . The same condition applies to the oil re-
sources which have been discovered and considerably developed in 
recent years. 
(4) The textile industry is what may be called China's export in-
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Table 1 . Estimates of China ' s Exports and Imports by Usack and 
Batsavage, 1966,1969, and 1970 . 
unit: UQllion U. S . $ 
Exports Imports 
1966 1969 1970 1966 1969 1970 r Foods tu ff s 615 615 645 510 350 355 
Of which: 
Animals meat and fish 230 210 215 ... . . . ' .. 
Grains 150 ll5 llQ 400 260 280 
Fruits and vegetables 120 175 170 ... . .. . .. 
Crude materials, fuels 480 450 430 340 310 360 
and edible oils 
Of which: 
Oil seeds 90 75 65 ... . .. . .. 
Textile fibers 105 120 100 150 90 llO 
Crude animal materials 90 130 ll5 ... . .. . .. 
Rubber .. . . .. . .. 85 145 80 
Chemicals 90 90 105 250 310 330 
-Of which: Fertilizer ... . .. . .. 155 205 230 
Manufactures I 920 820 8601 910 850 1,115 Of which : 
Textile yarn and Fabric 305 310 340 35 30 45 
Clothing 185 195 155 ... . .. . .. 
Iron and steel 90 35 40 225 275 390 
Nonferrous metals 401) 351) 251) 55 225 210 
Machinery and equipment ... . .. . .. 455 240 395 
Other 105 55 10 25 10 10 ----
Total 2,210 2,030 2,050 2,035 1,830 2,170 
Source: A. H. Usack and R. E. Batsavage, "The International Trade of 
the People's Republic of China," in Joint Economic Committee, Con-
gress of the United States, People's Republic of China : An Eco-
nomic Assessment, May 1972. 
Note: 1) The estimates do not indicate the esLimation results for 
this row. U.N . estimates, which are subject to the reservation 
described in Table 3 indicate that the amount of exports of machi-
nery and equipment (SITC 7) was U.S . $63 million for 1969 while 
the amounts of import was U. S. $600 million . 
dustry, rraking up currently about one-fourth of total exports . 
Analyses of production costs suggest that it has already a suffi-
cient competitive power in the international rrarket . Yet, the 
prospects for its further expansion seem· to be limited by protec-
tionist policies in both the advanced and developing c ountry mar-
kets . 
(5) Exports of processed metals, chemical products and, especial-
ly, rrachinery and equip me nts are still very limited in arrDunt . 
The low voluIIE of exports for these products should be assessed 
against the well-know fact that the export market for these com-
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Table 2 Destinations of Imports and Origins of Exports 
within the Domestic Economy: 1970 
A. Imports 
[
Domestic sectors of 
final destination 
Central economic 
sector 
Uses 
For technological pro-
gress 
For making-up deficit 
supply 
Categories of traded 
corrnodities: Arrount 
(million U. S. dollars) 
Machinery and 
equipment 
Chemicals 
Metals 
(395) 
(100) 
(600) 
Export industry 
sector 
For supplying raw mate- Textile fibers 
rial for export comrro-
( llO) 
di ties 
? 
Local industry 
sector 
Agricultural sector Agricultural inputs 
Household consump-
tion sector 
B . Exports 
r--rlomestic sectors o~ 
origins 
Central economic 
sector 
Export industry 
sector 
Local industry 
sector 
sector~ Agricultural 
I 
? 
Chemical fertili-
zer (230) 
Grains ( 280)1 
Categories of tradea-° 
comnodi ties: Amount 
(million U.S. dollars) 
Metals ( 65) 
Machinery ( ? ) 
Textile yarn and 
faeries and 
clothing ( 495) 
Foodstuffs (645) 
Oilseeds, fibers, 
crude animal 
rraterials (280) 
Remarks: Traded comnodities indicated in the last column are by no 
means complete; the traded value shown in the bracket only 
shows that anount identified in Table 1 . 
nodities is the only one anong China's export markets where the 
income elasticity of demand is high and there is no artificial 
barriers that restrict their free trade . 
3. The important implication of the above discussion is that the 
development of metal, chemical and machinery industries as new 
branches of export industry would countribute most easily to weaken-
ing of the existing export constraints. The question which immedi-
ately follows is why the Chinese government has not yet initiated 
measures in that direction . To answer this question, one needs to 
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make detailed studies by indus try on the technical quality, prices 
and costs of the products and on the export market conditions . I 
shall dwell on some of these topics shortly by taking up machinery 
industry as an example . Before, that, however, a few general re-
marks may be in order . As shown in Appendix Table 3 on comparative 
Chinese and Japanese price level, the Chinese side was at a serious 
comparative disadvantage for the cornnodities under question were in 
the 1950's. With the progress of capital accurrulation and advance-
nent in technologies, the comparative disadvantage position of these 
10 comnodities appears to have become less , though precise estima-
tions are difficult at the present stage . On the other hand , Chart_ 
1 indicates that the overall comnodity structure of China's foreign 
trade, which is of a pattern exhibited by developing economies, is 
largely reflected in the structure of China's trade with the western 
advanced countries, whereas the structure of China's trade with the 
developing countr~es is rroving gradually toward the pattern exhibit-
ed by developed countries. This suggests that should the comnodities 
under question become major export comnodities, their markets will 
at first be located in the developing countries . 
5. Turning to China's machinery industry, it will be useful at 
first to summarize the evaluation of a Japanese machine-tool engin-
eer (who has a profound experience in technical interchange with 
China) on the technological level that China's machine-tool industry 
has now r eached. 11 
10 
11 
Cl) Machine- tool factories in China are at present manufacturing 
alnost all the kinds of machine-tools being manufactured in the 
world. A considerable arrount of them have been manufactured by 
the Chinese according to their own designs. There is very little 
simple straight copying o f imported machine-tools. In no st cases, 
sone kind of improvement or devise is added to the domestically 
manufactured machine-tools. 
(2) Large-scale and super-large-scale machine-tools do not seem 
On the basis of the price changes in industrial and agricultural 
goods between 1957 and 1970 shown in Appendix Table 2, and also 
by using the Japan's wholesale price i ndices, we can estimate 
that during the same period, the Chinese prices relative to the 
Japanese prices declined by 11 percent for foodstuffs and crude 
materials and by 25 percent for all of the other comnodities . 
Hajime Miyazaki, "The Machine-tool Industry in China," Nippon no 
Kagaku to Gijutsu (Science and Technology in Japan) August 1972 . 
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Chart 1 . The proportion of China ' s Exports and Imports by 
Comrrodity Groups : Four major Trade- Partner Groups, 
1955 , 1959 and 1969 
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Sources : UN, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, March 1961, March 
1964 and March 1970 and Government of Japan, Jsusho HakushQ. 
(White Book on Foreign Trade) for 1960, 196 4 and 1970 . 
Notes : In this diagram, both exports and imports are classified 
according to US ' s SITC in the following way : 
A: SITC Sections 0 and 1 Food , beverages and t obacco 
B : SITC Sections 2 and 4 Crude rraterials, exc . fuels; 
and fats 
C: SITC Section 3 Mineral fuels and related materials 
D: SITC Section 5 Chemicals 
E : SITC Section 7 Machinery and transpor!:. equiprrent 
F : SITC Sections 6 and 8 Other :rranufactured goods 
The percentage of the export or import anount of each 
group to total export or import anount is indicated pro-
portionally by the area of the quadrangle corresponding to 
each group . 
The lin indicates the year 1955 (for Japan 1957) , 
- --- 1959 (for Japan 1964) and ~ 1969 . 
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to have been manufactured . Processing that requires the aid of 
these machine- tools is being done either by imported rrachine-tools 
or by various means: remoulding of the existing rrachine-tools, 
rranufacturing of special machines and simple devices. 
(3} There is no problem about precisions, except in the case where 
the precision of a specially high standard is required. 
(4} There are shortcomings in the quality of rraterials and in the 
divison of labor and cooperation among those factories which are 
still underdeveloped. 
(5) The differential in technological levels is still substantial 
arnong regions and arnong factories . Yet, an elementary technical 
knowledge of manufacturing rrachine-tools has been widely diffused . 
Many factories producing ordinary nachines are, in order to rreet 
the deficit in supplies, self-manufacturing a nuniber of special 
purpose machine-tools as well as such general-purpose machine-
tools as lathes and friase milling nachines . Even local srrall-
scale enterprises and the factories of the People's Comnunes are 
engaged in self-nanufacturing of such items . 
Japanese engineers admit that together with the development of 
machine-tool industry, China has now reached a stage in which alrnost 
all types of industrial machinery can be independently manufactured . 
Depending on the branch of industry the levels of technology at the 
!T()St advanced factories are said to be similar to those of Japan ten 
or fifteen years ago . 
In Chart 3 the fierce competitions in the Hong Kong import rrarket 
between Chinese and Japanese products of consumer durables, indus-
trial nachinery and !Tihchine tools is illustrated . Since the state 
trading system in China is able to determine the export prices of 
comrrodities without regard to dorrestic costs and prices, this state 
of competition does not necessarily reflect the competitive power of 
these commodities in terms of production costs and prices. Yet, my 
earlier references regarding the general tendency toward a price de-
crease in manufactured goods sugges t that the production costs of 
those machines which do not require a high degree of precision and 
whose structure is relatively s imple should be decreasing . Moreover, 
the chart indicates that the competi ti vri:: power of these comrrodi ties 
in terms of quality is certainly sufficient and even increasing . An 
implication of these discussions is that, if she wishes to do so, 
China may be now in the position of being capable of exporting much 
6 6 
Chart 3 
(1) 
sooo 
>" s 
c 
!:l 
rt 
I-'· 
!:l 
-~ 1000 
-{/} 
I-' 
0 
0 
0 
500 
100 
50 
10 
5 
1956 1960 
SHIG ERU I S HIKAWA 
Competition between Selected Chinese and Japanese 
Commodities in the Hong Kong Market as Reflected 
in the Shares of H.K. Import from the Two Countries 
Bicycles (2) Lathes 
( 733110) 
(71502) 
5000 -
>" 
8 
c 
!:l 
rt 
Import f-' · 
from !:l 
China ::r: 1000 :;>;: 
~ 
-{/} 
I-' 
0 
0 ,/ 0 Impo?/ from 
Japan 500 
""' 
\ Import 
from 
Japan 
;v 200 ;;. ··~.~ 100 100 [ \ ' \ Japan 
(; ' / I China \ 50 
\ c so ~ China \ !:l 
I f-' · 
'1/ \ rt \ <: c Pl !:l I I-' f-' · 
I c 
I 
rt (1) 
<: 
lI! 
J 
Pl 
I-' 
!::':: c 
-{/} 
10 (1) 
::r: 
:;>;: 
-{/} 
5 
1965 1970 1956 1960 1965 1970 
10000 
5000 
. 30000 
20000 
10000 
5000 
1000 
500 
100 
THE IMPACT OF THE EMERGENCE OF CHINA 
:J>' 
8 
c 
::s 
rt .. 
::r: 
~ 
-(/} 
I-' 
0 
0 
0 
(3) Electric fans 
( 725034) 
~r/ 
jnport J 
-from 
Japan 
.___!nport 
from 
China 
d ~.,.....-"-o-o-~100-
o~ -~ l. Japan/" --o 
-t;-1'\-J!'~l v~,~~ 
China---- · 
c 
::l 
f-' · 
rt 
< 
Pl 
I-' 
c 
ro 
::r: 
?<: 
-(/} 
I 
10000 
5000 
150 
1000 
50 500 
100 
:J>' 
8 
c 
::l 
rt .. 
::r: 
~ 
-(/} 
I-' 
0 
0 
0 
67 
l4l Co~ton power looms 
(717120) 
Import~ 
from Japan 
China 
;~~;/, ::r: f-'· 
~ rt 
-(/} 
~< 
. Pl 
I-' 
c 
ro 
1956 1960 1965 1970 1956 1960 1965 1970 
Source : Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government , 
Hong Kong Trade Statistics, Imports, December issues of 1957-
1971. 
10000 
5000 
68 SHIGERU ISHIKAWA 
larger quantities of nachinery products than at present. 
6 . If the above observation is essentially valid, the reasons 
why China has not yet initiated export prorrotion neasures of interne-
diate and capital goods seem to be either one or two of the follow-
ing three . (1) China's intention to intro&uce the western indus-
trial technology has not been serious to date; hence, China has not 
felt keenly the necessity to increase the total amount of exports 
substantially. (2) Dorrestic demand for intermediate and capital 
goods has been too large to cater for ~xport. ( 3) The Chinese 
governrrent might have considered the measures to prorrote the expor-
tation of these goods but abandoned them, because it was found to 
require not only reallocation of resources and man-pmvers from other 
important branches of industry, but also additional importation of 
parts , netals and even mineral products . 
7 . In terms of the future possibilities, reason (3) seems 
likely to be the most important and, hence, worthy of a further com-
rrent . This reason suggests that under the present economic and re-
source conditions in China, rreasures for export pronotion of rretals, 
chemicals and nachinery products would require at least sone shift 
of the policy criterion of dorrestic equilibrium toward that of inter-
national equilibrium. If this shift is substantial, the resultant 
economic structure may cone into conflict with the economic struc-
ture of "self-reliance," and the ideal of a new society based on eli-
mination of the "Three Big-Differentials" may lose its dynamic ele-
rrents. Yet, this seems to be a dilemma that the Chinese governrrent 
I!UlSt face, if they want to introduce western technology as quickly 
and as corrprehensively as possible. 
IV China in Asian-Pacific Trade 
1. The central interest of this section is to explore the possi-
ble place, role and impacts of the Chinese economy with its unique 
behavior patterns outlined above in the international econoTI\Y, es-
pecially in the Asian-Pacific area, where different behavior pat-
terns of nations, enterprises and (perhaps also) people prevail. 
The question is novel . In the prewar era, foreign trade of the 
U.S.S . R. drastically declined (from 1930) once the foundation of her 
capital goods industry was established, and the econoTI\Y was alr;ost 
closed to the international econoTI\Y . China's economic policy is 
similar to that of the u.s.s .R. in that the economy is guided by 
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"planners' sovereignty " and aims at industrialization on the princi-
ple of "dorrestic equilibrium. " Yet, there are at least two dissim-
ilarities. First, China is much more "outward-looking" in feeling 
the necessity to introduce western technology . Second, China has 
emphasized that "human initiatives" is to be relied on as the impor-
tant dynamic force in economic development. Although this second 
point concerns domestic policy, China seems to believe that a rrodel 
of economic developmnet along these lines should be relevant to 
other developing countries as well. 
2 . First, with regard to the place of China in the international 
trade . Up to this time , it has been quite minor . As is shown in 
Table 3 of the international trade matrix centering on China, the 
values of China's exports and imports in 1969 occupied only 0 . 8 per-
cent and 0 . 9 percent respectively of total world exports and imports . 
In the Asian-Pacific area, the proportion of exports to and imports 
from China in total exports and imports of a country was 1 . 5 percent 
and 4 . 4 percent for the Asian countries corrbined excluding China and 
Japan ("Other Asia" in the Table), 2.7 percent and 2 . 0 percent for 
Japan, almost nil for the U. S . , 0 . 8 percent and 0 . 5 percent for 
Canada and 2 . 5 percent and 0 . 8 percent for Australia and New Zealand 
corrbined. The i mport percentage figure for "Other Asia" is mislead-
ing, because China's export trade with "Other Asia" is concentrated 
in three countries : Malaysia (in 1969 US$133 million), Singapore 
(US$140 million) and in particular Hon g Kong (US$446 million) 12 ; 
the weight of the China trade is only significant for these countri-
es . The issue, therefore, is whe ther and how the above position of 
China's for€ign trade will chane in the near f uture. 
3. Exploration of this issue can be fi r st made by separating the 
c onceivable determining factor s of China's fore i gn trade into three 
groups: The first group concerns China's own policy, the second the 
policies of the ~dvanced we stern countries to China and the third 
with the possible course o f economic development in d e veloping Asia . 
12 
(l) The discussions in the previous sections suggest that dep~nd­
in~ upon Chinese govern rrent policy, there are conceivably three 
broad alternative paths o f d e velopment in China ' s foreign trade in 
The con tribution of Ho n g Kon g to t h e f oreign c urre ncy rec eipt of 
Ch ina i s well s u mmariz ed in A. H. Usack and R.E. Bat s ava ge, "The 
International Tr ade o f t he People 's Republ ic of China, " in Joint 
Economic Committe e , U.S . Con gress, Pe ople' s Republ ic of China : 
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the near future. 
The first alternative is that China decides to develop her cen-
tral economic sector as quickly and as comprehensivly as possible . 
The demand for imports would increase to such an extent that the 
export pronotion of metals and machinery would require additional 
imports of raw materials and parts, and mineral and nil resource 
development for exports would require the acceptance of the "deve-
lopment-import" for fill la offered by the Western countries. Under 
this alternative, the principle of "domestic equilibrium" would 
have to be substantially replaced by that of "international equili-
brium," and this may force the existing domestic economic struct·-
ure to be substantially remoulded. The second alternative is one 
in which the policy of the recent past remains to be in operation. 
The rationale for this would be that the economic policy of deve·· 
lopment an economic structure of"self-reliance" should be adhered 
to as ideologically only valid policy; any measures which may im-
pair the principle of "domestic equilibrium" should be kept as 
rrinimall as possible. ~nder this alternative, the economy's for-
eign trade dependency ratio may tend to decline further as the 
capital ~ccufilllation in the central industry sector grows. The 
Chinese economy would be left isolated and remain as a low-produc-
tivity and, hence, low-income econorrry, though the econorrry may work 
quite effectively. The third alternative would be somewhere bet-
ween the above two alternatives. 
It is by no means easy to attempt any useful projections of 
China's foreign trade which wou ld correspond to each of these al-
ternatives. Yet, the following comments may be made . Probably 
the case where the present import dependecy ratio of the econorrry 
continues to remain the same would correspond to some variant of 
the third alternative. The trend value of the annual growth rate 
in China's national income seems to be in the 4 to 6 percent range 
if past performance is made the base of the inferrence.
13 
Stabili-
13 Refer to Ishikawa, "Prospects of the Chinese Econorrry: Trends and 
14 
Cycles" (op.cit . ) 
In Ishikawa, "Hypothetical Projection of the Chinese Economy : 
1966 to 1981," The Developing Economies, September 1970, four 
different assumptions were used for alternative projections. A 
practicable variant based on one of these assumptions indicates 
a growth rate of around 5 percent. Ne ither of these assumptions 
take up the case whe re the introduction of western technology 
would create a favorable situation for growth. 
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ty of economic policy and a rrore active introduction of western 
technology would raise somewhat this range of growth rates, maybe 
5 to 8 percent level. 14 With this range of rate of growth in na-
tional income, and starting from 1970 (Table l)the valueof China's 
total imports would increase as follows (the values of total ex-
ports would similar in each case, if the present practice of 
roughly equalizing the value of total exports and total imports 
continues): 
Value in US$ billion Index 
5% case 8% case 5 % case 8% case 
1970 2.17 100 
1975 2.76 3.19 127 . 6 146.9 
1980 3 . 53 4.69 162 . 9 215 . 9 
1985 4 . 51 6.88 207 . 9 317.2 
The import or export dependency ratio may increase somewhat 
even under this alternative. Incorre elasticities of import and 
export, however, may not be as high as 1.5 or 2.0, such as observ-
ed in Taiwan during the 1960's (income elasticity of export was 
1 . 426 and that of import 1 . 906 between 1960 and 1969). Such 
ratios would be only possible under the first alternative . I at-
tempted previously a hypthetical projection (1965-1975) on the 
basis of an assumption that is essentially similar to the second 
alternative . 15 The import dependency ratio of the demand for 
machinery and equipment was assumed to decrease from 40 percent 
in 1957 to 15 percent in 1975. For other import categories, vari-
ous assumptions with regard to income elasticity of imports were 
made . The result of the projection indicated an annual growth 
rate of 2.5 percent of both exports and imports . 
Of these three possible alternatives, I am inclined to consider 
that the third is most probable . However, as discussed in the 
last section, this alternative seems to carry an unstable element 
which tends to bring the economy sooner or later back to the first 
alternative. Politically, this would, in turn, tend to invite a 
reaction resulting in a swing to the second alternative. The 
Chinese government, thezefore , would prefer a cautious path even 
15 
See not~ 9. For details , refer t o Ishikawa, ed., Chugoku Kei zai 
no Choki Tembo (~ong Term Projections of the Chinese Economy), 
Vol.II, The Institute of Deve loping Economies, 1966, Chapter 1. 
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16 
under this third alternative . 
(2) The future of China ' s foreign trade will be affected by the 
policies of the advanced western countries toward the China trade , 
either through their impacts on Chinese policy or directly through 
their impacts on the commodity flows . Paticularly noteworthy is 
the growing interest in China as a possible export market that 
Japanese manufacturers in almost every branch of heavy-chimical 
industry have shown in the past year. This is understabdable 
especially in fields such as iron and steel products, machine-
tools and chemical fertilizers whose ratios of dependency on ex-
ports to China are already very high . 16 The expectation that 
China will emerge as a source of supply for minerals and especial -
ly oil is also growing . This growing interest has led directly 
or indirectly to pressure exerted on the government to relax 
or remove export and import controls on the China trade, controls 
on export credit terms extended to China by the Export-Irrport Bank 
and other artificial restrictions . 
(3) The future of economic development in other Asian countries 
may also affect China's foreign trade, mainly because it will 
dtermine the size of the potential market for China ' s exports of 
metal, chemical and machinery products . In the case that China 
chooses to adopt the first alternative course of development 
foreign trade described above, the possibility will arise in which 
China's demand for the primary products of these countries will 
tend also to increase and the course of their economic development 
will affect even this primary product trade . 
While the prospects for economic development in other Asian 
countries is a big subject to study, three issues seem to be among 
the most crucial factors - one: the so-called Green Revolution, 
two : industrialization through the direct investment in manufact-
ures by enterprises from advanced countries and three : the advanc-
ed countries' policies toward imports of primary and light indust-
rial products from these countries . The first two represent the 
dynamic elements which have emerged since the second half of the 
1960's. Already in a few countries , these two factors have con-
The ratio of total value of exports which were exported to China 
was 9 . 0 percent in 1970 for iron and steel, 20 percent for 
machine-tools (in terms of total value of production 20 percent) 
and 53 percent for chemical fertilized in 1969 (in terms of total 
volume of production 44 percent) . 
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tributed a great deal towards increasing the growth rates of food 
and manufacturing production, though not to the extent of reducing 
the foreign exchange gap significantly . On the other hand , they 
have also created new problems . The Green Revolution has brought 
with it an increasing differentials in income and wealth positions 
aITOng the rural families . Industrialization through direct invest-
ment of foreign capital has aroused the fear of foreign dominance 
over the economy among the urban residents . These problems will 
have a long-run impacts upon the course of economic development . 
Perhaps the most crucial issue , at least in the immediate future, 
will be the third one . Insofar as the basic principles of econo~ 
mic development policy in these countries continue to remain the 
same, and barring an appreciable increase in the current flow of 
international aid , a more drastic change in the import polices of 
the advanced countries in favor of the developing countries is 
what is urgently required for the economic development of the Asi -
an countries . 
To sumnarize•, it is not probable that China's foreign trade will 
follow the first alternative path of development . It is safer to 
assume that China's export and imports will grow at a rate of 5 to 8 
percent or a little above that . If this estimate is valid, the 
issue of the place of China's foreign trade in the Asian-Pacific 
trade may also be estimated . If, as projected by other authors , 17 
the foreign trade of other countries in the Asian-Pacific area will 
also increase at a growth rate that is similar to or higher than 
that indicated above for China, the relative position China has held 
in the recent past will not change significantly . 
4 . The subject of the impact of the emergence of China does 
not end with the discussion of the China ' s place in international 
trade . The challenge of the emergence of China may rather cone 
from the Chinese model of economic development the essensial in-
gredients of which are, as discussed in the previous sections, (i) 
the policy of "domestic equilibrium" rather than "international equi-
librium"; (ii) the policy of constructing a viable local economic sec-
tor with the primary reliance on "human initiatives" of local people 
and (iii) the policy of constructing gradually, selectively and with-
17 
Kiyoshi Kojima , Saburo Okita and Peter Drysdale, "Foreign Eco-
nomic Relations ~· in Asian Development Bank , Southeast Asia's Eco-
nomy in the 1970 ' s , Lonqnan , London, 1971 , and Saburo Ohkita , 
Econo~c Development i n the 1970 ' s - Japan and Asia, The Japan 
Econonuc Research Center , June 1972 . 
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in her own rreans a central economic sector which has an interna-
tional competitive power . There is certainly a problem how far the 
countries of Southeast Asia would be able to follow the first ingre-
dient of the Chinese model, since the economic structure of the 
countries are significantly exposed to the foreign trade and the size 
of the economy is nostly small. However, the second and third in-
gredients may become attractive, and when this happens the present 
pattern of foreign trade of these countries would be modified accord-
ingly . 
Space does not permit further elaboration . Following comments , 
however , are in order . ( l) The challenge would become when real 
when the following two situations arise: first, in China the cur-
rent economic policy continues to be enforced and her domestic eco-
nomy progresses in a way that may be slow but is nevertheless 
steady, and second, in other Asian countries the Green Revolution 
and the industrialization mainly through direct investment by for -
eign enterprises will have definitly unfavorable social effects , and 
the advanced western countries ' import policies will remain substan-
tially as they are now. ( 2) The dissemination of the Chinese model 
as an alternative economic development model for the developing coun-
tries would be facilitated by a steady growth of their China trade, 
by an increase in exchanges of tourists and cultural and academic 
missions and by a growing volume of technical and economic aid by 
China . The role which will be played by the Overseas Chinese re-
siding in these countries (including these naturalized) is not en-
tirely certain, but is potentially very important. (3) China ' s eco-
nomic aids, which amounted to 2 . 2 billion U. S . dollars from 1953 to 
1972, 18 seems to be peculiarly Chinese, especially in the sense that 
the aid projects are being undertaken using technological and orga-
nizational methods similar to those used in China . ( 4) Responses 
to Chinese aid and methods have so far been much more significant in 
Africa than Asia . While there are cultural, political and histori-
cal reasons for this, this may not hold in the future should condi-
tions in (1) and (2) come to be satisfied . 
18 
Leo Tansky , "Chinese Foreign Aid ," in Joint Economic Committee , 
U. S . Congress , People's Republic of China, An Economic Assessment . 
This paper gives a good account of 8hara~teristics of China's aid 
projects . 
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Overall 
pattern 
Restoration Period 
1949-52 
Recovery policy 
Organizational Democratic insti·-
policy tutional reform 
Appendix Table 1 Changes in the 
1 FYP Period 
1953-57 
Soviet model of 
planned indust-
r iali za tion 
Toward establi-
shing organiza-
tions on the 
Soviet Model 
GLF Period (2 RYP) 
1958- 60 
Chinese method of 
dualistic industri -
alization 
Toward decentrali -
zation 
Industry Take-over of the Enphasis on cen-
sta te enterprises; tral state e nt-
San-fan and Wufan erprises; cent-
movement ralized manage-
Emphasis on local 
state enterprises, 
especially hsie~ 
and hsiang enter-
prises: Simplifica-
tion and "revolu-
tionalization" of 
management . 
Agriculture Land redistribu-
tion 
Allocational 
policy 
Industry 
Agriculture 
Restoration of 
normal market me-
chanism 
l oeflationary me-
asures; Fiscal 
centralization; 
restoration of 
the Northeast 
base 
Reconstruction of 
internal trade 
channels between 
the rural and ur-
ban districts 
ment system of 
state enterpris-
es with khozras-
chet and incen-
tive wages; 
Gradual coopera- Reorganization in-
tivization and to People's Com-
collectivization munes as a basic 
Emphasis on 
heavy industria-
lization which 
is also consid-
ered as prerequ-
isite to agricu·· 
ltural moderni-
zation 
I Investment prio-
rity on 
(1) heavy indus-
try 
(2) large-scale 
factories 
(3) highly adva-
nced techniqu-
es 
(4) the existing 
industrial bases 
Strengthening of 
marketing cont-
rol 
!
economic and admi -
nistrative unit 
Emphasis on in-
creased production 
of foodgrains and 
steel 
Emphasis on build-
ing of small-scale 
local industry 
with native tech-
niques, mainly by 
local resources 
Strengthening of 
intensive farming 
method s (improved 
cropping systems, 
water conservancy, 
manuring) with 
local resources 
THE IMPACT OF THE EMERGENCE OF CHINA 77 
Economic Policies of the PRC Government 
Readjustrrent Period 
1961-65 
Readjustrrent aiming 
at recovery 
Elimination of inefficient 
hiien and hsiang enter-
pr ices 
Reorganization of PC into 
decentralized fashion 
Priority on the industrie s 
supporting agriculture; 
readjustrrent of small 
ente rprises; and technical 
reforms in the existing 
large-scale enterprises 
Relaxation and renewal of 
intensive farming rre thods 
3 FYP Period (Cultural 4 FYP Period 
Revol . ) 1966-1970 incl . 1971-
Formulation of a new 
economic policy 
Revised Chinese 
method 
Toward decentralization with a re-
vised rrethod 
Emphasis on local stat e-enterprises 
in close connection with People' s 
Commune ; Decentralized manage ment 
system: " three combination ," r e -
duction of wa ge and salary differ-
entials 
People ' s Comnu ne with Production 
Teams as basic decision-naking 
units 
Creation of self-reliant regional 
economic zones with priority on 
agricultural rrodernization ; gradual 
shift in the emphasis to the cent-
ral rrode r n sector . 
Local industrial structurecentering 
on agricultural-input i ndustry , 
small and rredium scale and interme-
diate technology . Technological 
transformation of central industry . 
Intensive agriculture with increas-
e d use of mode rn inputs 
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Appendix Chart 1 
Changes in National Incorre, Agricultural 
Output and Foreign Trade of China 1952-1971 
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Remarks : Official estimates refer to t he reconstructed version in 
Ishikawa 1 s National Incorre and Capital Formation in Mainland 
China , Institute of Developing Economies , Tokyo , 1965 and those 
shown in Appendix Table 2 . Liu-Yeh e stimates ref er to those in 
Liu and Yeh , The Economy of the Chinese Mainland : National Incom::_ 
and Economic Development , 1933 - 1959 . (Note 2) . Liu estimates 
refer to those in T . C. Liu , "Quantitat i ve Tr e nds in the Economy " 
in Eckste in, Galenson and Liu , ed ., Economic Trends in Communist 
~, Aldine , Chicago , 1968 . The growth l i ne indicated by x 
represents one of a few other estimates derived by use of the 
structural estimation equations deve l oped by Liu and by the seri-
es of estimated outputs of selected commodities that are independ-
ent from those used in Liu estimates . This corresponds to Version 
1 I attempted in this way in my "A Hypothetical Protection of the 
Chinese Economy; 1966 to 1968 . " Ashbrook ' s estimates : refer to 
A. G. Ashbrook , Jr ., "China : Economic Policy and Economic Results : 
1949 - 71 , " in Joint Economic Committee , Congress of the U. S ., 
People ' s Republic of China : An Economic Assessment , May 1952 . 
His GNP indexes are converted here to t he GNP series expressed 
in the yuan values of 1955 , the base year o f his estimates . The 
figures for exports and i mports are take n from t he estimates made 
by Usack and Batsavage referred t o in Table 1 . 
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Appendix Table 2 Official Estimates of China's National Income 
which are Converted to U. S . Dollar Values by 
Official Covernsion Rate : 1970 and 1957 
1970 (in 1957 (in 
Annual growth 
1970 prices) 1957 prices) 
rate in 1957 
prices 
1. NDP (in $billion) 88 .3 46.6 6.4 
of which, 
Agricultural output 24 . 5 18.3 1. 7 
Industrial output 27.3 10 . l 10 . 1 
2. Population (million 
1.3-1.8 persons) 750-800 634 
l'. Per capita NDP (in $) ll0-ll8 73 4.6-5 . 1 Per capita agr.output 31·- 33 29 -0 . 1- 0 . 4 Per capita ind.output 34- 36 16 8.0-8 . 5 
Source: S . Ishikawa, "Prospects for the Chinese Economy : Trends and 
Cycles," Pacific Community, Jan.1973 . 
Remarks: In deriving the annual growth rate in 1957 prices, allow-
ances are made for the price increase between 1957 and 1970 of 
7 . 9 percent in agriculture and the price reduction of 21 . 9 percent 
in industry. For agriculture and industry combined the average 
price reduction was 15.5 percent between 1957 and 1970, and this 
is assumed to be equivalent to the index of NDP def lator for the 
same period. 
Appendix Table 3 Comparative Chinese Price Level with Respect 
to Japan (the Chinese prices expressed as ratio 
to the Japanese prices, when the latter is 
converted to yuan at the official exchange rate) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
1. Textile materials 
2. Fuels (coal) 
3. Matal and metal products 
4. Building naterials 
5. Chemical products 
6. Miscellaneous producers ' goods 
7. Agricultural products for food 
8 . Other food 
9 . Textile products 
10 . Miscellaneous ordinary consume 
~l. Miscellaneous durable consumer 
rs' goods 
s' goods 
1951 1957 
. 52 1. 01 
. 94 . 79 
4.06 2 . 24 
1. 44 1. 23 
1. 38 2 .41 
1. 22 2.63 
. 53 .54 
1. 05 1.17 
2 . 20 3 . 35 
2 . 07 1. 96 
4 . 06 2.24 
Source and remarks : Toshiyuki Mizoguchi, "Comparison of Chinese and 
Japanese Prices", in Ishikawa, ed. Chugoku Keizai no Tokei-teki 
Kenkyu (Statistical Studies of the Chinese Economy), Vol.II, 1962. 
The figures are estimated by using the whole-sale price data in 
Tokyo (compiled by the Bank of Japan) and in Shanghai (compiled by 
Shanghai Economic Institute of Accademia Sinica, Collected Prices 
Materials Before and After the Liberation of Shanghai, 1921-1957, 
Shanghai People's Publishing Co., 1958 . The Chines e prices of tex-
tile products ( 9) seem to include excise duties which are quite high . 
COMMENTS AND DISCUSSION OF 
IsHIKAWA's PAPER 
Ronald Hsia opened the discussion : With China taking over the 
UN Security Council seat, the expectation of the world is to see 
her play an active role not merely in world politics but also in 
international trade, particularly trade in the Asian-Pacific Region . 
Such an expectation , however, should be examined against reality. 
This constitutes the task of Professor Ishikawa in his paper . 
At the outset, I wish to point out that I find Professor Ishika-
wa' s paper highly informative and extremely interesting. It con-
tains a wealth of information and ideas concerning the impact of 
China on the economies of the Asian-Pacific Region. 
This impact , as Professor Ishikawa sees it, will be more likely 
in the broad field of general economic strategy than in the narrow-
er field of trade , although it is the latter field to which he has 
addressed himself in the paper . This, perhaps, explains why he has 
devoted a substantial portion of his paper to examining the nature 
of the Chinese economy and the economic policy of China . 
As far as this portion of the paper is concerned, I find myself 
in general agreement with the author. There are, however, a few 
minor points which I might raise . 
While the decentralization of economic administration began in 
1958, Ishikawa treats it in the paper as if it were a recent deve-
lopment . Similarly the reliance on "human initiative" dates back 
to the 1950s rather than the second half of 1960s. In fact , ever 
since the beginning of the Chinese Communist regime , "human initia-
tive" has been played up as in the emulation and technological inno-
vation campaigns . 
Professor Ishikawa has singled out human engineering and the na-
rrowing of gaps between industry and agriculture between town and 
country, and between mental and physical labour as the major charac-
teristics which distinguish China from other socialist countries . 
It seems to me that these characteristics are common to all sociali-
st countries and that the difference between China and other social-
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ist countries is a matter of degree rather than kind. 
Regarding the Great Leap Forward policy, Professor Ishikawa ' s 
view that it is a nearly complete reversal of the previous Russian-
type policy appears to have somewhat contradicted the Leap policy 
of "walking on two legs", that is, equal emphasis on modern capital-
intensive technology and large scale of operation, on the one hand, 
and traditional labour-intensive technology and small scale of oper-
ation on the other . 
Similarly the discussion of people's communes in this paper giv-
es the impression of uniformity among commune practices . In fact, 
commune practices differ widely in different parts of the country. 
While in many communes , the production team is the accounting unit 
and makes decisions on production distribution and investment , in 
some other communes the production brigade is the accounting unit 
and makes similar decisions . There are also communes where invest- 1 
ment decisions are made at the commune level. 
Turning to external trade, Professor Ishikawa correctly points 
out that China's foreign trade policy is to satisfy the demand for 
imports arising mainly from the country's industrialization need 
for intermediate and capital goods under the constraint of export 
capacity . However, China's low foreign trade dependency ratio 
(which are estimated to be 2 . 7 percent for exports and 2 . 6 percent 
for imports in 1970) cannot be attributed solely to her policy of 
self-reliance, as Professor Ishikawa seems to infer . Equally res-
ponsible for the low ratios are the vast size of · the Chinese econo-
my and the rich and divergent endowment of natural resources. With-
out these basic conditions, self-reliance would have been a disast-
rous policy from the viewpoint of economic development. 
I am somewhat puzzled by the lack of ~iscussion in this paper on 
possible trade diversion . Surely with China 's increasing diplomatic 
relations direct trade will develop with countries with which China 
has newly established diplomatic relations. Some of this direct 
trade would undoubtedly develop at the expense of entrepot trade 
hitherto carried out in Hong Kong or Singapore . Any discussion of 
trade diversion may well tie in with the export constraint emphasiz-
ed in this paper . It should be noted that trade diversion is not 
something new to China . After the Sino-Soviet rift, there was a 
substantial diversion of China's trade from the Soviet Union to 
Western countries and Japan. Prior to the rift, China was getting 
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three quarters of her imports from the Soviet Union . Following the 
rift, this proportion dropped down to less than one quarter . 
The prospect for developing China's external trade, as Professor 
Ishikawa sees it, is not particularly bright . His judgement appears 
to be based on the export constraint, which he feels can be weaken-
ed only by developing metal , chemical and machinery into export in-
dustries, in as much as exports of these commodities are not subject 
to man-made trade barriers and because of the relatively high elas-
ticity of demand for these commodities. But he feels that owing 
to price disadvantage and other difficulties the prospects for de-
veloping these industries for export are not especially good . In 
this connection , China's offer of selling a substantial amount of 
crude oil (which falls into the same category as the above mention-
ed commodities) to Japan reported in Tokyo newspaper yesterday will , 
perhaps , brighten somewhat the outlook for China ' s external trade . 
Arthur Paul continued the commentary : Because Professor Hsia has 
commented on Professor Ishikawa ' s conclusions and on some of the 
more general aspects of this paper, I shall direct my remarks more 
to the description of the Chinese economic structure , the new insti-
tutions , and the methods used to increase productivity and for the 
selection of technology . Success or failure of the structure or 
of the methods could influence Chinese foreign trade policies and 
thus affect the conclusions of the paper . 
I had the privilege of hearing Professor Ishikawa describe the 
economic structure of China on an earlier occasion , and since then 
I have been thinking about its implications for the rest of Asia. 
Now, after reading his paper, several questions have come to my 
mind . 
The first qeustion pertains to the spec ial features of the econo-
mic structure that China has built in order to carry out the policy 
of "reliance on human initiative . " Were the formation of agricul-
tural Production Teams of twenty and thirty farm families , the cre-
ation of Combinations of Managers, Engineers and Workers for local 
industries and the active efforts to eliminate the Three Big Differ-
entials " steps that were improvised in order to relieve the pressur-
es created by a surplus of labor supply , by unemployme nt and under-
utilization of farm labor? Or are these steps the r esu lt of plan-
ning? Were they tested in various areas b e fore they we r e ge nerally 
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adopted? 
In his paper Professor Ishikawa states that there is not yet 
enough information to judge the results of this approach to develop-
ment, but I am wondering if there are some indications of whether 
the use of these methods is expanding or contracting . 
It seems to me that to obtain further information about the re-
sults achieved by these Chinese methods of tackling the problem of 
achieving optimum labor utilization is a matter of great importance 
to the other countries of Asia , and to other parts of the world as 
well. 
If the Chinese practices reduce industrial productivity or result 
in poor choices of technology for agriculture and small industries , 
then no doubt they will be greatly modified or discarded as time 
goes on . On the other hand , if the results that China achieves are 
positive, if she obtains more effective utilization of labor by 
these methods and thereby increases productivity , then the economic 
structure and the methods used in China will spread to those neigh-
boring countries that are struggling with problems created by the 
existence of vast pools of unutilized human energy . This could 
have far-reaching effects on economic planning in other areas, as 
well as important political repercussions . 
Another observation that I would like to make pertains to what 
seems to be a downgrading of the functions of planners, the decent-
ralization of the decision making process, much of which will now 
take place at local levels. In the local industrial sector, deci-
sions are to be in the hands of the "Combinations" of managers , en-
gineers and workers . Presumably the views of economists and socio-
logists are reflected in the determination of the basic general di-
rection of the economy and particularly of the Central Industrial 
Sector, but they will not have any direct influence on the import-
ant decisions to be made at the operating level. 
I am wondering how this will affect the choice of technology for 
the local economic sector . The most interesting and impressive 
technological devices that make effective use of excess labor and 
at the same time increase productivity are those that reflect in 
their designs the ideas of economists (and sociologists) as well as 
those of highly specialized engineers . These can be relatively 
simple tools , but they embody sophisticated and modern engineering 
84 SH IG ERU I S HIKAWA 
practices. It is hard to see how the Production Teams of farm fami-
lies and the local industrial Combinations can have access to or 
make proper use of the fruits of this highly specialized division 
of labor unless they are furnished from the top of the structure, 
which does not seem to be contemplated in China at this time . 
In the West, most of the results of the efforts to create new 
industrial and agricultural technology appear in the form of labor 
saving devices . There are now some important and well-organized 
efforts to create new technology that is suitable to areas where 
there is excessive unemployment and where farm labor is underutiliz-
ed . These efforts involve the attribution of proper weight to the 
existence of surplus labor ; but they disregard neither modern en-
gineering principles nor the possibility of using (as components) 
technology created in other parts of the world . It is possible 
that the Chinese approach may over weight the labor supply factor 
and many disregard other factors that could contribute more effect-
ively to development . 
Professor Ishikawa has mentioned the Green Revolution. He refers 
to increasing differentials in the income and wealth positions of 
rural families that have followed the modernization of agriculture 
in other parts of Asia and to the possibility of further unfavor-
able social effects of the Green Revolution . The reports that I 
have seen on the results of the Green Revolution vary greatly in 
their conclusions . The first reports from India tended to confirm 
Professor Ishikawa ' s references to unfavorable economic and social 
effects . The way in which India introduced the new seeds and mecha-
nized cultivation in the Punjab did have such effects, but the me-
thods that India used reflected political objectives which called 
for the achievement of self-sufficiency in food production in the 
shortest possible period of time . Somewhat similar methods have 
been used in Pakistan . On the other hand , there are other areas of 
India where different methods brought forth different results . In 
those areas, credit to finance the needed inputs was more readily 
available to small farmers and so was access to water and to suppli-
es of the new seeds themselves . Reports from those areas regarding 
the effect on local employment and income distribution are very dif-
ferent from the reports of the experience in the Pun j ab . 
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There are also important studies of the impact of the introduc-
tion of the new rice seeds in the Philippines . The results are not 
yet conclusive, but they already indicate patterns that are differ -
ent from the Indian experience . 
Professor Ishikawa has performed a valuable service by gathering 
the information contained in his paper and presenting it in a clear 
and concise form . The information will be of great interest and 
use to those planners in Asia who are struggling with the imponder-
able problems created by vast surpluses of unutilized labor . They 
will watch , not only with curiosity, but with intense and vital in-
terest , the results of the Chinese efforts to meet these problems . 
Subsequent discussion focussed on the possible emergence of Chi na 
as a major trading nation , e ither as an exporter of agricultural 
and other primary products or as an exporter of light manufactured 
goods. In particular, the possibility of intense competition be-
tween other developing countries and China in the export of light 
manufactured goods was stressed . 
Professor Ishikawa agreed with other participants who argued that 
adoption of the Chinese development strategy was unlikely to change 
the trade dependence of Southeast Asian countries greatly, both be-
cause of the size of their domestic markets and because of the na-
ture of their resource endowments . 
In reply , Professor Ishikawa s aid that he had presented these 
alternative courses for t he f uture course of China ' s foreign tra de 
and had deliberately refrained from concluding whether she would 
take the first alternative of ' import dependence ' or the second al-
ternative of 'self reliance '. But he was not so p e ssimistic as had 
been suggested about the f uture cours e of China ' s foreign trade . 
He added that the success of China ' s development strategy was 
still uncertain . Further , it did not appear that the employment ef-
fects were a major consideration in the choice of a particular deve-
lopment strategy . There was more concern about the linkage mechani-
sm by which industrial development put energy into agriculture and 
thus led to agricultural development and the absorption of labour 
by the agricultural sector . 
PART II 
INDUSTRIALIZATION 
AND 
TRADE GROWTH 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
3 
TRADE AND INDUSTRIALIZATION POLICIES: 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SECOND BEST1 
Helen Hughes 
I . Introduction 
Enpirical evidence of the costs of high protection and the bene-
fits of trade has in recent years added so nuch weight to the conclu-
sions of trade theorists that not only in the literature, but also 
in the minds of sophisticated policy makers, there is little doubt 
that in a global context, the rrore outward looking an economy the 
better . Trade policies on the other hand, continue to be strongly 
protectionist, and steps taken toward trade liberalization have turn-
ed out to be of minor value to developing countries . There has been 
little attempt and no success in explaining actual geographic and 
corrurodity patterns of trade in terms of trade theory . Thus, in 
spite of the attention devoted to the economics of international 
trade , and in spite of the considerable advances rrade in the field 
in the last 20 years or so, there is also considerable disillusion-
rrent with the state of the art. 2 
This paper does not argue that the theory of trade is irrelevant. 
Nor does it suggest that private persons and governrrents are not 
1 I am indebted to Naimeh Hadjitarkhani for the preparation of the 
data for this paper . 
2 R . N. Cooper, reviewing the international econoIPics articles in the 
new International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, concluded 
that "there is a serious question about the relevance of the pure 
theory of trade", Journal of Economic Literature, June 1970,p . 436 . 
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rrotivated, by and large, by their economic interests . It does, how-
ever, contend that the factors usually hidden in simplifying assurrp-
tions for the convenience of trade theory rrodels - technological 
change and economies of scale, product differentiation and irrperfect 
corrpetition, the costs of administering trade policies, historical 
trading patterns and temporal dimensions, and problems of incorre dis-
tribution - are critical in determining private economic behavior 
and government policy. After sumrrarizing the characteristics of the 
international trading structure which face developing countries, 
this paper examines these factors in the context of industrial poli -
cy forrrulation. Because political conditions influence and some-
times determine economic goals, those too are taken into account 
where they are of particular importance . The options open to the 
developing countries are then discussed . 
II . Characteristics of the International Trading Structure Facing 
Developing Countries 
The economic evaluation of the efficiency with which resources 
are allocated depends on the identification of appropriate narket 
and social prices. In an open economy, and among open economies, 
this rreans prices in an international trading context . The dorrestic 
resource cost, 3 effective protection, 4 and the Little-Mirrlees 5 meth-
od of project evaluation have focused on international prices as the 
relevant social prices . The more recent Sen Gupta-Sen-Marglin pro-
ject appraisal method , emphasizing the problems of using internation-
al prices as social prices in a second-best world, 6 concluded that 
international prices should be viewed as market prices which require 
adjcistrrent according to a country ' s optimizing objectives. An ana-
lysis based on shadow pricing similarly uses international prices as 
reference points. Thus, whatever the method of approach , the identi-
fication of an international price is essential . Paradoxically , 
these cost benefit methodologies have been refined at a time when 
3 
4 
5 
6 
M. Bruno, "The Optimal Selection of Export-prorroting and Irrport 
Substituting Projects" in UN, Planning the External Sector : Tech-
niques, Problems and Policies, 1965 . 
M, Carden, The Theory of Protection , 1971, brings together the 
various threads of effective protection ~hPory as well as noting 
its historical evolution in Appendix 1, p . 245 ff . 
OECD , Development Centre Stndies , Manual of Indus t ri al Project 
Analysis in Developing Count~ ie s , Vol . l , Methodo l ogy and Case 
Studies , 196 8 . 
UNIDO , Guidel i nes for Pro j ect Evaluation , 1972 . 
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trading conditions have made an international price largely of h i s -
torical interest . 7 
The erosion of 'international prices' has been essentially an eco-
nomic process. It has taken some considerable time, and it cannot 
be understood without reference to the economics of industrial organ-
ization. In retrospect, ~orld War II was the watershed between the 
largely outward looking nineteenth century and the neo-mercantilism 
of the twentieth . Though to a lesser extent than in World War II, 
the demands of a war economy accelerated economic change, making pro-
duction more corrplex and capital intensive. The cost reducing advan-
tages of economies of scale were accentuated . In the 1920s mass pro-
duction techniques were applied to mass consunption products, bring-
ing capital intensiveness and economies of scale to marketing . Pro-
duct differentiation emerged as a marketing technique, adding quali-
ty differentials to price differentials as a means of conpetition . 
Vertical and horizontal integration was stimulated. Increased con-
centration in production and distribution spilled over national 
boundaries, replacing indirect by direct foreign private investment. 
The multinational corporation emerged as a fact of economic life . 
The growing importance of the economies of scale provided a time 
dimension rationale for discriminatory pricing. Marginal costing to-
day would be recouped by average costing on a larger scale of pro-
duction tomorrow . The potential benefits of economies of scale gave 
a new impetus to pre-meditated investment in excess capacity, and 
then looked to marginal pricing in export markets to minimize losses 
until the market grew to catch up with the capacity installed. In 
some capital and intermediate goods industries this led to cyclical 
movements with peaks of excess capacity driving prices below margin-
al costs in international markets so that investment was halted. 
After a few years, however, demand caught up with existing capacity, 
shortages developed and prices rose, and a new investment - margin-
al pricing cycle began. International steel prices have for many 
years been an exarrple of such a latter day "cobweb" theorem. 
Product differentiation and increasing concentration, with attend-
ant monopoly and oligopoly, gave new opportunities for discriminato-
ry pricing. Firms in the lead of a "product cycle" were in a parti-
7 
A~though ~ork such as R.E. Lipsey and I.B. Kravis', Price Corrpeti-
t~v~nes~.in Worl~ Trade, . 1971,acknowledges the difficulty of deter-
in:-ning interi:iati<?nal prices", the problem has received curiously 
little attention in the considerable literature concerned with the 
consequences of their measurement . 
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cularly favorable position because they could use the intra-margin-
al profits earned by their nonopoly of knowledge as a base for "mar-
ginal pricing" . Colloquially and widely used this came to mean any 
prices below average fixed and variable costs . Oligopolistic firms 
were often able to establish a comfortable non-price competitive en-
vironment in a domestic market, but had to compete with oligopolist-
ic firms from other countries in international markets . For many 
products international markets became more competitive than domestic 
markets , and "marginal pricing" became more and nore concentrated 
in exports . In extreme cases, marginal pricing could be used as a 
temporary measure to capture export markets from existing competit-
ors, prevent their entry, or to prevent local production . Once a 
dominant market share was gained prices could be raised to average 
costs, or higher, in a classical "dumping" tactic . 
Vertical integration on an international scale began to affect 
the pricing of raw materials. As multinational corporations invest-
ed abroad to assure themselves of raw material supplies , mineral pro-
duct and some agricultural raw material markets c·eased to be inter-
national in any meaningful sense . The multinational corporations 
priced products to minimize tax, royalty and other costs, generally 
lowering the " international market" prices of such products by tak-
ing their profits in their home country . Processing tended to be 
undertaken in a firm' s horre country , usually because it was econo~ic 
to process close to final markets , but sometimes merely because this 
was convenient for the parent firm. 8 
At the other end of the spectrum, in the production of consumer 
goods , the advantages of a location close to final demand began to 
lead some multinational corp8rations to taking firstly final assemb-
ly , and later other production , abroad . But here too intra- firm 
pricing did not reflect market values , but rather a cost minimiz-
ing process with respect to direct and indirect taxes . 
Vertical integration into shipping , insurance and banking serv-
ices led to a further erosion of market pricing . Trade credit and 
freight and similar service costs became extensions of the pricing 
system, greatly complicating the measurement of international prices . 
8 
In time protective tariffs were used to reinforce such locational 
choices . See B . Balassa , "Tariff Protection in Industrial Nations 
and its Effects on the Exports of Processed Goods f r om Developing 
Countries ", The Canadian Journal of Economics , August 1968 . 
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The infant industry argurrent for protecti on was as old as the en-
deavour s of the f i rst French and Germany rranufacturers to catch u p 
with t he English i ndustrial l ead i n the late eighteenth century , and 
by t h e n i neteenth century protective duties were a wi dely establish-
ed form of trade policy. Af ter World War I agricultural and manu-
facturing i n terests formed a mutually supporting protectionist alli-
ance in contine ntal Europe . In thi r d country markets, rroreover , 
all the industrialized countries began to feel competition from 
China, through Hong Kong, its export entrepot port , and rrore import-
antly , from Japan . These newcorrers to world markets were very poor 
countries; the "pauper labor" argurrent for protection becarre import-
ant . 
In several primary producing countries the dislocations in the 
supply of manufactured goods during World War I, together with the 
declining elasticity of demand for primary products in industrializ-
ed countries led to the first wave of protectionist argurrents on 
both infant industry and balance of pay rrents grounds particularly 
in Latin Arrerica . The decline of employrrent opportunities in agri-
culture and mining added to this argurrent in Australia, New Zealand 
and Canada, and the first signs of population pressure of a differ-
ent kind becarre an argurrent for industrialization in the Netherlands 
East Indies and Indo-China . Nationalist influences helped to push 
primary producing countries into an interest in wanting to shift 
primary processing back to raw material resources, evoking a strong 
protectionist reaction from ind ustrialized countries . 
It is worth emphasizing that protectionist policy trends were 
evident in rising tariffs and pegged currencies before the Gr eat 
Depression . It is true that there was a strong nationalist element 
in protectionism after World War I both in industrial and primary 
producing countries , but the growing imperfection of international 
trade, aris i ng out of the imperfections of industrial markets, was 
an important factor in the growth of support for protection . Thus 
Maynard Keynes ' 1920s protectionism, which he never really abandon-
ed as a national approach to policy, can not be blarred on his never 
spending "the twenty minutes necessary to understand the theory of 
values; 9 rather , it was due to the same sharp understanding of the 
reality of a less than optimal economic world which led to his pub-
9 Gerald Shove, quoted in Joan Robinson , Economic Philosophy, 1962 , 
p . 79 . 
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lication of the General Theory in 1936 . 
The balance of payments crises of the late 1920s and early 1930s 
of course greatly strengthened protectionist trends. The industrial 
countries which had already used " infant industry " argurrents in the 
nineteenth century to build up industrial strength in the face of 
England's lead became more protectionist, and the newly industrialis-
ing countries strengthened trade barriers . Great Britain itself 
succumbed to protectionism in the wake of its loss of industrial 
leadership . The Imperial Preference Scheme of 1932 , which introduc-
ed a new element in the trading environment by attempting to stimu-
late trade through diversion among countries with strong political 
ties, was the result . Countries affected by competition from Japan 
either directly, or in third country narkets, also took particular , 
discriminatroy tariff and quantitative trade diverting measures 
against Japanese imports. What little now remained of the nineteen-
th century nobility of labor and capital was further restricted . 
The 1930s saw further tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade toge-
ther with rrore currency controls . The further erosion of "inter-
national prices" and growing discrepancies in factor prices with 
consequent departures from comparative advantage in production were 
not the only results. The multinational corporations thrived on 
the rents created by the multiplicity of barriers to the interna-
tional rrovement of factors and goods . Once the worst of the depres -
sion was over, they grew rapidly at the expense of their smaller 
t . t t. . h. t. 1 b d . lO compe i ors opera ing wit in na iona oun aries . 
World War II stimulated technological advances to a new level, 
greatly strengthening the effects of economies of scale on produc-
tion and narketing. Technological advances in the communications 
industries particularly favored the multinational corporation both 
in production and marketing . There was, however, also, a new di-
rection in policy . It had long become evident to economists like 
Keynes that the 1930s nation by nation approach to international 
economic problems merely exacerbated them. The creation of the In-
10
In the very considerable literature which has attempted, without 
conspicuous success, to analyze the multinational firm , Edith Pen-
rose' s "Foreign Investment and the Growth of the Firm" in the Eco..:-
nomic Journal, June 1950, remains the best exposition of the way 
in which the multinational firm can take advantage of strictly 
economic rents. In recent years , however, it appears that the 
"rent" opportunities created by trade policies have been even more 
relevant to the growth of the multinational corporation ' s import-
ance . 
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ternational Monetary Fund at Bretton Woods, and the meetings which 
led to the establishment of the General Agreement on Trade and Tari-
ffs , therefore sought international cooperation in payments and 
trade measures as a path to less distorted factor and comnodity 
prices . Without the I . M.F . and GATT factor and comnodi ty novements 
would probably be even more constrained than they are now . However , 
several trends have tended to undermine and run counter to interna-
tional cooperation. 
Most industrialized countries remained basically protectionist 
in the 1950s and 1960s . The members of the European Economic Com-
munities (EEC), and to a lesser extent, the European Free Trade 
Association, sought to benefit from wider economies of scale than 
their national boundaries permitted, without, however, abandoning 
protection against the rest of the world . They were prepared to 
cooperate internationally in liberalizing trade in manufactures -
where they were not seriously affected by competition - but not in 
agricultural products . Thus while the Kennedy Round of tariff re-
ductions substantially reduced international tariff levels for so-
phisticated manufactured products, the rate of effective protection 
was even raised on some primary processed products (Table 1). Po-
litical pressures excluded textiles from the negotiations, and quan-
titative restrictions generally began to be imposed more often and 
more widely against developing country imports. Japan used, and is 
still using, non-tariff as well as tariff barriers to build up its 
technological expertise and as a base for vigorous export growth. 
Its strategy has included fostering horizontal and vertical integ-
ration for international competitiveness and the use of the domes-
tic market and credit incentives as a base for marginal pricing. 
Some developed countries, notably Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
continued to follow intransigently protectionist policies for their 
domestic manufacturing, while inveighing against the agricultural 
protectionism of other developed countries. 
Neo-mercantilism and "marginal pricing" for export markets gain-
ed new strength when GATT was persuaded to make drawbacks of indi-
rect taxes a legitimate form of export subsidy. This introduced 
some extremely dubious concepts into the rules of international 
trade . The proposition that indirect taxes fall on consumers rather 
than on producers, whereas direct taxes fall on producers, was giv-
en credence without evidence that this is in fact so. Because in-
96 
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Nominal and Average Effective Tariffs 
Before and After the 
I U. S . 
I Commodity Nomi- Effec -
SITC No . nal tive 
I.l. 
Meat 
Fresh & frozen pre KR Oll 5 . 2 5 . 2 
post KR 4 . 6 4 . 6 
2 . Meat preparation pre KR 013 5 . 9 6 . 1 
post KR 4 . 7 5 . 6 
IL Cocoa 
1. Cocoa beans pre KR 072 . 1 0 0 
post KR 0 0 
2 . Cocoa powder pre KR 072 . 2 4 . 6 36 . 7 
& butter ~/ post KR 072 . 3 1. 3 11. 6 
3 . Chocolate pre KR 073 9 . 5 12 . 7 
post KR 4 . 8 1. 3 
III. Copra 
I 1. Copra pre KR 221. 2 0 0 
post KR 0 0 
2 . Cocoanut Oil crude pre KR en 422 . 3 5 . 5 46 . 3 
cake_}?/ post KR en 081. 3 5 . 5 47 . 2 
3 . Cocoanut Oil pre KR 422 . 3 30.0 30 . 0 
refined post KR 30.0 30 . 0 
IV . Leather 
1. Hides & Skins !pre KR 2ll 1.1 1.1 
I post KR 1.1 1.1 
2 . Leather pre KR 6ll I 9.6 25 . 7 
post KR 4.7 12 . 0 
3A. Leather Goods, other post KR 612 15 . 5 24.5 
than shoes post KR 831 7 . 7 11. 4 
3B . Shoes post KR 851 16 . 6 25.3 
post KR 14 . 9 26 . 3 
v. Iron 
1. Iron Ore pre KR 281. 3 0 0 
post KR 0 0 
2. Pig Iron , pre KR 671 1. 8 9 . 3 
Ferro Alloys post KR 0 . 7 0 
3. Steal Ingots pre KR 672 10 . 6 106 . 7 
post KR 6 . 3 62 . 2 
4 . Rolling Mill pre KR 673 7 . 1 -2 . 2 
Products post KR 676 3 . 5 -4 . 8 
/~Weighted average of duties : cocoa powder 40% , cocoa butter 60% . 
IE Weighted average of duties : coconut oil 80%, oil cake 20% . 
Source: UNCTAD, The Kennedy Round Estimated Effect on Tariff 
Barriers, 1968 . 
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on Selected Products in the Major Industrial Countries 
Kennedy Round (percentage) 
97 
U. K. EEC Sweden Japan 
Nomi- Effec- Nomi- Effec- Nomi- Effec- Nomi- Effec-
nal tive nal tive nal tive nal tive 
8 . 3 8. 3 19.8 19 . 8 0 0 10.0 73 . 5 
4.2 4.2 17 . 8 17 . 8 0 0 6 . 2 6 . 2 
11. l 15.2 23 . 8 46.1 0 -7 . 0 24 . 8 73 . 5 
8 . 3 10 . 4 19 . 5 44 . 3 0 - 5 . 7 16 . 4 47.3 
1. 5 1. 5 5 . 4 5 . 4 6.0 6 . 0 5 . 0 5 . 0 
0 0 3.2 3 . 2 3 . 6 3 . 6 3.0 3.0 
1.1 -3.3 22 . 8 150 . 0 9 . 2 34.2 17 . 4 106 .7 
0 -2 . 5 18 . 2 126 . 6 3.9 31. 6 12.2 98 .3 
10 . 0 26.3 30.0 42 . 7 15 . 0 42 . 7 35 . 0 43 . 0 
10 . 0 28 . 6 I 18 . 0 19 .3 I 11. 3 27 . 0 35 . 0 68 . 6 
10 . 0 10.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10.0 10.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 . 0 52 . 3 10.0 66 . 4 0 0 10 . 0 65.4 
14 . 0 50 . 0 10 . 0 85.4 0 - 1.0 10.0 85 . 4 
15 . 0 15.0 15.0 183.3 0 0 10 . 0 10 . 0 
15 . 0 15.0 15 . 0 186.3 0 0 10 . 0 10 . 0 
5 . 4 5 . 4 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14.9 34.3 7.3 18.3 7.0 21. 7 19.9 59.0 
11. 4 30 . 3 4 . 8 12 . 3 1. 7 4 . 3 11.6 34.7 
18.7 26 . 4 14 . 7 24.3 12.2 20 .7 23 . 6 33.6 
9.3 8 . 1 7 . 3 10.4 10.4 22 . l 11. 8 15 . 0 
24 . 0 36 . 2 19 . 9 33.0 14.0 22.8 29.5 45.1 
20 . 4 32 . 7 11 . 9 19 .3 11. 9 22 . 8 22 . 9 36 . 5 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.3 17 . 9 4. 0 -13 .8 0 0 . 7 10 . 0 54 . 3 
0 . 8 -2 . 9 4. 0 3.5 0 -4 . 3 1. 9 2 . 9 
11.1 11.1 6. 9 6 . 9 3.8 3 . 8 13. 0 58 . 9 
9.4 88.8 4.0 1.1 3.8 41. l 6.4 16.6 
9.5 7.4 7.2 10.5 5 . 2 13 . 2 15 . 4 29 . 5 
7 . 4 3 . 6 5.5 11. 5 5 . 1 12 . 6 8. 9 20.5 
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direct tax drawbacks were legitimate whereas direct tax drawbacks 
were not, the collection of revenues through indirect taxes was im-
plicitly encouraged . The proposition that consuners of i mported 
goods do not have to bear the social costs of producing them has 
curious implication indeed for international resource allocation . 
The formation of the EEC also revived the dying preferential 
trade concepts of the 1930s, and extended them, in complex forms , 
on a country by country basis , throughout the Mediterranean basin as 
well as rraintaining them in relation to developing countri es which 
had fornerly been French colonies . 11 In the 1960s the developing 
countries devoted much of their energy , and spent a great deal of 
their bargaining power , negotiating the one way Generalized Prefer -
ence Scheme adopted initially by Australia, and in 1971 by the EEC 
and Japan . While it is not yet clear which groups in which coun-
tries have benefitted from the EEC ties with developing countries , 
all the available evidence suggests that the trade creating effects 
Generalized Preference Scheme hav e been negligible .
12 
The socialist countries, with the exception of Yogoslavia, have 
remained aloof from even such limited co-operation for freeing world 
trade and paynents as the persuasive powers of the I . M. F . and GATT 
have achieved . The Cold War contributed to a return to barter trade 
on an international scale , with governnents pricing goods, credit 
and currency according to the exigencies of balance of paynents sit-
uations and politica l objectives rather than in relation to costs . 
The flow of aid to developing countries has emphasized prevail-
ing patterns of trade discrimination . Aid in the form of surplus 
agriclutural products has tended to be high cost both in the short 
run and in terms of countries ' following their comparative advantage 
in production . It has accentuated bilateral historical trading pat-
terns which were not always in the interest of the developing coun-
try . Not only has the initial volume of aid frequently been reduced 
11 
Naimeh Hadjitarkhani, "Preferential Arrangements between Deve -
12 
loping and Developed Countries, and am:mg Developing Countries" , 
IBRD Working Paper No . 162 , 1973 (mineographed) . 
See P . J . Lloyd , "The Value of Tariff Preferences for the Deve-
loping Countries : Australian Experience" , Economic Record ,March 
1971 for an examination of the very limited Austr a lian schene . 
D. Wall in "The Commonwealth and the Generalized Sy stem of Pre-
ference ." A St udy prepared for the Comnonwealth Secre t a ria t , 
1972 (Mi neogr a phed ) , a rrore broadly based enquiry ·, is typical 
of t he rather rrore pessimistic views prevalent among t r ade econo-
mists . 
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by high procurement costs, but subsequent spare parts and investment 
costs have often been unduly high because a country was tied to high 
cost suppliers . Government support for "aid" export credits has ac-
centuated the irrationality of international prices, and made it dif-
ficult for the more industrialized of the developing countries, which 
are now beginning to produce capital goods, to corrpete effectively . 
All in all the developed countries' aid represents a small proportion 
of the costs that their protection imposes on developing countries 
in limiting their ability to export products in which they have a 
corrparative advantage in production. 
Thus while international trade discussions, and, indeed, trade ne-
gotiations, have continued to focus on tariffs, non-tariff barriers 
to trade have become more and more important, and frequently the 
. 13 most important, obstacles to trade . 
III. Industrialization Policies 
Industrialization ha$ of course been a continuing process, with 
new entrants coming into the industrial sphere, and older ones gra-
duating to greater industrial maturity. For many of today's indust-
rializing countries, the beginnings of modern industrial experience 
go back to the end of the nineteenth century . The pace of industri-
alization, however, accelerated when at the end of the 1940s the 
former neo-colonial and colonial countries wished to consolidate 
their political independence in economic terms . The primary export 
experience of the 1920s and 1930s, the further wartime interruptions 
of manufactured product supplies, actual and looming unerrployment, 
and the evident correlation between advanced industrial technology 
and high standards of living, suggested that industrialization was 
the way to economic prosperity. Tariffs, import licensing and fo-
reign exchange controls were seen as fulfilling three functions: · bal-
ance of payments control, revenue mobilization, and protection for 
infant industries . In many countries incentives to foreign invest-
ors were added to the protectionist threats to multinational corpo-
rations' export markets to ensure the availability of capital and 
13 
Apart from R. E. Baldwin's Non-Tariff Distortion of International 
~. 1970 and UNCTAD studies, summarized in "Non- tariff Barriers 
and Restrictive Trade Practices and their Impacts on the Export of 
Less Developed Countries" , 1972 (mimeo gra phed ) there has been lit-
tle serious study of non- tarif f trade barrier s despite their i n -
creasing impor tan c e . 
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advanced technology . 
"Marginal pricing" or "dumping" as it was usually seen from the 
developing countries ' point of view , was viewed as a major , and of-
ten as a concerted , threat against the developing countries ' indus -
trialization endeavors . It frequently seemed that no natter in 
which direction a country turned , c . i . f . prices were lower than 
those of locally produced goods , though they were often also lower 
than the ex-factory prices in the exporting country . In practice , 
whether the prices of imported goods were g~nuinely lower, pernan-
ently or temporarily " narginally priced" , or "dumped " in the true 
sense of the word, was extremely difficult to judge . The multina-
tional corporations ' transfer pricing , particularly where compli -
cated "depletionallowances " were involved , confused the issues of 
long term corrparative advantage even further . Industrialization 
was in any case a powerful political as well as economic objectiv e . 
Most of the larger developing countries during the 1950s and 1960s 
built up protective barriers around their growing industries in 
which tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade were combined with 
incentives to capital investment through exchange , credit and import 
regulations exempting capital goods, and in many cases raw rraterial 
and intermediate imports , from import duties and restrictions, and 
giving varying degrees of income tax holidays to local and foreign 
investors . 
Given the increasing corrplexity of industrial "catching up" due 
to technological advances and increasing benefits of the economies 
of scale , some "infant industry" protectionism by developing count-
ries was inevitable . Combined with the developed countries ' trad-
ing practices and their unwillingness to deal with the e mployment 
and income distribution adjustments which a rational international 
economy required , the multinational corporations' monopoly of ad-
vanced production techniques, and their ability to exploit the im-
perfections of the international economy , even the excesses of de-
veloping countries ' protection become understandable . 
In the 1950s the only exception to this pattern was Hong Kong 
which was able , on the basis of its pre-war export entrepot experi-
ence and the inflow of capital , entrepreneurship and skills from 
China, to enter world rrarkets in textiles and other labor intensive 
products . Hong Kong started exporting from a free por t base, and 
its laissez-faire policies enabled it to thrive in a world trading 
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environment in which it could buy raw materials at "marginal pric-
es" , and sell the products of its highly productive low cost labor, 
without affecting the importing countries' markets significantly . 
When Taiwan sought to follow Hong Kong's lead in the early 1960s , 
textile markets were still fairly open, but it started from a highly 
protected base. The alternative was either to reduce protection 
and devalue, or to introduce export subsidies. Politically, dis-
turbing the economic rent structure established by the protective 
system was impossible, and the path of export subsidies was chosen . 
As Israel, Pakistan, Korea, and later other developing countries 
with import replacement industrialization strategies ran into stag-
nation, balance of payments problems and income distribution diffi-
culties, they chose the same export subsidy option, sometimes to 
the point at which they were exporting foreign exchange. Singapore 
has been the only new entrant with a sufficiently small total out-
put of a number of labor intensive products to enable it to pursue 
a basically free trade policy from the mid 1960s. The developed 
countries reacted to the developing countries' exports with quanti-
tative import restrictions . Although only a small share of the 
domestic market was affected (Table 2), together with the loss of 
third country markets, this led to labor and capital dislocation 
with which the developed countries were not prepared to deal. 
For all but the two exceptional city states - Hong Kong and Sin-
gapore - the issue now is thus not one of protection versus free 
trade. Barriers to their exports are as ITR.lch as a reality as their 
own distorting, protectionist domestic policies. Inefficient pro-
ductive capacity has been established, but nuch of it is depreciated, 
and the issue is for the most part not how to eliminate it alto- -
gether, but what is worth retaining, and how to minimize the cost 
of production in such industries. 14 Given the past and present 
biases against agriculture because of the subsidies to industry, 
the problem is not how to reverse the trend, but by which policies 
and instruments can agricultural and industrial development become 
mutually reinforcing. Agreed that in the past industrial develop-
ment has, with minor exceptions been pursued at the cost of employ-
ment and the low income groups, the issue is not growth or employment , 
but how can both these objectives be fulfilled . 
14 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
See. S. Guisinger and D. C. Meade, "Foreign Exchange Saving as a Mea-
sure of Economic Efficiency", 1973, (mimeographed) for an elabora-
tion of this point . 
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Table 2 
Share of Imports of Textiles from Developing Countries 
as a Share of Apparent Consumption of Te xtiles 
in the EEC Countries and U. K. 1967 
(percent) 
Gernany France Italy Belgium Netherlands U. K. 
Spun Yarn/~ 
Cotton 2 . 3 0 . 2 0 . 3 2 . 7 2 . 2 7 . 4 
Cotton & mmf 1. 5 0 . 2 0 . 4 2 . 4 1. 9 n . a . 
Woven Cloth/~ 
Cotton 2.3 1. 5 9 . 5 1. 7 7 . 4 35 . o/~ 
Cotton & mmf 1. 3 1.1 7 . 1 1.5 6 . 0 24 . 4/~ 
Clothin/E 
Cotton & mmf 1.18 0 . 05 0 , 06 0 . 27 0 . 74 1. 65 
/a Percentages are calculated from quantity figures . 
u. s . 
0 . 1 
0 . 3 
6 . 2 
3 . 6 
IE 
~ Percengates are calculated from value figures based on consurrer 
expenditure . 
/!:_ 
/~ 
It should be noted that imports include figures for imports in-
tended for re- export as well . 
U. K. share declined in 1969 to 31 . 5 and 23 . 2 . 
Aggregate figures are not available , but in almost all catego-
ries imports are below 20% of total consumption . 
Source : Calculated from L . Keough , "Export of Cotton and Cotton 
Type Textiles from Developing Countries to the United 
States", IBRD Working Paper 122 , 1971 and G. Shepherd , "Ex-
ports of Cotton Textiles from Developing Countires to the 
European Economic Community and the United Kingdom, 1958-
1967", IBRD Working Paper 52 , 1969 . 
Trade policies remain central to industrialization policies , es -
tablishing the levels of effective protection and export subsidy 
which determine the basic allocation patterns in an industrializ i ng 
economy . In a narrow sense effective protection is determined by 
the rate of exchange, the level of tariffs , the incidence of quanti -
tative restrictions, import duty exemptions on inputs, the relation 
of internal indirect taxes to the duty structure, and the competence 
with which these regulations are administered . It is now ~;ell es-
tablished that the variations in the level of effective protection 
as well as its absolute height have an important bearing on the effi -
ciency with which resources are used . The gross inefficiency of 
"tailor made" tariffs which encourage the establishment of indus-
tries on a cost plus basis has been well known for some time, but 
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the complexities of "tailor made" effective protection in the sense 
of combining the effect of tariffs, quantitative restrictions, indi-
rect internal taxes, and exemptions from import duties, are only now 
becoming arrpeciated in countries deepening their industrial struc~ 
ture from final assembly to intermediate and capital goods manufac-
ture . The traditional end product oriented "tailor made" effective 
protection frequently :rreans negative effective protection for indust-
rial inputs . In general, intermediate and capital goods are far 
less protected than final goods, with a corresponding lack of incen-
tives to intermediate and capital goods manufacturing . 
The devaluation of the exchange rate is the obvious policy for im-
proving a country's international trading situation, and to the ex-
tent that the rate of exchange is overvalued at present levels of 
tariff and other instruments of protection, this is a basic require-
ment of a ITOVe toward a better policy framework . However, as the 
existing tariff and other protective measures in most countries are 
of the "made to measure" type, with large variations in protective 
levels,devaluation alone will not result in a structural improvement 
in the economy . After a time, the same strains and stresses which 
led to the need for the original revaluation will reappear. For 
ITOst countries, therfore, devaluation is not· enough, and if currency 
is not overvalued at prevailing tariff and non-tariff protective 
levels, it may indeed, without other policy changes affecting the 
structure of industry, have very little positive effect . 
The approaches to a better tariff structure are well known. A 
low, ITOderate uniform tariff is least likely to encourage ineffi-
ciency, but it is unlikely that political pressures, and existing 
inefficient firms' adjustment costs will enable countries to ITOve 
as far as this in one step. A ITOre piecemeal approach would suggest 
that establishment of a revenue tariff, commensurate with a country's 
revenue needs and at the same level as domestic sales or excise 
taxes. (Such taxes Illl.lst either be imposed on a value added basis,on 
final sales, or kept low to avoid cascading which has arbitrary ef-
fects on relative costs and leads to und~:e vertical integration . ) 
One, two or three protective "bands" could be added to the revenue 
tariff to take into account existing protection levels, at the same 
time reducing them and making them nore uniform. Reductions and the 
progress to uniformity can be made more palatable if manufacturers 
are put on notice that a government intends to implement such a pro-
gram gradually. Many are likely to react by reducing their costs. 
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Such reductions nay bear in mind that existing plants have written 
off their investnent and may lower costs accordingly . New invest-
nents would be within the bands established for various product 
groups. Import duties would become easier to administer . In ex-
ceptional cases, higher tariffs could be granted, but again on a 
reducing scale . The rationale for the levels of bands and the pro-
ducts they covered would not be whether the product is a consuner 
or producer good, but the comparative cost of producing it. Public 
enquiry and open hearings where consumers as well as producers would 
be represented would serve to avoid excessive protection in such 
cases. Moreover, it is generally true in developing countries which 
have gone even sone way in industrial development that new enter-
prises do not usually require greater protection than existing 
firms. By taking advantage of the external economies being built 
up, and by filling market gaps, new investors frequently need less 
protection than existing ones have obtained. 
Taxes on luxury goods, however defined, require special conside-
ration. It is usual to impose high tariffs on luxury imports, and 
yet this encourages high profits for local producers, without nece-
ssarily cutting down consumption and eroding revenues. Luxury tax-
es have to be imposed equally on imports and local production if 
they are to be effective. 
Once a rational tariff structure is established, the need for 
import duty exemptions on capital goods and raw materials and other 
inputs is eliminated. This avoids much of the excessive protection 
which often has particularly adverse effects because manufacturers 
establishing production with such high effective protection find 
they can not remain profitable without it when their initial privi~ 
lege period expires. The threat of dismissing workers in countries 
with high unemployment is generally very persuasive . The elimina-
tion of import duty holidays also diminishes the subsidy to capital 
intensive production , and removes the disincentive to the production 
of intermediate goods . This often enables small scale sub- contract-
ors to begin import replacing production . 
The treatment of quantitative import res trictions is more comp-
lex. A number of developing countries have noted t he developed 
country stratagem, used with p a rticular effe c tiv e n e ss by Japan , of 
using quantitative import restrictions to limit a domestic market 
to local producers to enable them to export on the basis of low 
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"marginal" prices . Some developing countries, notably Iran, have 
followed this approach quite successfully in recent years . The dif-
ficulties of successful implementation are , however, considerable. 
such an approach is only effective if domestic prices can be kept 
to desired levels and this means control over entry and pricing. 
A special argument for quantitative controls arises if this is the 
only practicable administrative method of stopping technical smug-
gling to maintain revenue collections . The "marginal pricing" of 
smuggled goods, which prevents industries in which a country may 
build up a comparative advantage in the long run, is another reason 
for quantitative controls over imports . This type of smuggling do-
es occur, but more commonly smuggling is a positive element in trade, 
preventing protectionist excesses in countries with highly distort-
ed price signals. 
Once various protective measures are introduced as a defense 
mechanism against the existing world trade framework, a bias against 
other domestic activities and against exports follows . The bias 
against other domestic sectors, particularly agriculture must large-
ly be regarded as the cost of industrial development; equal general 
subsidies to agriculture can be only justified in a situation in 
which a country is seeking to change its total terms of trade. How-
ever, if a country does not wish to be locked into a small autarkic 
industrial economy , if it wishes to export manufactures to benefit 
from economies of scale in production as well as for balance of pay-
ments reasons, then it has to introduce export subsidies to offset 
the negative effective protection on its exports . Export subsidies 
may be seen as existing at three levels . The first level includes 
drawbacks on import duties , temporary admission systems and exemp-
tions from import prohibitions , or the establishment of free trade 
export zones to establish these objectives where this is administ-
ratively simpler , to offset the direct costs of protection . Ase-
cond level of subsidy through income tax exemptions and cheap credit 
may balance the general excess cost of domestic factors and goods 
due to protection generally . Beyond such measures, subsidies may 
have some justification if they are used, on the "infant industry" 
argument to penetrate new markets. Otherwise they are simply sub-
sidizing the importers who are generally in developed countries, 
and domestic manufacturers. At this point a country is frequently 
unaware of both the costs and incidence of its export subsidies . 
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As markets become more restricted, importing countries are, more -
over, likely to use the evidence of subsidies outside the GATT 
as a reason for excluding such imports . There is at present a con-
siderable threat that the United States will impose countervailing 
duties on imports from Mexico , Korea and the Philippines . 
The higher and the more unequal protection, the higher and more 
complex will the subsidy system have to be , and the less liekly is 
it to lead to an optimal allocation of resources . Sound export po-
licies do not thus merely require the imposition of a subsidy sys-
tem to match protection; a decline in overall protection, and a re-
duction in its variability , are essential . 
Most countries are not satisfied with the protection afforded 
manufacturing industries by trade policy measures , but subsidize 
manufacturers further by giving them income tax holidays of varying 
duration . Introduced largely on the advice of the International 
Chamber of Commerce in the 1950s to attract foreign investment , the 
high costs of these policies have now been well established . They 
include a further layer of protection to industry , a stimulus to 
capital intensiveness, and in the case of foreign investment , fre-
quently transfers of revenues to the government of the lending coun-
try" The benefits are known to be small . Yet developing countries 
throughout the world continue to compete with each other in the ex-
tent and duration of such give-aways . 15 
Subsidized credit similarly gives domestic manufacturers an ex-
tra layer of protection . Originally intended to equalize the cost 
of capital to investors in developing countries with costs in deve-
loped countries , i n many cases , where exchange has been overvalued 
and inflation has been rife , credit costs fell far below those of 
developed countries , and so:rretimes became negative . As access to 
such sources of credit has b e en largely limited to the large and 
medium firm, there has been severe discrimination against small 
scale entrepreneurs . By distorting factor prices , capi tal intensive 
production methods have been encouraged . In some countries comple -
mentary labor legislation , artificially raising t h e labor costs 
through high severance allowances which make it impracticable to 
dismiss workers , artificially high minimum wages, family allowances 
15 
See H. Hughes , "Assess:rrent of Policies Towards Direct Foreign In-
vestment in the Asian- Pacific Area", in P . Drysdale, ed . Direct 
Foreign Investment in Asia and the Pacific, 1972 . 
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and s imi lar measu res , have re i nforced the effects of credi t subs i-
dies , s evere l y constrai ning t he lon g ter m growth of employment at 
the cost of preserving a small proportion of existing jobs . An in-
dustrial l abor e l i t e benef i ts from such measures at the cost of 
labor generally . 
Trade and credit measures do not exhaust the list of subsidies 
frequently provided for manufacturing industry . Unduly low priced 
serviced land , uneconomically low utility charges and similar mea-
sures are sometimes added incentives , further distorting the econo-
ny in favor of manufacturing . 
Even a rroderate protectionist policy , not accompanied by further 
subsidies , imposes further controls on an economy . 16 Once protec-
tion may be obtained , the possibility of making profits merely by 
exploiting the economic rents created by the protective system aris -
es . At worst nanufacturers may plan to establish plants that are 
less than economic and internationally corrpetitive because they 
know that once they are in business , wi th workers employed , the 
threat of closing down and dismissing a hundred or more workers 
will be too great a political risk for the government to bear . The 
same reasoning leads to excessive entry secure in the knowledge that 
governments will be too weak politically to allow the firms to com-
pete until the inefficient go out of business , but permit protection 
to rise until a cozy oligopoly is established . The situation is 
generally at its worst when strong, aggressive multinational corpo-
rations combine with local "partners " to play this game for defen-
sive investment reasons . The ensuing fragmentation of production , 
with excessive capital intensive capacity used at low levels , and 
incapable of competing internationally is the most cornrron form of 
industrial organization in industrializing countries . Nor are these 
excesses confined to domestic production . The emphasis on exports 
is lead i ng firms to build spuriously large plants for exports, safe 
in the knowledge that the host country will enable them to finance 
such exports by domestic market sales . This is for exarrple happen-
ing under the automobile rationalization plans for Southeast and 
East Asia . Two plants producing 70,000 manual transmissions annual-
16 This point is being increasingly noted in the analysis of protec-
tive systems . See for exarrple, S . Guisinger , "Tariffs and Trade 
Policies for the Ethiopian Manufacturing Sector" , 1972 , (mimeo-
graphed) . 
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ly have been licensed in the Philippines for exports to a regional 
market which totals less than 70,000 cars annually. The market for 
manual transmissions in other developed countries is small . 
Where economies of scale are important in production, a country 
wishing to start such production usually has a choice of oligopolis-
tic competition which can not become cost competitive for many years 
until the domestic market expands rapidly as world markets for such 
products are very competitive and subject to "marginal pricing" or 
a rronopoly or duopoly which would have lower costs because some eco-
nomies of scale would be reaped, with some opportunity of "marginal 
pricing" for exports . As economies of scale tend to become more im-
portant with the deepening of production, industrial planning has to 
take into account problems likely to arise in the future. Where two 
autorrobile assembly plants might not be too uneconomic, it is alnost 
certain that two piston or transmission plants will be . A planning 
agency has to be sure it can persuade the assemblers to use a comrron 
parts supplier before permitting both assembly plants to operate . 
This implies control over entry for industries with significant eco-
nomies of scale . 
Once control over entry is established, price and quality cont-
rols become mandatory unless the scale of production is large enough 
to enable the firmor firmsestablished to be exposed to internation-
al competition . 17 The administrative problems become difficult in-
deed . Quantitative import restrictions, with a threat of exposing 
manufacturers to competition if they do not follow reasonable price 
or quality policies are a possible instrument of control . However , 
only a few countries have been able to maintain reasonably success-
ful entry and price control policies . 
The establishment of an administrative system implied by protec-
tionist and other subsidy measures for manufacturing , together 
with even the minimal controls necessary to prevent political lobby-
ing leading to a constant pressure for raising protection, create 
a situation in which the manufacturers ' opportunities for profits 
through manipulating the "rules of the game" often exceed profits 
which may be gained in the ordinary course of business . The multi-
national corporation with its superior managerial , legal and other 
17 . 
Assuming also that the country can be reasonably sure that such 
prices will be "average" rather than "irarginal" . 
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resources, which frequently include political pressure through its 
own government, is usually in a very strong position to benefit 
from such "rents", and does so accordingly. It pays entrepreneurs 
to spend more time in Minister's waiting rooms than on the shop 
floor . The developed countries ' lobbies are soon duplicated and 
extended, albeit on a smaller, more personal basis . 
Profits arising from the administrative structure not only bene-
fit the large scale producers, but necessarily, unless special steps 
are taken, discriminates against the small entrepreneur . This is 
particularly acute where effective protection is available on a 
"tailor made" basis, together with firm by firm incorre tax holidays, 
subsidized credit and other subsidy rreasures. The small entrepre-
neur can not obtain protection tailored to his needs, and he is 
often excluded by minimum fixed investrrent clauses from benefitting 
from import duty exemptions . Even if he is entitled to it, he fre-
quently can not obtain subsidized credit . Generally speaking he 
can not get his foot inside a Ministry door . The typical system of 
protective measures and subsidies encourages vertical integration 
by large firms which can obtain the benefit of special incentives , 
and against small entrepreneurs who can not . Such discrimination 
is frequently the principal reason for the poor performance of the 
small scale sector , its failure to engage in sub-contracting for 
large enterprises, and its low productivity and growth . 18 
The metropolitan concentration of manufacturing beyond the point 
at which external economies of such concentration would normally be 
outweighed by congestion and other costs, is another effect of pro-
fits reaped from administratively created economic rents . The lack 
of infrastructure in the countryside and poor communications are 
contributing factors , but pressure to improve them is unlikely to 
become important while manufacturers are in effect tied to central 
government offices . 
Small enterprises are an important reservoir of entrepreneurship 
in countries where this is generally the scarcest factor of produc-
tion . Other things being equal, small scale enterprises are gene-
rally rrore labor intensive than large . A thriving small scale sect-
or reduces the skewness of income distribution . For all these rea-
sons, removing the discrimination against small enterprises is im-
18
c . f . S . Watanabe , "International Subcontracting, Employment and 
Skill Promotion", International Labor Review , May, 1972 
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portant to healthy industrial growth . Stimulating industrial pro-
cessing in the countryside where this is economic is a parallel 
aspect of sensible industrial development . Given the d i stortions 
created by existing policies, this paradoxically, requires further 
administrative remedies . 
IV . The Options for Developing Countries 
China and the United States are the only countries bordering the 
Pacific large enough , and well enough endowed with natural resources 
to make autarkic, inward oriented economic policies feasible . Even 
for these countries such policies would not be optimal, and for the 
other countries international trade is even more important . The 
favorable effects of international trade on growth , employment and 
a relatively favorable distribution of income have been demostrated 
for a number of Southeast and East Asian countries; for the small 
countries particularly , a trading orientation is essential to rapid 
economic improvement . (Table 3 gives some indicators of industrial 
and trade characteristics of countries bordering the Pacific . It 
of course has to be interpreted with great caution) . 
The developing countries ' trade and industrial policy options 
are however constrained by the present and likely international 
trading framework . An improvement in trading conditions would re-
quire considerable policy changes in developed countries to compen-
sate low income groups affected by changing trade patterns. Initial-
ly the developed countries would of course also be the principal 
benefactors as they account for the bulk of world trade , and the 
initiatives for improving trading conditions should, therefore, in 
their economic self interest , come from them. If the current res-
trictive trends were replaced by an opening up of markets for labor 
intensive products , and if there was a significant move to average 
rather than "marginal " pricing , the signals facing the developing 
countries would enable them to pursue much more rational trade poli-
cies . Greater economic competitiveness together with improved and 
coordinated tax policies in developed and developing countries 
would , moreover , curtail the multinational corporations ' ability to 
exploit international trade for their private interest . The outlook 
19 
B . Balassa and Associates , The Structure of Protection in Develop-
ing Countries, 1971 ; B . Balassa , "Industrial Policies in Taiwan 
and Korea" , in L . E . di Marco , ed, International Economics and De-
velopment : Essays in Honor of Raul Prebisch , 1972 and Singapore, 
Economic Development Board , Annual Reports, passim. 
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for a rapid improvement in international trading relations is not , 
however, hopeful, and the developing countries would therefore be 
well advised to seek their own solutions to their problems . 
An examination of the structure of protection and incentives 
suggests that at present the highest protection is afforded luxury 
consurrer durables and automobiles . Yet bicycle, bus and truck as -
sembly does not require the same economies of scale as automobile 
production , and provide more scope for employrrent , and for backward 
linkages . In general rrass consumption goods such as textiles , build-
ing rraterials and simple agricultural implements require less pro-
tection , srrall scale enterprises are more common , and where high 
tariffs exist there is either some protection redundancy or very 
high profits . Most developing countries could substantially re-
duce their levels of protection by shifting their product mix from 
a largely urban , upper and middle class orientation to one catering 
to the rural population and the urban poor . A shift in government 
expenditures toward labor intensive public works, particularly in 
rural areas, and to low income site and services and housing pro-
jects , could stimulate the largely domestically based construction 
material industry . Cement block , bricks and drainage pipes can be 
made largely of local rraterials , and their bulk and weight encour-
ages decentralization far more effectively than income tax holidays~O 
Such changes in the product mix would make trade among developing 
countries much more attractive . A move toward technologically simpl-
er and more labor intensive products would rrake a decline in protec -
tion possible without a decrease in employment, but on the contrary 
with increasing industrial employrrent perspectives. Because of the 
their high trade barriers , developing countreis have until now fail -
ed to benefit from intra-industry trade which has dominated trade 
among industrialized countries in the last twenty years . Intra- in-
dustry trade is generally self-adjusting because workers of an in-
dustry can move fairly readily into another industry branch, and 
21 . ' . l d . t whole industries are not affected. This approacn is ea ing o a 
20 See M. Haq, "Developing Country Alternatives ", in H. Hughes , ed ., 
Adjustrrent or Confrontation : Industrialization and Trade Policies 
in the 1970s , (forthcoming) for a view of alternative strategies 
open to developing countries . 
21 B . Balassa , "Tariff Reductions and Trade in Manufactures among 
the Industrial Countries", Arrerican Economic R~view , June 1966 . 
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Table 3 : Some Industrial and Trade Indicators 
GNP per Popula- Gross Value Gross Va- Gross Va-
Capi ta tion mid- Added in lue Added lue Added 
1970 1970 Manufac- in Manu- in Manu-
Market turing as facturing facturing 
Prices % of GNP as % of as % of 
Gross Va- Gross Va-
lue Added lue of 
in Comrro- Output 
dity Pro-
East Asia 
China, People 
Rep. of 
Hong Kong 
Japan 
Korea, North 
Korea, Rep . of 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
Southeast Asia 
(US$) 
160 
970 
1,920 
330 
250 
920 
390 
Indonesia 80 
Malaysia 380 
Philippines 210 
Thailand 200 
Viet Nam, North 100 
Viet Nam , Rep . of 100 
East Pacific 
Canada 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Peru 
U. S . A. 
Australia 
Australia 
New Zealand 
3,700 
720 
340 
560 
290 
300 
360 
670 
430 
730 
450 
4 , 760 
2,820 
2,700 
(million) 
836 . 0 
4.0 
103.4 
13 . 9 
31. 9 
2 . 1 
14.0 
115 . 6 
11. 0 
36 . 9 
36 . 2 
21. 2 
18 . 3 
21. 4 
9 . 8 
21. 6 
1. 7 
6 . 1 
3 . 5 
5 . 2 
50 .7 
2 . 0 
1. 5 
13 . 6 
204 . 8 
12 . 6 
2 . 8 
1968 
37 . 8 
30.2 
64.0/b 
17.9 
12 . 6 
22 . 6 
11. 0 
11.1 
17 . 3/ e 
13 . 2 
10 . 0/f 
25.1/f 
28 . 5/g 
16.8 
19 . 4/h 
16 . 9 
18 . 2 
15 . 7/ i 
23 . 0/ i 
15 . 1 
15 . 8 
14 . 0/f 
28.1 
28 . 2 
23 . 4/ f 
duction 
1968 
87.5 
61. 3/a 
78 . 0/b 
33 . 0 
65.9 
45 . 9 
13 . 7 
19 . 1/c 
32 . 0 
27 . 9 
24 . 2/f 
65 . 5/f 
65 . 2 
44 . 4 
23 . 4 
32 . 3 
38 . 7 
35 . 4 
61.2/f 
31. 0 
37 . 2 
33 . 9/c 
80 . 5 
67.1 
55 . 7/f 
1965, 
1969 
35.1 
40.5 
21. 2 
32 . 7 
30 . 1 
40 . 6 
50 . 6/f 
40.7 
52 . 2/f 
44 . 1 
42 . 9 
37 . 5 
39 . 4/j 
36 . 5 
46.9 
47 . 2 
39 . 2 
31 . 4/j 
/a Includes transportation and commlnication. b/ 
/c 1966 . d/ 1960-68 . e/ Net material product . 
ket price . /j 1968 . 
f/ 1967 . 
Note : (1) Comrrodity production includes agriculture, mining, 
(2) Exports of (non-resource-based) manufacturing, 
loping Countries : 1970 Review . 
l3) The average annual growth rate of (non- resource-
as the same for gross value added of output and 
possible, local currencies have be en used in the 
and gross value of output . 
Source: U.N . and country data . 
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for Countries Bordering the Pacific 
Exports 
of Non-
Exports 
of Non-
resources resource 
based Ma- based Ma-
nufactur- nufactur-
ing as % 
of Gross 
value of 
ing as % 
of total 
Merchan-
Manuf act- dise 
uring Exports 
Output 
1969 1969 
73.1 
9.4 
13. 8 
31. 2 
23 . 9 
0.3 
16.3 
3.1 
7 . 9/f 
19.6 
1.5/f 
1. 8 
14.1 
0.6 
17.5 
16. l/j 
8.3/j 
4.9/c 
1. 0 
11. 5/j 
4 . 4 
4.2 
3. 3/j 
88 .6 
96 . 0 
76.2 
28 . 0 
79.3 
19.7 
13.2 
11. 0 
11. 7 
3.0 
69 . 3 
5 . 7 
10.8 
18.9 
1. 4 
33.2 
26 . 6/j 
25.9 
14.4 
2 . 6 
30.4/j 
76.0 
22.6 
10.7 
Total 
Merchan-
dise 
Exports 
as % of 
GNP 
1969 
64.6 
10.9 
9.4 
14.4 
25.3 
6.1 
36.7 
11. 4 
12.4 
0 . 3 
21J. 7 
21.9 
9 . 5 
22.4 
13.1 
20 . 3 
14.8 
5 . 0 
20 . 3 
12.6 
19 . 8 
4.3 
15.0 
19.1 
1960-1969 
Averaqe Annual Growth Rate 
Gross Va- Exports GNP per 
lue Added of Non- Capita 
in Manu- resource 
facturing based 
( %) 
14 . 3 
14 . l 
14 . 2 
19 . 0 
13 . 5 
1. 2 
12.0/d 
4.3 
8.1 
6.6 
5.6 
4 . 5 
5 . 4 
9.0 
7 . 9 
10.0 
12.0 
10.7 
2.9 
6.1 
6.1 
6.3 
Manufac-
turing 
( %) 
15.0 
18.2 
66.5 
6.4 
50.9 
22.0 
12.4 
15.1 
9.8 
-3.5 
15.9 
2.4 
27.8 
27.2 
-0.5 
21. 0 
29 . 0/d 
14.3 
29 . 0 
41. 0 
14.6 
8.6 
23.0 
22 . 0 
( %) 
6.4 
8.7 
10.0 
5.9 
6 . 4 
4.5 
6. 3 
0.8 
3.8 
1. 9 
4.7 
3 . 2 
1. 0 
2.8 
1. 7 
1. 5 
2.9 
1. 2 
1. 9 
1. 9 
3.5 
3.5 
4 . 8 
1. 4 
3 . 2 
2.9 
2 . 0 
113 
includes mining, electricity, gas and water, net material product . 
/ g Net domestic product. /h Includes mining. /i In mar-
manufacturing, electricity, gas and water . 
defined as Total A in UNCTAD, Trade in Manu~acturing of Deve-
based) manufacturing is calculated at current prices, where-
GNP per capita are computed at constant prices. As far as 
time series for export of (non-resource-based) manufacturing 
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new approach to increasing trade among developing countries. An ar-
rangement under GATT auspices, for reciprocal preferences among 16 
developing countries at roughly similar levels of economic develop-
ment is currently being negotiated . Developing countries would have 
much to gain from increasing their efficiency through competitive-
ness in products suited to their level of development. Such trade 
would, moreover, be likely to stimulate product and production pro-
cess innovation, broadening the choice of techniques, and making 
adaptation to scarce capital and low cost labor easier . 
Such an approach would be particularly suitable for regional 
trade, where the history to date has not been particularly success-
ful. The Central American Comnon Market, the only functioning one 
bordering the Pacific , has 11 million people . Investment in indust-
ries which, though reaping some economies of scale, are still uneco-
nomic, but which the countries would not have undertaken separately, 
has nevertheless been encouraged . While it is theoretically possi-
ble to have an outward looking comnon 11\3.rket, in practice there has 
been a tendency to raise tariffs to the highest common denominator, 
and they have not been offset by export incentives. Politically 
this would have been impossible because of the varying incidence 
effect on the member countries. The concentration of production in 
the most developed countries, exacerbating income differentials, 
has been encouraged, leading to critical strains . Countries which 
could have turned to world markets on their own have been locked 
into high cost import replacement by the product mix fostered by 
the Common Market upper income consumer good oriented policies. 
Alternative approaches to regional trade, based on lower protection 
and a better product mix can hopefully be worked out in the future. 
There is a considerable range of industrial development among 
industrial countries, and consequent opportunities for the relative-
ly industrialized ones to dominate trade just as the developed coun-
tries have established "the rules of the game" in a broader context. 
On the other hand, some of the relatively industrialized countries 
are becoming the most efficient, least cost producers of a growing 
range of capital equipment, and greater trading opportunities for them 
could mean a substantial overall reduction in the cost of capital 
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equipment , as well as better adaptation to the factor proportions of 
poor c ountries . For all developing countries the greater efficiency 
following from mutual trade would provide a better basis for market 
penetration to developed country markets for these need not be neg-
lected in stimulating trade arrong developing countries . The degree 
of attention to developed country markets would depend on a country's 
estimate of its developed country market prospects . 
The instrurrents of policy for an industrialization strategy which 
would aim at greater efficiency and lower prices, the encouragement 
of small indigenous entrepreneurs, the choice of IIDre labor inten-
sive techniques, and hence improved icorre distribution, are not dif -
ficult to devise . Many are inherent in the policy changes necessary 
to any rrove toward a less distorted policy frarrework . The differ-
ences are mainly those of emphasis; reducing effective protection on 
luxury goods , limiting entry into luxury good production even at the 
expense of consumers ' (upper income) sovereignty, reinforcing such 
measure with appropriate luxury taxes, and ending discrimination 
against small entrepreneurs . Trade policy alone can not of course 
carry development forward. Other measures would have to include an 
agricultural development policy, a strong public works program par-
ticularly in rural areas, and a steeply progressive and strictly ad-
ministered income tax policy to mobilize the necessary public reve-
nues. Unfortunately, such a policy package is likely to prove as 
indigestible to upper income groups in the developing countries as 
adjustment assistance is in developed countries . 
COMM ENTS AND DISCUSSION OF 
HuGHEs ' s PAPER 
Perry Chang opened the discussion : The paper started by saying 
that "there is little doubt that in a global context, the more out-
ward looking an economy the better" . But as the author has so ably 
demonstrated to us , trade barriers and questionable trade practices 
are increasing and the prospect of increasing industrial exports 
from the developing countries in this or any other region is not at 
all bright . 
The question then arises as to what would be the "second best" 
solution to industrial and economic development for the LDC ' s? 
Since "outward looking" policies have their limitations, one 
might be tempted to say that the solution may be found in some "in-
ward looking" policies . But the author categorically dismissed this 
possibility by saying that in this region only China and the United 
States could afford to adopt inward looking economic policies, and 
that even for these countries, such policies would not be optimal . 
Her own prescription is that the LDC ' s in this region should try to 
change their industrial mix " from a largely urban, upper and middle 
class orientation to one catering to the rural population and the 
urban poor". In addition, she reminded us that "other measures 
would have to include an agricultural development policy , a strong 
public works program, particularly i n rural areas , and a steeply pro-
gressive and strictly administered i ncome tax policy to mobilize the 
necessary public revenues" . 
There is , of course , much wisdom and insight in these recommenda-
tions. But I wonder if these are not really "inward looking" poli-
cies? I do not mean to take this up merely as a semantic problem . 
What is more important is that the distinction between the so-called 
" inward " and "outward looking" policies seems to have resulted in 
much confusion regarding the true relations between trade and deve-
lopment . 
First , the importance given to the "outward looking " policies is 
apparently based on the traditional theory that trade is the " engine 
1 1 6 
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of growth" . But Chinese experience , as we discussed this morning, 
seems to indicate that this may not be true for all countries . Even 
though the author insisted that among the LDC ' s in this region only 
China can afford inward looking policies, many , if not all of her 
recommendations, it seems to me , are basically the same as what has 
been tried in China . Moreover , while trade constitutes only a small 
part of China ' s GNP , one cannot say it is unimportant to her economy. 
Nor can it be said that China is really "inward looking" . 
The truth is perhaps that no country can be entirely inward look-
ing or entirely outward looking . To what extent trade could serve 
as "the engine of growth" would depend on the special circumstances 
in which the countries find themselves . It might be more feasible 
for some countries to follow mainly the Western pattern and for 
others, basically , the Chinese pattern . I am not convinced that only 
China can grow with relative little foreign trade, especially trade 
i n manufactured products . 
A second point I would like to make is that trade expansion does 
not necessarily depend on industrialization; it may depend more on 
the modernization of the primary producti on sector . It is very like-
ly that primary products , including fisheries , forestry and mining 
products, will continue to be the main foreign exchange earners in 
many LDC's in this region . 
I am , of course , not against industrialization; I am only concern-
ed about how it can be achieved . To change the industrial mix in the 
manner suggested by the author is indeed worth considering . To try 
to expand the market through regional co- operation in industri al 
development is another possibility . But I believe that the future 
of industrial development for the LDC ' s in this region would depend 
perhaps even more on the economic conditions of the developed coun-
tries . It hardly needs saying that only when the world economy 
grows at a fqster rate will the LDC ' s have a better chance to grow 
with it . 
Let me add that the LDC ' s would fare even better if more and more 
highly industrialized countries, such as Japan , could also become 
truly "high comsumption" societies . There are , of course, both in-
stitutional and psychological difficulties in this process . But 
with continuous prosperity and increasing trade surpluses , this 
transformation seems to be more than a possibility . 
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Susumu Watanabe continued the commentary : Hughes raises many import-
ant points , and her policy suggestions are generally gound and de-
serve serious consideration . I have , however , some doubts and do 
not agree with the author on a few points . 
F i rst, the author advocates outward looking policies because 
greater efficiency will be attained thereby than by inward looking 
policies . As a goal and trend to be realized in the long run, I fu l-
ly accept this view . But, in discussing immediate and shorter- term 
policies for developing countries, I would not readily agree that 
"there is little doubt that in a global contex t , the more outward 
looking an economy the better". True, the most successful develop-
ing countries (for example - Hong Kong , Singapore , Taiwan, South 
Korea, Mexico and Brazil) are those which have adopted outward look-
ing policies . With the exception of the two city states, that is 
Hong Kong and Singapore , however , they all had completed inward look-
ing import substitution programs before embarking on outward looking 
policies . It seems that the accumulation of industrial skills and 
experience during this earlier period may have been an essential 
pre-condition to the success of outward looking policies . If so , 
which of the two types of policies should be recommended would de-
pend on the stage of development of the economy in qeustion . 
Incidentally , no close correlation appears to have been establish-
ed in Table 3 between international trade, employment and income dis -
tribution, in spite of the suggestion made by Hughes in the paper . 
Second, it is difficult to be optimistic about the prospect of 
the contribution which reduced trade barriers will make to the expan-
sion of labour intensive manufacturing in developing countries . As 
UNCTAD reports indicate , imports of labour intensive manufactures 
and semi-manufactures from developing to developed countries come 
mainly from very few countries in the Far East , namely , Hong Kong , 
Taiwan and South Korea . Little progres s has been made by other coun-
tries . In order to predict the outcome of a reduction in trade bar-
riers, it is necessary to ask why these few countries remain excep-
tions and why other countries have failed to follow their example . 
It is indeed unfortunate that "there has been little attempt and no 
success in explaining actual geographic and c ommodity patterns of 
trade in terms of trade theory". 
It is obvious that miscellaneous factors influence trade patterns; 
for expample, climate, endowment of raw materials and traditional 
mode of life . In my view, the most important explanaiton of the 
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exceptional position of these few developing countries in the Far 
East is the quality of their labour force . Their workers are known 
for discipline , industriousness, and dexterity . Taiwan and South 
Korea have built up human capital by industry in adequate elementary 
and secondary school education . Hong Kong and Singapore have absorb-
ed a large number of Chinese workers. If this diagnosis is correct, 
then, reduction in barriers of trade in labour intensive manufactures 
and semi-manufactures will benefit, under the present conditons, on-
ly those countries with rich human resources, and the gap between 
them and the rest of the developing world will widen still further . 
Such a tendency may be re- inforced by mounting competition from 
China in export markets for labour intensive products, as already 
evidenced in developed countries . 
Third, it is possible to take a more positive view of foreign in-
vestment and multi national corporations than Hughes . All the "suc-
cessful" developing countires rely heavily upon multi national cor-
porations for capital, entrepreneurship and marketing . Even when 
they do not directly depend upon multi national corporations, they 
often do indirectly, through international subcontracting arrange-
ments . It is, indeed , wondered whether these countries could have 
been so successful in their outward looking policies without the 
help of foreign investment and multi national corporations . 
Finally, sometimes Hughes seems to have been rather carried away 
in advocating less restrictive policies . Her argument about the dis-
criminatory effects of protective measures and subsidies upon the 
small scale industny sector is one example . Hughes argues that this 
is the main reason for this sector's failure to play a significant 
role in growth . That this is not true is demonstrated by the record 
of the Japanese economy in the past . In most of the developing coun-
tries, the small scale industrial sector benefits from subsidies and 
other promotional measures specifically designed for it, and in some 
cases, for example in India, the amount of funds allocated to it is 
more than it can absorb within the plan period . It seems that the 
main reason for the failure of the small scale industries in develop-
ing countries is the lack of such co-operation between large and 
small sectors as was practised in Japan and other developed countries 
in the form of subcontracting. 
Dr. Hughes also attributes the failure of intra-industry trade 
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among developing countries to their high trade barriers . But these 
are a partial and probably only a minor factor . More important are 
the lack of necessary industrial skills and experience as well as 
organizational problems. Political antagonism among developing coun-
tries is often another important explanation. 
Discussion was concentrated on questioning the analytical frame-
work of Hughes' paper, especially the first half. Many participants 
agreed that the paper may have reached the right conclusions but not 
for the right reasons . It was suggested that trade theorists were 
hardly to blame for the 'muddled and irrational structure ' of trade 
that has developed in large part because of muddled and irrational 
policies . Distortions in the international market were a matter for 
concern, but many of those mentioned by Hughes were considered amen-
able to policy manipulation and the corr ect approach, in terms of 
mobilizing as many resources for development as possible, was to cor-
rect them directly. The observation that distribution policies were 
important as well as allocation policies was accepted by most, but 
few conceded that this led to rejection of basic comparative advan-
tage concepts in planning development strategies. Others thought 
that the idea that marginal cost pricing by industrial countries was 
necessarily disadvantageous to developing countries was based on a 
theoretical confusion . One participant questioned over-stres s on 
the role of scale economies . 
Dr . Hughes insisted that trade theorists, in their neglect of the 
role of scale economies, the effects of the product cycle, and the 
multi national corporatin , produced policy conclusions that were 
largely irrelevant to the policy issues facing developing countries . 
4 
THE GROWTH OF EXPORTS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
IN LABOR SU KPLUS ECONOMIES -- WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE 
TO KOREA, TAIWAN, AND HONG KONG 
Soon Chough 
Introduction 
Korea and Taiwan belong to that particular family of developing 
countries which could rrost aptly be characterized as srrall, labor 
surplus, dualistic economies with poor natural resources . Hong Kong, 
by and large, shares these characteristics except the dualistic as-
pect . The cultural and historical ~ackground of these three coun-
tries contain discernible differences, but looking at it from the 
global vantage point, the three countries do share enough similari-
ties in their Northeast Asian heritage . 
With rrore or less similar economic and non- economic conditions, 
these three countries embarked on ascent for economic development 
towards the middle of 1950's . Their economic perforrrances are now 
recognized as arrong the most successful of all developing economies . 
The similarities in economic and non-economic conditions as men-
tioned in the preceding paragraph would lead one to expect a similar 
pattern o f economic development to emerge in these countries in the 
course of the two decades of development effort . This in fact is 
borne out in our analyses . On the other hand, there are enough dis-
similarities in resource endowrrent, initial conditions, socio-poli-
tical environrrent, and the pattern of development policies, and one 
would naturally expect that the success stories of these countries 
would contain enough differences as well . It is the purpose of this 
paper to trac e and corrpare these similarities and dissimilarities of 
1 2 1 
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these economies in the pattern of development , with particular em-
phasis on foreign trade and structural transformations . 
It is plainly impossible to discuss all aspects of economic deve-
lopment of these countries in a short paper, and the author is con-
strained to discuss only those which are considered to be rrost direc-
tly relevant to the growth of foreign trade and the structural 
change of the economy that occurred concomitantly with the growth of 
trade . 
In section one, I will try to describe the pattern of growth of 
trade and the structural change that is expected to be observable in 
a snall, labor surplus, dualistic economy with poor endownrrent of 
natural resources . The discussion is necessarily in general terms, 
but it will provide the rest of the paper with the conceptual frame-
work that could help clarify the basic similarities in the trend of 
development of the three countries, and help limit the scope of the 
discussion. 
The subsequent sections deal with the highlights of economic deve -
lopment and the growth of trade of these three countries and analyze 
the pattern of structural change of these countries, and the last 
section deals with future prospects and sets forth nain conclusions. 
1 . The Pattern of Economic Development and the Growth of Trade 
First of all, the three economies under survey are all relatively 
snall economies . The size of an economy could perhaps be best mea-
sured by the size of GNP . The GNP of Korea in 1970 was approximate-
ly $8 . 1 billion, and those of Taiwan and Hong Kong were about $5.S 
billion and $2 . 6 billion respectively. This means that these three 
countries put together generated less than 8 per cent of that of 
Japan in the same year . Second , none of these economies are endowed 
well with natural resources . In this regard , Taiwan is best situat-
ed of all three countr i es : Korea has bery little natural resources, 
and Hong Kong has virtually no natural resources to speak of, except 
having a harbor strategic ally located . 
Third, three economies are labor surpl us economies . The word 
labor surplus is interpreted to mean an unusually high labor land 
ratio . Korea and Taiwan are arrong the most densely populated coun-
tries in the world , Taiwan has the population d e nsity of 408 per-
soris per square kilometers in 1970 , Korea 323 . 4 persons in 1971, and 
Hong Kong 3 , 714 persons in 1970 . In all these countries the liter-
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acy of the population is very high . 
Fourth , Taiwan and Korea dualistic structure with respect to the 
modern industrial sector and traditional agricultural sector . In 
Korea the proportion of agricultural production in GNP was 36 . 2 per 
cent in 1960 , while the corresponding figure for Taiwan in the same 
year was 31 . 4 per cent . 
It seems ' that the development of a small, labor surplus , dualis-
tic economies with poor natural resources tends to go through a few 
phases, though these phases are by no rreans uniform in sequence and 
duration . 
The first phase is the one in which modern development has not 
yet occurred . The predominant industry is agriculture . The for-
eign trade is still at the infant stage , and exports consist rrostly 
of primary products . 
The second phase is one of establishing import substitution in-
dustries. The word import substitution industries refers to those 
industries that are newly established to cater mainly to the dorres -
tic market. The establishment of import substitution industries are 
financed in many cases by borrowing from abroad . In recent years 
the attempt of industalization by fo s tering import substitution in-
dustries have been criticized severely , rrainly for the reasons that 
they tend to be inefficient, increase the propensity to consume , and 
aggravate the balance of payments problem. In spite of the weight 
of these observations , however , d eveloping countries like Korea and 
Taiwan seem to have no choice but to develop a well-chosen bundle of 
import s11bsti tu ti on industries at the initial sta•::e of industrial 
development . what is wrong would not necessarily be import substi-
tution industries as such , but those whi ch are excessively capital 
intensive and merely help increase the propensities to consurre and 
import, rather than dev elop domestic resources and inter-industry re -
lations . Should a developing country give adequate heed to these 
pitfalls , the establishrEnt of import substitution industries of 
enough magnitude would help develop entrepreneurial ability and the 
technological skill of labor force, and break the underdevelopment 
equilibrium. 
At the stage of import substitution , one can expect the develop·· 
ing country to start exporting manufacturing products . It may sound 
contradictory to assert that export of manufacturing goods would 
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take place when most of the ~.ianufacturing industries are of import 
substitu~ion type . But , export of manufacturing products do take 
place at this stage because (1) import substitution industries , if. 
chosen wisely, would entail div0rsification of resources that have 
hitherto been left undeveloped , and mere exploration of new use of 
idle resources alone would render some industries to produce export-
able products and provide these industries with incentive to dovent-
for-surplus exporting, and (2) increasing pressure on the balance 
of payments induces the government to take a variety of export pro-
notion measures . 
The third phase of development marks the emergence of a variety 
of export industries and the reduction in the propensity to import . 
Export increases because, (1) on the supply side, an increasing 
number of labor intensive industries are able to reduce the cost of 
production through improvement in the technological and managerial 
skill, and (2) on the demand side , the hitherto untapped overseas 
markets are explored . The propensity to import decreases because 
the increasing number of intermediate products which are imported 
during the Phase II are now domestically produced . The sooner, how-
ever, the country tries to achieve import sul::•sti tut ion of heavy in-
dustries, the more difficult it would be to reduce the propensity to 
import . 
The last phase is the period of developing capital and technology 
intensive industries . As this phase comes, the comparative advan-
tages of these countries start shifting from merely unskilled labor 
intensive industries to the skilled labor intensive industries . At 
this stage, the economy in question should be wary not to indulge in 
an indiscriminate attempt to build excessively capital intensive in-
dustries without paying adequate regard to cost of them. During 
this phase , the proportion of export of capital intensive goods in 
total exports will increase . As more of technology intensive goods 
can be exported , the economy is no longer a "labor surplus", "dua-
listic" one. 
2 . An Overview of Economic Development 
For the benefit of those readers who are not acquainted with a 
broad outline of the development picture of these countries a mini-
mum account of the picture of development is presented below . 
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(1) Korea 
The count ry e ngaged i n rec on struction effort after the cease-fire 
was signed i n 19 53, and thanks partly to the U. S . economic aid , the 
economy was a ble to establish minimum a rrount of import substi tution 
industries and to curb runawa y inflation by the end of the 1950 ' s . 
Looking at Table 1 , we see that dur ing the 1950's, annual average 
rate of growth of GNP was appr oximately 5 per cent , rate of invest-
ment 11 per cent, and that of saving less than 5 per cent of GNP . 
The proportion of production of secondary industries in GNP was less 
than 15 per cent , and as we shall see later, the annual value of ex-
ports, consisting predominantly of primary products, fluctuated 
arround $30 million . All in all , the economy during 1950 ' s was still 
at Phase I as defined in the preceding section . 
The country launched its first economic development plan in 1962 , 
and this opened the Pliase II of development . The primary target of 
the plan was to establish import substitution industries . The U. S . 
economic a i d decreased during this period , and the public and pri-
vate loans from abroad was the primary rreans to finance the great 
variety of import substitution industries e stablished during this 
period . Thanks to the vent- for-surplus exporting and vigorous ex-
port promotion rreasures taken by the government, exports also in-
creased very rapidly . 
During the second five year plan period , 1967-71, the country wit-
nessed the ann·:.al average rate of growth of GNP at 11 . 4 per cent, 
and the rate of growth of exports at 33 . 8 per cent . In spite of the 
great increase of exports, however, imports also increased greatly, 
The great increase in exports is partly due to a continued expansion 
in import substitution industries -- and the consequent export drive 
as discussed in the previous section -- and partly to the emergence 
of a few important export industries . By and large, the second five 
year development plan period could be characterized as the period 
of the Phase III . 
The annual imports of foreign capital, particularly the short-
term cornrrercial loans, increased greatly until 1969, when it reached 
the peak of $560 . 3 million . The feeling became widespread that the 
economy was in need of arresting the expansionary trend . In late 
1969, the governrrent adopted tight ;1-onetary and fiscal policies, re-
stricted comrrencial loans, and the local currency was devalued in a 
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series of exchange ra t e readjustrnents . 
Furtherrrore , various measures for increasing agricultural produc-
tions were taken , and heavy doses of investments were undertaken in 
such fields as iron and steel, petro-chemical industries, and rrachin-
ery and equipments . 
The Korean economy in 1972 still contains elements of Phases II 
and III, but it has launched a full-scale program of establishing 
heavy industries. It entered into the phase IV around 1970 . 
(2) Taiwan 
Taiwan's industrialization effort started with the first five 
year development plan of 1953 . The postwar economic developrnent of 
Taiwan falls into two phases ; one spans the 1950's and the other 
the 1960's . The first period can be characterized as import substi-
tution period (Phase II) and the second the export growth period 
(Phase III) . As shown in Table 1 GNP grew at an annual average 
rate of 6- 7 percent throughout 1950 ' s . The gross dornestic capital 
forrration grew steadily, and so did exports . When the economy ent-
ers the Phase III in the early 1960's, all the above magnitudes 
grew at an accelerated pace . 
The picture of healthy development is clearly portrated in Table 
1 . The rate of increase of GNP was accelerated towards the middle 
of the 1960's, investment and dorrestic saving increased greatly , 
and the proportion of secondary industries in GNP increased rapidly . 
Inflation was rapidly subsided, and the balance of payrnent deficit 
became visibly narrowed every year, thanks to the great increase in 
exports and reduction in imports. The economy displayed typical 
features of the Phase III in the 1960's, and an increasing number 
of capital and technology intensive industries started to be estab-
lished in the late 60's. Taiwan also entered into the Phase IV to-
wards the end of the 1960's . 
(3) Hong Kong 
The economic growth of the srrall island-port of Hong Kong is 
even more remarkable than that of Korea and Taiwan. Hong Kong 
naturally followed quite a different pattern of development from 
Korea and Taiwan. Thanks to the size of the area, and lack of tra-
ditional sector, Hong Kong's Phase I which lasted until 1954, has 
different meaning from Korea and Taiwan . During this phase, Hong 
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Kong had very little industry . It was around the middle of 1950's 
that Hong Kong started developing rranufacturing industries , and 
the Phase II covers the period of 1955-59. Though Honk Kong d id 
not develop import substitution industries as such , it is noteworthy 
that Hong Kong resorted to developing local rranufacturing industri-
es, though , unlike Korea and Taiwan, the industrialization effort 
was not accompanied by measures to protect domestic industries . 
Druing the second half of the 1950 ' s and in the first of the 1960 's, 
a variety of sophisticated labor intensive industries were establi -
shed . It is important to note that Hong Kong ' s trade is based upon 
the island ' s industrial strength . The Stage III set in early 1960 ' s, 
and since then Hong Kong's trade increase was phenomenal . 
The per capita export of Hong Kong in 1969 was approximately 
$546, while the corresponding figures for Taiwan (1969) and Korea 
(1970) were $78 and $26, respectively , This means that Hong Kong 
is by far the most vigorous trader among the three countries, and 
that Hong Kong's income is generated mostly from export of goods 
and services . Hong Kong's industrial structure in recent years is 
becoming increasingly technology-intensive, though naturally no 
attempt is ma.de to launch a major drive for establishing iron and 
steel and petro-chemical indust~ies. 
The economic perforrrances of the three countries may now be com-
pared . The pattern of development of all three countries are strik-
ingly similar; all three countries displayed similar phases, as 
their economic development proceeded . However , there are a few im-
portant differences . The most outstanding difference between Korea 
on the one hand and Taiwan (and Kong Kong) on the other hand, is 
that the initial conditions (i . e . economic conditions when the 
Phase II was open) were much more favorable for Taiwan (and Hong 
Kong) than for Korea . Taiwan had been better developed than Korea 
when the two countries were liberated both in manufacturing indust-
ries as well as in agriculture . The proportion of secondary indust-
ry production in Taiwan was already 20 . 8 percent in 1955, while the 
corresponding figure for Korea was only 12 . 2 percent in the same 
year . The agricultural conditions were far better in Taiwan than 
in Korea both in terms of overhead capital and climatic conditions . 
The rates of investment and saving were fa~ larger in Taiwan than 
in Korea, as shown in Table 1 . These conditions rendered it pos-
sible for Taiwan to achieve much faster r~te of growth than Korea 
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during the late SO ' s and early 60's . 
The second difference is that Korea ' s conscious industrial deve-
lopment program started in 1962 , while it started in the early SO ' s 
for Taiwan and Hong Kong . The fact industrialization effort started 
much later in Korea than the other two countries has led the former 
to have much greater sense of urgency and to become much rrore ambi-
tious in development planning than the latter . Korea ' s Phases II 
and III took approximately 5 years each - with much overlapping -
while Taiwan and Hong Kong took twice as much time to go through 
these stages . 
Korea has been trying to accomplish so much in such a . short time , 
so that rrany problems that would have norrrally been solved during 
the Phases II and III were carried over to the Phase IV, while for 
Taiwan and Hong Kong, IIDch greater degree of structural adjustment 
was achieved during each phase before the new phase was open . Ne 
shall continue to discuss this problem in subsequent sections . 
3 . The Trend and Structure of Exports 
(1) The Trend of Exports 
The general picture of development of foreign trade is sumrrarized 
in Table 2 . The average annual rate of growth of exports during 
the 1950 ' s was about 8 . 3 percent for Korea, for Taiwan, and 7 . 6 per-
cent for Hong Kong . The corresponding figures during the 60's were 
39 . 4 percent for Korea, 31 . 5 percent for Taiwan , and 17 . 0 percent 
for Hong Kong . Thus, the trade of all three countries became great-
ly accelerated in the 60's . As shown in the table , the phenomenal 
increase of export is reflected by the increasing proportion of ex-
port in GNP and the increase in the ratio of exports to imports . 
The more favorable initial condition of Taiwan compared to Korea 
is also discernible in Table 2 . The proportion of export in GNP in 
Korea was only about 1 . 4 percent during the first half of 1950 ' sand 
2 . 4 percent during the second half of the 1950 ' s, while the corres-
ponding fi gures for Taiwan we re 7 . 8 percent and 10 . 7 percent respec-
tively . Even in 1970 , the proportion of exports in GNP for Taiwan 
was 24 . 9 percent while it was only 12 . 8 percent for Korea . 
The trade balance of Korea was extremely unfavorable in the SO's , 
and it became gradually mitigated in the 60 ' s . Taiwan's trade de-
ficit became completely wiped out in early 70 ' s, and Hong Kong late-
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Table 2 The Trend of Exports 
K 0 R E A T A I WAN HONG KONG 
I 1) 
Aver- % E~orts 1 ) Aver- % 1). ~-?r~ Aver- % Exports 
age of l)Imports .age of l)Imports age of Imports 
Annu- GNP Annu- GNP Annu- GNP 
al al al 
Rate Rate Rate 
of of of 
Grow- Grow- Grow-
th(%) th th 
1950-1955 7.3 1. 4 0.10 6.8 2 ) 7.8 0.66 5 . 2 n.a. 0.68 
1956-1960 9.2 2.4 0.18 3.7 10.7 U,60 9.9 n.a. 0 . 67 
1961-1965 40 . 0 6.0 0.38 24.2 16.2 0.85 10.8 n.a. 0 . 74 
1966-1970 38.8 12.8 0 . 42 26.1 24 . 9 1. 00 18 . 5 n.a. 0.87 
1971 27.8 9.8 0.45 36 . 8 30.6 1. 03 12 . 4 n.a. 1.18 
1) Figures show those of the last year of each quinquenium. 
2) 1953-1955 average rate of growth. 
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, Director Gene-
ral of Budgets, Accounts, and Statistics, National Income of 
the Republic of China, various issues, International Monetary 
Fund, Direction of Trade, various issues. 
ly has almost established the balance between exports and imports. 
(2) Composition of Commodity Groups 
Tables 3A, 3B, and 3C summarize the commodity group composition 
of export. These data are compiled by comparable statistics with 
the same method of classification, the comparison of these tables 
·.vould be of particular interest. 
As we have already observed in the previous paragraphs, in both 
Korea and Taiwan, the export largely consisted of food and live 
animals, and crude materials during their Phase II (i.e. for Korea 
1950-1964, and for Taiwan 1950-1959), but exports of manufactured 
goods have since become greatly important. In the case of Hong Kong, 
the proportion of manufactured goods in total export was large from 
the beginning, but even here, the proportion has been steadily in-
creasing. 
The second point to note is the strength of primary, and especial-
ly, agricultural, products. In the case of Taiwan, the export of 
agricultural products is still very vigorous. As Table 3B shows, 
export of food and live animals constituted approximately 30% of 
total products in 1968, whereas the corresponding figure for Korea 
I 
I 
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Table 3A Commodity Group Composition of Exports , Korea 
(in millions of U. S . dollars)l) 
1955 1960 1965 1970 
Total 18 . 0 32.8 175.1 835 . 2 
( %) (100 . O) (100 . O) (100 . O) (100 . 0) 
Food and Live Animals 1.1 9 . 7 28.2 65 . 5 
(%) (6 .1) (29 . 6) (16.1) (7 . 8) 
Beverages and Tobacco 0 . 0 0 . 5 0 . 9 14 . 2 
(%) ( O) (1. 5) ( 0. 5) (1. 7) 
Crude Materials, Inedible, 
Except Fuels 14 . 7 15 . 8 37 . 0 100.0 
(%) (81. 7) (48. 2) (21.1) (12 . O) 
Mineral Fuels, Labricants 
and Related Materials 0 . 5 1.1 1. 9 8 . 8 
(%) I (27 . 8) (3. 4) (1.1) (1.1) 
Chemicals 0 . 0 0 . 4 0 . 4 11. 4 
(%) ( O) (1. 2) (0 . 2) (1. 4) 
Manufactured Goods, Clas-
sified by Materials 0 . 9 3 . 9 66 . 4 220 . 9 
(%) (5. 0) (11. 9) (37 . 9) (26 . 4) 
Machinery and Transport 
Equipments 0 . 2 o. o 5.5 61. 5 
(%) (1.1) (O) (3 . 1) (7 . 4) 
Manufactured Goods, Mis-
cellaneous 0 . 5 0.0 34 . 5 352.5 
(%) (2. 8) (0) (19. 7) (42 . 2) 
Other Commodities (O) (0) (0) (O) 
(%) 
1) Figures in parenthesis show percentage in total exports. 
Source : Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook . 
Table 3B Co.mnodity Group Co.mposition of Ex;ports, Taiwan 
lin Jll.illions o;f; N T Dollars) 
1950 1955 1960 1965 1968 
Total 1,984 .3 1,916 . 9 5,965.7 17 , 987.3 31,567.6 
( % ) (100 . 0l (100 . 0) (100.0) (100 •. 0) (100 . 0) 
Food and Live 
Animals 1,791 . 5 1,680.0 3,953 . 9 9 , 322 . 0 9,441.5 
(90 .3) (87.6) (66 . 3) (51. 8) (29 . 9) 
Beverages and 
Tabacco 2 . 4 0.7 14 . 6 76 . 8 95 . 0 
( 0 . 1) C0.041 c.o . 2) ( 0. 4) (0 . 3) 
Crude Materials, 
Inedible, Ex-
cept Fuels 54.9 74 . 3 284 . 0 973 . 0 1,398 . B I 
C2. B 1 ( 3. 9) (4 . 8) (5 . 4) c 4 . 4 l I 
Mineral Fuels, 
Lubricants 
Related Mate-
rials 38 . 0 11. 0 116.7 76.4 379 . 0 
( 1. 9) (0 . 6) C2. Ol (0 . 4) (1. 2) 
Chemicals 44.8 68.8 157.7 732 . 7 801. 2 
( 2 . 3 l ( 3. 6) (2 . 6) (4 . 1) (2 . 5) 
(continued) 
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(Continued) 
1950 1955 1960 1965 1968 
Manufactured 
Goods, Cla-
ssif ied by 
Materials 33 . 4 49.8 1,185 . 4 4,501.9 8 , 848 . 8 
(l. 7) ( 2 . 6) (19 . 9) (25 . 0) ( 28 . 0) 
Machinery and 
Transport 
Equipments 0.0 0.5 46.5 780 . 6 4,164 . 5 
(0 . 9} (1 . 6} ( 3 . 4) ( 8 . 3) (20.8) 
Other Conmo-
di ties 
( % ) 
Source: DGBAS, National Income of the Republic of China, Oct 
1970 
Table 3C Comnodity Group Composition of Exports, Hong Kong 
(in millions of Hong Kong Dollars) 
1950 1955 1963 1970 
Total 3,715 3,210 4,991 15,239 
( %) (100 . 0) (100 . 0) (100 . 0) (100 . 0) 
Food and Live Animals 470 335 417 500 
( %) (12.7) (10 . 4) ( 8. 4) ( 3 . 3) 
Beverages and Tobacco 57 20 73 75 
( %) (l. 5) ( 0 . 6) ( l. 5) ( 0. 5) 
Animal and Vegetable Oils 215 35 21 13 
( %) ( 5 . 8) ( 1.1) ( 0 . 4) ( 0 . 08) 
Crude Materials, Inedible, 
Except Fuels 81<) 383 212 403 
(22 . 0) ( 11. 9) ( 4 . 2) ( 2. 6) 
Mineral Fuels, Labricants 
and Related Materials 85 29 14 42 
( %) 
I 
( 2. 3) ( 0 . 9) ( 0 . 3) ( 0 . 3) 
Chemicals 458 203 263 597 
( %) ( 12 ." 3) ( 6 . 3) ( 5 . 3) ( 3. 9) 
Manufactured Goods, 
Classified by Materials 1,072 1,250 1,233 3,042 
( %) (28 . 9) ( 38. 9) (24 . 7) ( 20 . 0) 
Machinery and Transport 
Equipments 150 120 251 1,733 
( %) ( 4 . 3) ( 3 . 7) ( 5 . 0) ( 11. 4) 
Manufactured Goods, I Miscellaneous 389 834 2,481 8 , 791 
( %) ( 10 . 5) (26.0) ( 4 9. 7) ( 57. 7) 
Other Comnodities 0 1 26 42 
( %) ( 0) ( 0 . 03) ( 0. 5) ( 0 . 3) 
Source : s . c . Fan, The Postwar Economic Development of Hong Kong, 
The Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, 
p. 41. 
I 
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was less than 8 percent . 
The third point to note is that in all three countries, export 
of technology and capital intensive goods is becoming increasingly 
pronounced as these economies enter the Phase IV . The increase of 
export of chemicals is steady in all three countries, and the in-
crease of machinery and transport equipment is particularly vigorous 
in Taiwan. 
(3) Major Export Items 
Let us now look at the major items in exports of Korea and Taiwan. 
Export goods are greatly diversified in recent years, but by and 
large, exports are led by a few major products . As Table 4A shows, 
the Korea's export in recent years is dominated by five most important 
articles, plywood and veneered panels, textile products, clothing, 
machinery and transport equipment, and wigs and false beard. These 
five items accounted for only about 22 . 4 percent of total exports 
in 1967, and the proportion increased to 66 . 5 percent in 1970. All 
these items are labor intensive goods, and they eloquently testify 
Korea's comparative advantage in these products . They also point 
at the need for developing new export industries the products of 
which command higher income elasticity in international markets . 
As pointed out in previous paragraphs, Taiwan's export of agri-
cultural products and the processed agricultural products are still 
fairly important . Rice and sugar, which constituted 78 percent of 
total export in 1953, decreased to mere 4 . 3% in 1970, but one notes 
the emergence of new export substitution products such as canned 
pineapple, canned mushrooms, and canned asparagas spears. As for 
manufactured goods, much the same picture as that of Korea prevails, 
i.e. the major export items are plywood, textiles, clothing and 
footwear, plastic articles, and electrical machinery. In 1970, 
these five items constituted 53.6 percent of total exports . Parti-
cularly noteworthy is the phenomenal increase in the export of ele-
ctrical machinery and appliances. 
Roughly the similar picture prevails in Hong Kong. In 1970, the 
five major export items were: clothing and footwear, toys and sport-
ing goods, textile products, telecommunications apparatus, and ele-
ctrical machinery . These five items were responsible for about 60 
percent of her total exports . 
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Table 4A Proportion of Major Export Items in Total Exports , Korea 
(%) 
1960 1965 1970 
Plywood and Veneered Panels 0 10 . 3 11. 2 
Textile Products 12 . 1 19.4 10 . 2 
Machinery and Transport Equipment 0 . 3 3.1 7 . 4 
Clothing and Footwear 10 . 0 14 . 2 25 . 6 
Wigs and False Beard 0 1. 3 12 . 1 
Total 22 . 4 48.3 66 . 5 
Source : Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues . 
Table 4B Proportion of Major Exports in Total Exports, Taiwan 
(%) 
1955 1960 1965 1970 
Agricultural Products 80 . 7 54 . 5 55 . 0 6 . 4 
Processed Agricultural Products 4 . 2 4 . 8 10 . 4 5 . 9 
Manufactured Products 
Plywood 0 . 1 1. 5 5 . 9 5 . 5 
Textiles 0 . 9 11. 6 10 . 3 13 . 8 
Clothing and Footwear 1.4 2 . 6 4 . 9 16 . 8 
Plastic Articles - - 2 . 6 5 . 1 
Electrical Machinery and Appliances - - 0 . 4 12 . 4 
Total of the above manufactured products 2 . 4 15 . 7 24 . 1 53 . 6 
Source: Kou-ShuLiang andT . H. Lee , Process and Pattern of Economic 
Development in Taiwan, The Center for Southeast Asian Studi-
es, Kyoto University, 1972, p . 17. 
4. Expansion of Overseas Market - Direction of Export 
Table 5 shows the direction of exports of Korea and Taiwan . For 
all three countries, the U. S . and Japan are the two ITDSt important 
export markets . In 1960, the share exports to the U.S . from Korea , 
Taiwan, and Hong Kong were 11.0 percent, 11 . 5 percent, and 17 . 9 per-
cent respectively, and these figure were changed in 1970 to 47 . 3 
percent for Korea, 39 . 5 percent for Taiwan, and 3S . 7 percent for 
Hong Kong . On the other hand, the Japanese market did not expand 
very greatly. In 1960, the share of export to Japan in total export 
was 61 . 6 percent for Korea, 57 . 7 percent for Taiwan, and 5 . 4 percent 
for Hong Kong . But these shares declined in 1970 to 28 . 1 percent 
for Korea, 15.1 percent for Taiwan . 
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1955 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1955 
1960 
1965 
1970 
Table 5 The Proportion of Export to the U. S . and Japan 
in Total Exports 
Korea Taiwan Hong Kong 
U.S. Japan U.S. Japan U. S. Japan 
49.0 41. 0 4.4 59 . 5 
11. 0 61. 6 11. 5 57 . 7 17 . 9 5 . 4 
35 . 2 25.l 21. 3 30 . 6 27.6 5 . 1 
47 . 3 28 .1 39.5 15 . 1 35.7 7 . 1 
The Proportion of Import to the U. S . and Japan 
in Total Imports 
Korea Taiwan Hong Kong 
U. S. Japan U. S . Japan U. S . Japan 
22 . 8 5 .6 47 . 5 30.5 
39.0 20.5 38 .1 35 . 3 11. 7 15 . 3 
39 . 3 36 . 0 31. 7 39 . 8 11.1 17 . 3 
29 . 5 40 .8 23 . 9 42.8 13 . 2 23 . 8 
135 
(%) 
U. K. 
14 . 3 
13 . 9 
10 . 2 
(%) 
U. K. 
10 . 8 
10 . 7 
8 . 6 
J 
Source : Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues 
International Monetary Fund, Directions of Trade, various 
issues 
On the other hand, the proportion of import from the U. S. in 
total import decreased, while that from Japan increased tremendously 
during the period. Toward the end of the 1960's, Taiwan and Hong 
Kong had trade surplus with the U. S. but trade surpluses with the 
U.S . were more than offset by the trade deficit with Japan . 
The general picture of trade of these countries in recent years 
is all these countries import producers ' equipments and half-finish-
ed goods from Japan and, export labor-intensive goods to advanced 
countries and especially to the U.S. The export success of three 
countries in the last two decades owes to the sustained strength 
of demand for labor intensive goods in the U. S . and other developed 
countries . 
The expansion of the U. S. market c a.nnot be counted on forever. 
The trade balance between Taiwan and Hong·Kong on the one hand and 
the U. S . on the other are already significantly unfavorable to the 
U. S. On the other hand, Japan might not, as she should, abandon 
overnightthe traditional policy of maintaining self-sufficiency as 
regards labor-intensive goods. 
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Under the circumstances the three countries would have to explore 
other rrarkets in Western Europe and other parts of the world . Fur-
thermore , the three countries should try to e xpand production of 
those export goods with high income elasticity of demand . These 
are products of technology-intensive industries . 
5. Export Promotion Policies 
The tremendous increase of exports of Korea and Taiwan owes much 
to government policies on export promotion . Both Taiwan and Korea 
have instituted a variety of export promotion measures . These mea-
sures, in case of Korea, range from rebates of indirect taxes , ta-
riff exemptions for imports of raw rraterials and intermediate pro-
ducts for exportable goods, reduction in income taxes on export pro-
fits , wastage allowances, the export-import link system, preferen-
tial rate on railway charges, and the establishment of free trade 
areas. 
It is impossible to describe and analyze in this paper the oper-
ation and the economic consequences of these systems, and I shall 
simpiy make a few points that appear to be particularly important. 
First of all, these measures seem very elaborate and might give 
one the impression that the extent of export subsidies is preponder -
ant. It is fair to point out, however, that the magnitude of sub-
sidies per dollar of export in Korea in recent years is less than 
what the list of the pronotion rreasures would lead one to anticipate . 
What appears as subsidy seems to a large extent to be "defensive" 
measures to offset the widened gap between domestic price increase 
and the rate at which the local currency is depreciated. In other 
words, the export subsidy has been acting in large measure as a sub-
stitute for devaluation , they have been necessary as "defensive", 
rather than "positive" export pronotion measures . Devaluation of 
local currency has been resisted because it increases the debt bur-
den in local currency of those firms which borrowed from abroad, and 
it tends to reinforce inflation . Promotion of exports with as lit-
tle devaluation as possible in an inflationary economy tends natu-
rally to accumulate various rrake-shifts in policy arsenal to off set 
depreciation of local currency . 
Second, one possible consequence of substituting for devaluation 
a variety of ad hoc export pronotion rreasures, however, is that they 
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would maximize the gross rather than net value of exports , and these 
measures tend to e ncourage e xporti ng by those goods , the domestic 
value added of wh i c h i s s mall , and discriminate against those export-
ers who use and develop l oc al l y produced inputs . As a further conse-
quence , these policies r e t ard the development of industries which 
produce int ermediate products for e xport purpose , which the govern-
ment has been try i ng so str eneously to encourage . 
In order to maintain the present rate of economic growth , Korea 
would have to transform the structure of export conurodities from 
those which need relativa ly little local processing to those comno-
dities which use more local resources, particularly the skilled la-
bor . As mentioned previously , the structure of the present export 
promotion schemes, which encourage mainly those industries which 
process rather mechanically the imported intermediate products 
should be replaced in favor of a systematized scheme to maximize 
foreign exchange earnings . Continued reliance on present system of 
export promotion may be effective from the short-run objective of 
maximizing value of exports , but it would be detrimental to bring 
about long run structural readjustment that the Korean economy needs 
to achieve . 
At the present stage of development of Korea and Taiwan, the ex-
port pronotion s ystem should be conceived, not as giving incentive to 
the act of exporting , but as an organic system of fostering export 
industries by inducing them to produce and sell abroad those goods 
which can be competitive in the international market from the long-
run point of view . 
6 . Capital Intensity and Producti vity 
Export of a developing country is due to many factors . From the 
supply side , the simple fact of expansion of production in the i m-
port substitution phase is the most important sin gle factor responsi-
ble for the exports of manufactured goods . But , as the economy 
reaches the Phase III, continued growth of export has to rely on de -
crease in average cost of production in export industries . The de -
crease in cost can be attributed to either the economy of scale or 
i ncrease in productivity through improvement in productive and nana-
gerial skill. For a developing country whose comparative advantage 
lies in labor-intensive industries , the latter cause of cost reduc-
tion seems nore important than the former . 
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As we saw in Section III, a sizable aTIDunt of export of manufac-
turing goods did occur during the Phase II of the three countri es . 
In order, however , for exports to incr ease , the productivity of ex-
port industries had better increase rapidly , so that some of the im-
port substitution industries can be transformed to export industries . 
In the present paper, we have not attempted to study productivity 
increase in major industries of three countries, and we would rrerely 
cite the results of a few studies that have been done on Korea and 
Taiwan . 
There seem to be some indications that increase in productivity 
of export industries of Korea is less than what one would expect 
from the rate of increase in export . 
An analysis has. been done by Dr . Chuk Kyo Kim as regards produc-
tivity increase in export, import substitution , and domestic indust-
ries during the period 1966-7 0 . 1 The study does have a few limita-
tions because sorre strong assumptions are made in these calculations 
and the period of study is limited to 1967-70 . But these limita-
tions do not seem to negate the validity of conclusion . According 
to the study, the findings of which is summarized in Table 6, one 
notes the remarkable fact that the growth rate of total productivity 
is in general much lower in the export sector than in the import sub-
stitution or the dorrestic sector . Total factor productivity showed 
an average annual rate of growth of 8.6 per cent, while exports grew 
at an average annual rate of 36 . 7 per cent between 1966 and 1970 . 
At industry level, most export industries indicate a low produc-
tivity growth as compared with import substitution and domestic in-
dustries except textiles, leather products, basic metal industries, 
and electrical machinery and apparatus. 
It is fortunate for Korea that productivity did increase in such 
major export industries as textile and leather products , and electri-
cal machinery and , but the above findings show that the Korean ex-
ports in general , in spite of the fact that they have grown very 
fast, have not been able to increase their factor productivity fast 
enough even in the Phase III . Increase in exports can be ascribed 
TIDre importantly to vent-for-surplus type of exporting than produc-
1
chuk Kyo Kim , "Productivity analysis of Korean Export Industries", 
Korea Development Institute , Collected Papers, 1972, p . 29. 
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tivity increase. This fact , together with the observation that the 
capital intensity of export industries is so nuch lower in the ex-
port sec'i:.or than in the rest of the manufacturing sector indicates 
the strong need of technical innovations in the export industries 
and greater capital investment in the export sector. 
I have not attempted to study productivity change of Taiwan , com-
parable to Kim ' s study on Korea . But impression one gets on this 
problem is that even in Taiwan, where structural adjustment has been 
more thorough-going than in Korea, expansion in production appears to 
have been a nore important cause of export expansion than improve-
ment in technology. 2 
Table 6 Total Factor Productivity Index for Export, Import 
Substitution and Domestic Industries, Korea 
( 196.6=100) 
Export Import Substitution Domestic 
Industries Industries Industries 
f 
1966 100 . 0 100 . 0 100.0 
1967 105 . 5 103.5 92.9 
1968 120.7 140.9 121. 3 
1969 131. 6 185 . 1 143 . 5 
1970 140.5 219 . 2 165.3 
Average Rate 14.2 
of Changes 8 . 9 21. 4 
Source: Chuk Kyo Kim, "Productivity Analysis of Korean Export 
Industries", in Korea Development Institute, Collected 
Papers, 1972. P . 29 
7. Agriculture and Trade 
we emphasized earlier that a satisfactory extent of agricultural 
f th t · 1 requi"rements for sustained in-development is one o e mos crucia 
dustrial development in the subsequent period. The importance of ag-
riculture to economic development is well-known, and does not have 
2 see for exanple Kou-shu Liang and T.H. Lee, Process and_Pattern_o~ 
Economic Development in Taiwan, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 
Kyoto University, 1972, pp. 45-46. 
w. y. Kuo, Taiwan no Keizai Koza_ (Economic Structure of Taiwan) , 
Kansai Economic Research Center, 1971. pp.121-124 .• 
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to be recapitulated here, but the fact that agriculture of Taiwan 
has, whereas that of Korea has not, generated what might be termed 
as Green Revolution , accounts for so many of the differences in per-
formance of the two economies during the last two decades , and in 
directions to which the future developments is expected to take. 
The rate at which the agricultural sector diminished in Taiwan 
in the 1960's was noticeably faster than that of Korea. In Taiwan 
the income accruing from the agricultural sector was 31 . 4 percent of 
GNP in 1960, and it decreased to 18 . 7 percent and in Korea , the ag-
ricultural orgin of GNP in 1960 was 39 . 0 percent and it decreased 
to 29 . 6 percent . 
The satisfactory development of agriculture in Taiwan has enabled 
Taiwan to increase the export of agricultural products and processed 
goods related to agriculture, to release labor and capital from ag-
ricultural sector to industrial sector . 
First, let us see the volurne of trade of agricultural exports and 
imports . Though Taiwan might eventually have to import food and 
other agricultural products , its agriculture at the crucial stage of 
industrialization has earned a substantial quantity of foreign ex-
change. The proportion of agricultural goods e~port in total export 
even in the late 60's was approximately 14 per cent of total export . 
Since in Taiwan the estimated average rate of net foreign exchange 
earnings by exporting agricultural products and processed agricul-
tural products is approximately 85 per cent of the value of exports, 
while the rate of foreign exchange earnings by exporting rranufactur-
ed products is only 55 .5 per cent, the importance of agricultural ex-
ports tends to be rruch greater than is indicated by the gross export 
figure . 
Compared to this, agriculture of Korea was not able to produce ex-
portable surplus at the initial stage of import substitution, and a 
substantial proportion of food consumption was, and still is, met by 
imports . Though the increase in agricultural production during the 
last two decade were by no means negligible, the green revolution 
apparently did not occur to the extent that has happened in Taiwan. 
Second , as regards the release of resources from the agricultural 
sector to industrial sector, one notes, first, t hat the proportion 
of agricultural saving in total investrnent was roughly sarne in both 
Korea and Taiwan, in the early 1950's --- 17 .6 per cent for Korea 
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during 1955-57 period and 16 . 7 per cent for Taiwan during 1952-54 
period --- but, during 1967-69 it becarre 24. 8 per cent for Taiwan 
3 while it becarre only 1 . 0 per cnet for Korea . This rreans that the 
Korean agriculture generated virtually no saving at all, while 
Taiwan ' s agriculture generated as nn.ich as a quarter of total dorres-
tic saving. The proportion of non- agricultural saving to total in-
vestrrent in Korea during l9b7-69 was 51 per cent, so that the remain-
ing part of investrrent in Korea was financed by foreign savings . 
As for rrovernent of labor from agricultural and non-agricultural 
sector, one notes that in 1950's, the Korean industrial sector ab-
sorbed relatively nore labor from the agricultural sector than Tai-
wan's industrial sector, but in the 1960's the trend was reversed , 
and Taiwan's industries absorbed rrore labor from the agricultural 
sector than Korean industries . This is shown by the rate of growth 
of industrial labor force in the two countries . According to a 
study done by Professor Gustav Ranis , 4 in Taiwan the industrial 
labor force increased at 3 . 1 per c ent per annum between 1953 and 
1959, while in Korea it increased by 5 . 5 per cent between 1956-62. 
But in the 1960 ' s the trend was reversed . In Taiwan, the industrial 
labor force increased at 8.1 percent per annum between 1960 and 1968, 
while in Korea it increased by 6 .3 per cent between 1960 and 1968. 
8 . Foreign Capital and Domestic Saving 
The discussion on structural transformation for Korea, Taiwan and 
Hong Kong cannot dispense with a glance at investment and saving . 
Korea and Taiwan in 1950's are the greatest recipients of the U.S . 
economic aid . Taiwan received a total of $1,444 . 3 million over the 
1950-65 period, or an average of alrrost $100 million a year, whereas 
Korea received twice as much during the sarre period, or an average 
of about $200 million a year . The U. S . economic aid provided both 
countries not only with consumption goods to help relieve the string-
ent post-war conditions, but also with the materials, and foreign ex-
change to establish the basic import substitution industries during 
phases I and II . 
3 
4 
Se e Gustav Ranis, "The Role of 
tion to Economic Maturity", in 
Docurrents and Selected Papers : 
rrent Plan , Sogang, Seoul, 1972 . 
ibid, p . 50 
Industrial Sector in Korea ' s Transi-
S . H. Jo and S . Y. Park (ed.) Basic 
Korea's Third Five Year Develop-
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Both countries started borrowing heavily from abroad in the form 
both of official loan's and private loans . The long-term capital im-
ports to Taiwan arrounted to $122 million U. S . dollars in 1970 , where-
as it arrounted to $548 . 1 million in Korea in the same year . 
The foreign capital has undoubtedly contributed greatly to eco-
nomic growth of the two countries, But , needless to say , it cannot 
of course be an unmixed blessing . Too much borrowing and undiscip-
lined way of spending will result in excess capacity in import sub-
stitution industries, increase rather than decrease the propensity 
to import, and aggravate debt service burden . 
Both Taiwan and Korea (and especially Korea) would need a large 
quantity of foreign capital in the future, in order to establish 
capital- and technology-intensive industries , and to help improve 
technical levels . But it is also true that for both economies in 
recent years , the constraint on development lies not so much in the 
shortage of foreign exchange as in the shortage of domestic resources , 
real and financial . 
The fact that Taiwan has established self- reli2nt economy is 
shown by the rate of saving . Taiwan's investment expenditure in 
1970 was as much as 30 . 0 per cent of GNP -- a very high rate of in-
vestment for a developing economy and this is matched by an equal-
ly high rate of saving . In fact the proportion of domestic saving 
in domestic investment has risen from about 45 per cent in 1955 to 
103 per cent in 1970 . This desirable state of affairs has been 
achieved, thanks to high propensity to invest induced by the high 
rate of profit which in turn is the result of improvement in techni-
cal and managerial innovations . 
Korea started borrowing from abroad in early 60 ' s and the arrount 
of borrowing especially in the form of private commercial loans in-
creased tremendously towards the middle of 1960 ' s . The total arrount 
of foreign capital import during 1959-71 period was approximately 
$2 . 7 billion, out of which the short-term commercial loans was $1 . 7 
billion, or about 63 per cent . 
Several factors contributed to the heavy borrowing from abroad, 
particularly in the form of commercial loans . 
First of all, the government encouraged importation of capital to 
implement the investment programs. Both the letter and the spirit 
of laws and regulations governing foreign · capital were very favor -
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ble to induce importation of it . Secondly , the rate of increase of 
domestic prices was much higher than the rate at which foreign ex-
change was appreciated . Thirdly , dorrestic interest rates on bank 
loans was much higher than interest rates on foreign capital . 
The heavy inflow of short-term capital created noticeable excess 
capacity in some import substitution industries , and the rate of pro-
fit in these industries gradually decreased . The problem of debt 
service started to loom large towards the second half of 1960 ' s, and 
the emphasis shifted from private short- term capital to public loans 
and direct investment . 
The fact that a great portion of investment has had to be financ -
ed by foreign saving indicates that Korea needs to prorrote dorrestic 
saving, and thereby release more domestic resources for investment, 
especially in export industries. 
9 . Future Prospects and Conclusions 
We have so far characterized the three economies as small, labor 
surplus, dualistic ones, and have traced the patterns of develop-
ment of these economies . During the last two decades, these econo-
mies were able to lay the basic foundations of an industrial econo-
my, upon which the growth can be accelerated in the 1970 ' s, provid-
ed that the major economic policies take the right directions. 
By and large, the economic future of these economies appears 
quite bright . Though the tremendous change in international poli-
tical relations that the East Asian area has witnessed in recent 
years would exert substantial influence on the future of the three 
countries under survey, the economic conditions of these countries 
are sound and robust . Korea, to be sure, has shown for the last 
two years a few signs of structural imbalance, which were manifest-
ed by temporary slowdown of economic activities . But, as the great 
export spurt shown this year indicates, the economy has been success-
fully recovering from recessions, and is expected to continue to 
grow with renewed strength . 
As we have seen, the advantage of having "labor surplus" condi-
tion will exist only to the extent that agriculture and other pri-
mary industries can be developed and release enough saving and labor 
from the primary sector to the industrial sector . The need for 
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this is particularly strong in Korea. Korea needs to have the kind 
of Green Revolution that Taiwan and other South Asian economies 
have achieved . It is very encouraging that agricultural sector is 
growing satisfactorily in recent years, and the third Five-Year 
Development Plan is giving priorities to agricultural development . 
In the industrial sector, a continued improvement in productivity 
has to occur in both export industries and import substitution in-
dustries. The borrowed technology m.lSt be assimilated to local con-
ditions by local entrepreneurs and labor force . 
As has been emphasized in this paper, the future of the three eco-
nomies lies in continued exports, and the structural readjustrrent 
that is required to bring this about . Productivity in export indus-
tries has to increase and new technology-intensive export commodi-
ties will have to be developed. As long as the major export comrrodi-
ties consist as they do today of plywood, textile products, clothing 
and footwear, the kind of export growth which these countries expe-
rienced thus far cannot be expected to continue. 
In order to improve technology, these countries will have to in-
crease investrrent. High investrrent calls for high saving and induce-
rrent of large volurre of foreign capital . The basis for continued 
increase in incorre and export is found in high investrrent, particu-
larly in private fixed investrrent. 
Foreign capital import will be continued . However, it should not 
be done indiscriminately, and the use of foreign capital must be 
judiciously distributed in order to overcorre the disadvantage of un-
balanced structure . The countries ought to be advised to make use 
of foreign capital to develop agriculture and fishing industries, and 
to enhance technical and managerial skill of the local labor force 
and entrepreneurs . 
It ought to be borne in mind, bowever , that it is dorrestic saving 
~hat is nowadays acting as constraint on r1evelopment in all these 
countries . Policies to induce voluntary domestic saving should be 
taken . The structure and functions of rronetary and financial insti-
tutions, of taxes and government expenditures should be carefully re-
viewed toward this end . 
At the stage of development of these three countries, care should 
be taken not to develop excessively capital intensive industries . 
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Excessively capital intensive projects should be scrutinized on st-
ringent criteria as regards the possibility of exploiting enough eco-
nomies of scale, the requirement of imports of raw rraterials and 
cost of production . 
The new overseas market must continue to be tapped . The growth 
of export of these three countr i es during the last decaJes relies 
heavily on the U. S . rrarket, and exploration of new markets in West-
ern Europe, and South America and other parts of the world is essen-
tial to ensure a continued and healthy growth of export . 
Because of her preponderant economic strength, Japan is expected 
to play a decisive role in the economic future of these countries, 
as a supplier of machines, equipments, and new technology, and as 
demander of labor intensive products of these countries . It is ex-
pected that an increasingly larger arrount of Japanese investment 
will be done in these countries, but a conscious effort should be 
made on the part of the Japanese government and industries to adopt 
trade policies to help these economies achieve the kind of structu·-
ral adjustment that need in the future . 
COMMENTS AND DISCUSSION OF 
(HOUGH'S PAPER 
Amado Castro introduced the discussion : I am grateful for the 
opportunity to comment on the experience of countries outside my own 
sub- region of Southeast Asia because I have found Dr . Chough's paper 
both informative and instructive . Here in my remarks I shall speak 
more from the view point of an economic historian than as an econo-
mic theor i st . In these three countries - Korea , Taiwan and Hong 
Kong - we are priv ileged to be witnesses to contemporary cases of 
economic development . For me as a student of economic history , I 
am grati fied that the industrial revolutions of the n i neteenth cen-
tury are also tak i ng place in the twentieth century in our part of 
the world . 
These three countries , as Professor Chough points out, are labour 
surplus , poor- resource base , dualistic economies and yet t h ey are on 
the way to successful economic development . What are the reasons 
for their success? I shall mention some which appear to be signif i-
cant , without implying that the list is exhaustive . 
1 . The first reason is hard work in an atmosphere of political sta-
bility . Then other factors are : 
2 . Great support from other countries , especially the United States . 
3 . At the same time (and this is important) openness towards for-
eign investment especially in the period s i nce foreign govern-
ment support was withdrawn . 
4 . Proximity to a large market , namely Japan . 
5 . In the cases at Korea and Taiwan , language - many Koreans and 
Taiwanese speak Japanese, so that it is possible to hav e foreign 
co-operation not just in large scale industries but also i~ med-
ium scale and even small enterprises . 
Nevertheless, Professor Chough points out problem areas, especial -
ly in Korea . The value added in Korean export industries which are 
often processing enterprises is not as large as, for example , in 
Taiwan . In Korea the savings rate is not as large as desirable, 
with consequent high dependence on imported capital . 
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There has not yet been p. "Green Revolution" in Korea to the ex-
tent that Taiwan has had . Am I right, however, in believing that 
this is a high priority concern in Korea now. 
The improvements in productivity have been disappointing, espe-
cially in Korean export industries. 
A fifth problem, in Taiwan as well as in Korea, is the need to 
modernize production, management, and the structures of firms. 
Among the lessons for Southeast Asian countries from the experi-
ence of the East Asian developing economies seem to me to be the 
following: The first lesson for economic development is the import-
ance of such traditional virtues as hard work, determination, poli-
tical stability and strong and enlightened national leadership . Ano-
ther lesson, which should have some meaning for a chauvinistic or 
over-nationalistic national leadership is the advantage to be gain-
ed from openness towards foreign investment . It is a fact, and per-
haps a persuasive argument for openness, that in Asia those countri-
es which have grown fastest have been relatively open towards forei-
gn investors. A third set of lessons concerns what Gamani Corea at 
a recent meeting called the "new conventional wisdom". Paradoxical-
ly, Taiwan and Korea are often cited to buttress the "new convention-
al wisdom". Here I shall figuratively turn the arguments on their 
heads. 
The first point concerns import substitution as a development 
strategy. This is supposed to be bad. Yet the experience shows 
what any economic historian will readily appreciate; that there is 
a time and place for almost everything. Import substitution is, or 
at any rate should be, a transitional phase in development. Another 
prescription in the new conventional wisdom is that countries should 
choose labour intensive industries using simple processes. Now Pro-
fessor Chough is pointing out that Korea should move towards high 
technology processes, especially since textiles and other products 
are very vulnerable to shifting trade restrictions in the developed 
countries. 
We hear that high dependence on imported inputs - "import depend-
ent import substitution" - is unsound. Yet here in Korea (as in 
Japan) we see "import dependent export substitution" and it is shown 
to have economic basis. 
The high interest rate policy which has in the past been a conspi-
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cuous reform in Korea is not discussed at length in Professor Chou-
gh' s paper, even though I for one would have been interested to hear 
more about it . High interest rates are a prescription we often get . 
But recent experience in Korea indicates that the interest rate can-
not and should not be kept abnormally high in more normal conditions 
because it causes distortions of its own . 
Lastly there is the issue of protection . This is not the nicest 
thing to do, it is not the very best behaviour from the point of 
view of theory . But from the Korean case the pragmatic judgement 
can be made - protection works ! It brings about the required trans -
formations . 
Still the favourable experience of the East Asian countries, 
while instructive, is not completely transferable to Southeast Asia; 
the formula cannot be adopted lock stock and barrel . In the first 
place, Southeast Asia , has in varying degree , higher man-land ratios 
and relatively better natural resource bases . Therefore the Taiwan-
Korea model of development is not quite so obviously desirable as a 
path of development . As Professor Chough metntions, the East Asian 
countries share the same basic culture and are geographically locat-
ed near Japan . Southeast Asians do not have that same cultural he-
ritage and they are more distant from Japan . The Southeast Asian 
countries generally have less favourable human resource endowments 
than Korea and Taiwan had even at the start. But at the same time 
many of the Southeast Asian countries have larger internal markets 
than did Korea and Taiwan when they began . 
To conclude, here in Taiwan and Korea we are seeing rapidly ris-
ing GNP, greater employment and better income distribution. These 
cases illustrate how economic growth by itself contributes substan-
tially to solving the problems of employment and income distribution 
which disturb many economists today . It is heartening to witness 
success in economic development and to see how human beings can over-
come obstacles . Even if there are mistakes, even if the process of 
development is not perfect, the hits are more than the misses. 
Finally it can already be perceived that these East Asian count-
ries will be going along the same path of development as Japan and 
so they should find much to learn from Japan's experience. At the 
same time we should all call on Japan to so change its policies that 
these countries will be easier able to follow the Japanese pattern 
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of development. 
Shinichi Ichimura continued the commentary: In order to make a 
fair comparison of the Korean economy with the Taiwan and Hong Kong 
economies, the Korean War and political instability must be mention-
ed. Perhaps the kind of political stability prevailing in Korea 
in the recent years will bring about economic achievement similar 
to Taiwan with a time lag of about five years. Another factor im-
portant for Korean development is her closeness to Japan . This will 
become increasingly important and advantageous for Korean develop-
ment . 
Both the Korean and Taiwan governments bore very heavy military 
budget . Was there any difference between the two governments' taxa -
tion policies? The relatively poor performance of the Korean agr i -
cultural sector must have necessitated different taxation policies . 
The agricultural policies in Korea are sometimes criticized on low-
pricing of rice . The fact described on Pl40-Pl41 must be at least 
partly due to such policies. The author should try to evaluate this 
critically important issue. 
The process of industrialization of a predominantly agricultural 
economy goes through several stages: (1) development of import-sub-
stituting industries - the prices of manufactured goods go up, deva-
luation takes place, the import to GNP ratio goes down; (2) the em-
ergence of export industries - the ground is prepared by (1) , export 
to GNP ratio goes up (2) capital goods industry begins to be built 
up . The Taiwan economy passed the first stage in the 1950s . It 
took about 10 years to reach (2). Korea is about to· reach the first 
start-line of stage (2) now. In this connection, overvaluation of 
Korean wan may be a problem. We would be interested in learning 
what the author would say on this burning issue in any developing 
country. 
One of the well-known characteristics of Korean economic policies 
is the very high rate of interest . What does Dr. Chough think about 
this policy? In Japan the postwar policies have always been "low-
interest rate" policy. Can it really promote saving? Can private 
banks make profit? How were funds allocated? Outstanding econom-
ists in Korea should present their views on this issue . 
Further discussion touched upon agricultural policies in Korea, 
the valuation of the Korean wan, the Kore an attitude towards East 
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Asian economic integration, and the comparative savings ratios in 
Korea and Taiwan. 
Professor Chough emphasised that Korean agricultural policies 
which stressed the maintenance of low agricultural prices had check-
ed agricultural output expansion and saving in the agricultural 
sector . However, these policies had undergone change in the 1960s . 
Chough argued that devaluation of the wan was likely to increase 
the debt burden and cause inflation in the Korean economy. An al-
ternative to devaluation, which he thought preferable, was the adop-
tion of non-monetary measures to stimulate the expansion of export 
industries . 
Asked about the Korean attitude to economic integration between 
Korea and Taiwan , Professor Chough pointed out that the Korean 
people were presently pre-occupied with many short-run problems 
which made interest in integration with other East Asian countries 
remote . In the long run such integration may become feasible . 
Asked why the Korean savings ratio appeared lower than Taiwan's , 
Professor Chough said that this could be attributed largely to lower 
per capita incomes and the aftermath of the Korean war . 
Professor Chough agreed with another participant who suggested 
that the productivity figures presented in the paper may tend to 
overestimate gross productivity because capital inputs used for de-
riving the figures were understated . 
5 
TRADE POLI CY MD PROBLEMS OF EXPORT EXPANSION 
THE CASE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Seiji Naya 
and 
Udom Kerdpibule 
Introduction 
The Southeast Asian reg i on includes many countries with similar 
climatic conditions and , to some extent , resource endowments . These 
countries' most distinguishing economic characteristic is their a -
bundant supply of unskilled and semi-skilled labor. With similar 
climatic and topographic conditions , they tend to have similar eco-
nomic structures . However , there are great differences in social , 
political and economic factors as well as the growth strategies of 
the individual countries . The region includes a potentially large 
scale economy in Indonesia with a population of over 120 million 
and rich natural resources as well as the city-state economy of 
Singapore with a population of only 2 million . The countries in 
Indo-China have been fraught with internal division and in a persis-
tent state of war . Burma has been follovling a policy of economic 
isolation, characterized by strict control over resource allocation , 
trade and capital flows . Until the mid 1960s , Indonesia also pur-
sued an inward-looking development strategy. Malaysia , S.ingapore, 
Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines have had relatively open 
trade policies in recent years, relying on indirect means such as 
tariffs rather than on quantitative and exchange controls or pro-
hibition . Although within this latter group there is still a differ-
ence in the degree of economic liberalism, Singapore being the most 
open and the Philippines the least . 
Politically speaking, their foreign policies are somewhat diverse. 
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While Burma has been in isolation, Thailand has been strongly anti-
communist and closely allied with the U.S . Malaysia and Singapore, 
on the other hand, are pushing for a neutralized Southeast Asia. 
A number of these Southeast Asian countries have, however, shown 
interest in regional cooperation. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines, Singapore and Thailand have formed a formal, through lossely 
tied, subregional organisation called ASEAN . Because it was indi-
genously founded and includes five countries with somewhat similar, 
outward-looking economic policies. ASEAN may be potentially import-
ant as a framework for future cooperative ventures. But the econo-
mic and political issues involved in regional economic cooperation 
are extremely complex, and regional ventures of major significance 
have not been attempted so far in trade and industrial areas . 
The Southeast Asian countries entered into the second develop-
ment decade with their GDP growing at a rate ranging from 2.2 per-
cent per annum for Indonesia to 7 . 6 percent per annum for Thailand . 
Much of the increase in the GDP was, however, offset by a rapid 
growth of population of the order of 3 . 0 percent per annum . During 
the past decade these countries have witnessed two major events: 
one is the so-called Green Revolution and the other is the delibe-
rate attempt to accelerate the pace of industrial development . 1 
Al~hough the Green Revolution may have appeared at first to be mere-
ly a technological breakthrough in the production of rice, several 
economists anticipate a number of far-reaching economic consequences . 
It may well be for example, that the reallocation of resources re-
sulting from the introduction of the high yielding variety of rice 
will result in an increase in the output of other food grains, other 
foodstuffs and raw materia l. The Green Revolution is also seen as 
a dynamic force; the reduction in the price of rice is equivalent to 
an increase in real income to be spent on manufactures . The lower 
price of rice also helps keep down the cost of living and money 
wages, two factors which together help accelerate industrialization. 
However, there has not been much concrete evidence of the Revolution . 
Until very recently the industrial development policy of the 
Southeast Asian countries had been basically that of i mport substi-
1 
For detailed discussion of these events and related policy sugges-
tions, see ADB, Southeast Asia's Economy in the 1970 s especially 
"Overall Report" by Hla Myint and "The Manufacturing Industry Sec-
tor" by Helen Hughes, Longman Group Limited, 1971 . 
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tution . Such a policy was considered desirable in helping to deve-
lop both the manufacturing sector and to lighten the burden of the 
trade balance deficit. A number of deterring effects have, however , 
been induced by import substitution policies and programs. Indus-
trial output has grown rapidly , but it may soon reach its limit be-
cause of the shallowness of the domestic market . Industrial growth 
may have created employment opportunities in the non-agricultural 
occupations but it is not likely to be very large because investment 
incentive measures tend to favor capital-intensive techniques rath-
er than labor-intensive ones . The tariff structures in some count-
ries also encourage the production of luxury consumer goods, and 
these industries are likely to reach the limit of the domestic mar-
ket quickly . It is also not certain whether the import substitution 
policy has helped the trade balance situation. While the composi-
tion of imports in favor of capital goods and against consumer goods 
has been taking place, total imports have been growing rapidly . 
Singapore is said to be the only country not building up a balance 
of payments burden with imported inputs for industrialization as 
the domestic manufactured exports have been pushed forward by its 
outward looking industrialization strategy .
2 
Many Southeast Asian countries are now realizing the limitation 
of an import-substitution policy and have been gradually shifting 
their emphasis to export-oriented industries . Modernization of 
agriculture has also receiv ed some impetus as a means toward diver-
sification of exports and as a basis for the development of more 
highly processed forms of primary exports . The shift to export-
orientation may be more difficult for these Southeast Asian coun-
tries than the East Asian countries and Singapore; there has been 
less pressure for doing so in the past because of their relatively 
abundant natural resources which were easily sufficient to provide 
for minimum subsistence . 
In the 1960s, exports of Southeast Asia, influenced by both ex-
ternal and internal factors, did not grow as rapidly as they could 
have. A few countries, e . g . the Philippines and Thailand, were 
able to achieve export growth in the order of 6 to 7 percent a year 
whereas exports of some others · even recorded an absolute decline . 
In general, the record of export expansion has hardly been suffi-
cient in view of their steadily mounting imports and employment 
2 
Hughes, Ibid., p . 186 . 
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creation needs. 
A rapid increase in population in this area is bringing about 
an unemployment problem, though the magnitude of this problem varies 
among individual countries . This problem is being felt most seri-
ously in urban areas so that the political pressures arising from 
it are more likely to present threats to government policies and 
governments than in the past. If agricultural as well as industri-
al sectors grow more rapidly, employment problems can be kept with-
in torelable limits . In part this depends on trade opportunities 
and the external economic relationships of these countries . 
In view of the overwhelming importance of exports in the South-
east Asian countries ' development efforts , this paper examines var-
ious problems of their export expansion . 3 In the following section, 
(II), their export performance in the 1960 ' s is presented . The 
emerging pattern of export expansion and various factors, internal 
and external, of their export growth are evaluated in light of the 
forces of demand and supply and some commercial policy problems . 
Internal and external policy measures that have impaired the export 
expansion of the region are described in Section III, followed with 
concluding remarks (IV) . Although the focus is on Southeast Asia, 
export growth of other Asian countries is presented for comparative 
purposes . 
II. f 
. . 4 
Export Per ormance of Southeas t Asian Countries 
Export Pattern and Growth 
As is now well known, world trade in the 1960's grew at a much 
faster rate than in the decade before, contributing to an export 
expansion for both developed countries (DC) and developing nations 
(LDC) as a whole . Among individual countries and sub-regions of 
the LDC, however, there has been wide variation in export growth . 
This variation is important in terms of possible explanations for 
it and policy implications that can be drawn from it . 
In Asia, per-annum export expansion in the 1960's has varied 
from the highest rate of 34 percent for Korea to a decline of 20 
3 An Appendix Note, "The Projection of Demand and Capacity to Ex-
port Manufactures," made by Udom Kerdpibule, is attached. 
4 
This section draws considerably from Seiji Naya, "Toward Expand-
ing Southeast Asia's Extra-Regional Exports," mimeo . 
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percent for South Vietnam (See Table 1) . 5 Though hardly comparable 
with the impressive performance of the East Asian countries , exports 
of Thailand and the Philippines have done relatively well , growing 
annually by 6-7 percent. The same holds for Singapore and Indone-
sia although their entrepot trade and the inaccuracy of trade sta-
tistics make evaluation of their trade patterns difficult. 6 The 
figures given in the table, for example, do not seem to reflect the 
extent of the export-oriented economy which Singapore has been suc-
cessfully developing, nor does it show the rising export earnings 
which have become increasingly important in Indonesia's redevelop-
ment program . 
Contrasting greatly with the performance of the ASEAN countries 
is the sharp decline of the absolute value of exports of other 
Southeast Asian countries . 
An export growth of 6 percent or so , however, is hardly suffici-
ent in view of the steadily mounting imports and employment creation 
needs of the Southeast Asian countries. Also, the rise in this 
region's exports has been considerably less than the world average 
and even less than that of both the Asian and LDC groups . This is 
so even if only ASEAN exports are considered . Part of this lag can 
be attributed to the region's continued heavy reliance on exports 
of primary products, though this explanation is often over-emphasiz-
ed . 
In world trade, combined primary products have been rising at 
only about one-half the rate of manufactures . In comparison, ASEAN 
has actually achieved export growth rates for both primary products 
and manufactures which are comparable, in fact higher, than the 
world averages for these two categories . But, for these countries, 
growth in primary goods continues to determine that of total exports . 
The growth of world trade, measured, for example, by the DC's 
total imports, varies among individual primary products (see Appen-
dix Table 1). Still, in only four out of the 29 primary product 
groupings, did DC's imports from the world grow at an annual rate 
of 8 percent or more (fish, animal feeds, wood and lumber, and non-
5 
6 
Throughout this paper, Asia and its sub-region, East Asia refer 
only to developing Asian countries. 
The trade data of Indonesia since 1963 and of Malaysia in recent 
years,whjch are used in the table, are based on returns of their 
trading partners . The returns, especially of intra-Southeast 
Asian trade, are found to be inadequate, i . e ., Singapore's re-
cords omit altogether its trade with Indonesia since 1964. 
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, Table 1 Annual Compound Rate of Export Growth , 1959-70 (in %) 
Country 
World 
DC 
LDC 
Asia 
Southeast Asia 
A SEAN 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore (c) 
Thailand 
Other S . E . Asia 
Burma 
Cambodia 
Laos 
South Vietnam 
East Asia 
Hong Kong 
Korea 
Taiwan 
South Asia 
Ceylon 
India 
Pakistan 
Notes : a: 1960-69 
b: 1959-67 
E 
Total 
8. 5 (a) 
9 . 1 (a) 
6 . 5 (a) 
5 . 7 (a) 
3 . 8 (a) 
1. 0 
4 , 0 (b) 
6 . 8 
3 . 3 
I 
6 . 4 
-8 . 2 
-7.3 
-3 . 5 
-2.5 (a) 
-19.9 
16 . 0 
I 12.4 
34 . 2 
20 . 1 
3. 5 
-1. 0 
3 . 4 
7 . 1 
c : excluding trade with Indonesia 
x E o r t s 
to DC Intra-Asian 
8.5 3 . 3 
6 . 6 0 . 3 
8 . 7 -16 . 9 
5 . 8 4 . 2 (b) 
6 . 2 19 . 7 
4 . 4 4 . 2 
9 . 3 3 . 7 
-5 . 4 -10 . 3 
-0.9 -9.8 
-6 . 0 -2 . 8 
-16 . 4 -30 . l 
20.6 11. 7 
17.8 7 . 0 
34 . 6 30 . 6 
22 . 1 18 . 9 
3 . 1 2 . 8 
-1. l -1. 6 
3 . 1 1. 7 
6 . 5 5 . 7 
Sources : U. N., Commodity Trade Statistics and Monthly Bulletin of 
Statistics (various issues) and I . M.F . , Direction of Trade 
Annual, 1958- 62 and 1963-67 . 
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ferrous metals), the last being the only one which increased by 
more than 9 percent. The DC's imports of such traditional primary 
products as rubber, cotton, jute, and tea which comprise a large 
proportion of Southeast Asian exports, either fell absolutely or 
rose very little. 
Although East Asian countries have been able to diversify their 
exports into manufactures by pursuing intensive export promotion 
measures , Southeast Asia has not. Singapore is the only country 
which shows signs of rapid export diversification into manufactures . 
But Singapore, with its lack of primary resources , resembles East 
Asian countries and not its neighbors. In view, then, of the over-
whelming importance of the primary exports of Southeast Asia , those 
factors which retard world trade expansion of traditional agricul-
tural and raw materials only serve to impair the development efforts 
of these countries. 
There is, however, more to these countries' export performance 
than the slow-growing world demand for primary products; the wide 
range in export growth among individual countries cannot be explain-
ed by exogenous factors alone . For commodities such as rubber , 
jute and sugar, they have, in fact, been unable to meet even a low 
d~mand and have consequently been losing out in the DC's markets 
(see Appendix Table 1). 
Contrasting to and off setting these stagnant exports have been 
ASEAN's exports of other primary products, most of which are grow-
ing faster than DC's total imports from the world; thus raising 
this group's share in the world market. The export growth of 11 
primary products listed (out of 29) exceeded 10 percent per annum; 
these include fish, maize, fruits, vegetables, and wood and lumber. 
Along with manufactured goods, these emerging exports have begun 
to play an important role in the region's export performance. Thus, 
ASEAN has been relatively successful in directing their resources 
into new areas of primary products, both in raw and processed forms. 
If the extent of export diversification is measured by the "commo-
dity concentration" index, the Philippines and Thailand show about 
the same rate of diversification as Hong Kong, though the first two 
export largely primary commodities whereas the latter relies almost 
entirely on manufactures . 
Also, in contrast to their over-all export expansion in primary 
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Table 2 Manufactured Exports of ASEAN Countries(a) 
Per Capita Value(b) Percentage 
Country ,___ill§ $) 
1961 1969 1961 
Singapore (c) 50 . 78 123 . 13 10 . 33 
Malaysia (d) 6.50 11. 06 2 . 65 
West Malaysia (e) 6 . 62 10 . 65 --- (n.a . ) 
Sabah 4.76 7 . 38 --- (n . a . ) 
Philippines 0.69 1.17 0.47 
Thailand {f) 0 . 28 2 . 63 0.30 
ASEAN (g) 2 . 38 4 . 83 l. 66 
Notes : (a) SITC Sections 5 to 8 excluding 687 . 01 (tin) . 
(b) Valued at 1964 constant prices 
of GNP 
1969 
18.08 
4 . 03 
---
---
0 . 69 
l. 88 
3 . 26 
(c) Including re-exports but not rubber manufactures . 
Source : 
{d) Excluding Sarawak ; total exports include intra- Malay-
sian trade . 
(e) Excluding tin . 
(f) Including tin . 
(g) Excluding Thailand ' s tin . 
US , Yearbook of International Trade Statistics . 
products , the ASEAN group (in fact , LDC's in general) have been 
quite successful with their exports of manufactured and semi - manu-
factured goods . It is true that the world trend for these products 
has been more favorable than for primary products and that exports 
of manufactures grew from a small base and still comprise a small 
part of their total exports . But ASEAN ' s exports of manufactures 
grew about 13 percent per annum in the 1960s . 
As shown in Table 2, the size of manufactured exports by differ-
ent ASEAN countries varies , both in terms of per capita value and 
as a proportion to GNP . Singapore shows the highest level of per 
capita exports as well as the highest percentage of exports to the 
GNP ; per capita exports more than doubled within the eight year 
period . The Philippines and Thailand show very low per capita ex-
ports , and both countries have managed to develop these exports 
faster than the rate of growth of GNP . 
A breakdown of total manufactured exports into c ommodity groups 
shows that there is a h i gh export concentration on resource-based 
manufactures (SITC 6) . In 1969 they constitute d 43 . 04 percent of 
the total for the ASEAN coun tries taken toge the r . Mor eover , ASEAN ' s 
rate of growth of these manuf a ctured exports exceeded t he wor ld 
TRADE POLI CY AND PROBLEMS OF EXPORT EXPANSION 15 9 
average. Included in this commodity group are wood products, cotton 
textiles, rubber and leather products. Miscellaneous manufactures 
(SITC 8), covering a large number of labor-intensive goods, shows 
the most rapid growth. 
There is also an indication that the pattern of comparative ad-
vantage of the ASEAN countries bears a certain relationship to the 
level of industrial development, as indicated by the size of per 
capita manufacturing production . Countries with higher levels of 
per capita manufactured GDP appear to export proportionately more 
commodities requiring a higher level of technology and human skills 
than countries with lower per capita GDP . 7 
The average annual growth rate for ASEAN as a whole is 12.3 per -
cent per annum, which is quite comparable to the average performance 
of all developing countries during 1960-69 (13 . 0 percent) . But in 
view of the fact that the growth rates of ASEAN manufactures are 
higher than the average for all developing countries, the figure 
suggests that manufacturing production in ASEAN countries is rela-
tively more oriented toward the domestic market than for exports . 
Another feature of Southeast Asia's trade has been the propor-
tionately large size of intra-regional exports in its total . But 
common to other LDC's as well, there has been the tendency of its 
intra-regional exports to grow more slowly than its trade with DC's 
(see Table 1) . 8 This has partly been policy-induced; their polici-
7Percentage share of commodity groups in total manufactured exports 
and per capita manufactured GDP , 1969 
Country 
Singapore 
West Malaysia 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Per capita manuf . GDP 
(US$ at 1964 constant 
factor cost) 
116. 41 
31. 68 
29 . 53 
20 . 26 
Percentage share of total 
manufactured exports 
SITC5 SITC6 SITC8 
14 . 72 39 . 80 25 . 08 
18 . 50 44 . 27 15 . 85 
11. 24 79 . 79 8 . 54 
4 . 50 62 . 03 22 . 50 
8A surprisingly large part of the falling intra-Asian trade can be 
explained by the inaccurate intra-regional trade data (Seiji Naya , 
"Patterns of Intra-Asian Trade and Regional Cooperation," a paper 
presented at the SEADAG meeting, Bangkok, Thailand , January, 1972 . ) 
When a certain adjustment on Singapore's trade is made and Indo-
nesia is excluded , intra-regional trade as a proportion of South-
east Asia ' s total exports rises slightly from 1962 to 1967 (see 
Appendix Table 2) . 
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es of import substitution and self-sufficiency are generally biased 
toward commodities for which their neighbors have a comparative ad-
vantage (e . g . rice). 
Also, many of these countries have responded to a buoyant demand 
for various commodities in DC's, particularly Japan and the U. S . , 
by expanding such exports to them . These two countries are the 
largest trading partners of the region; exports to Japan and the 
U. S . comprised 37 percent (19 percent and 18 percent respectively) 
of Southeast Asia's total exports in 1967 (Appendix Table 2). This 
percentage has been considerably larger for Japan in recent years; 
but the U.S. is by far the larger market for manufactures of the 
region since exports to Japan consist mostly of primary products . 
If the importance is measured in terms of the growth of the re-
gion's exports, Japan has been outstanding . The Japanese market 
for both primary and manufactured grew extremely fast in the 1960's . 
For example, her imports from ASEAN rose 10.2 percent per annum in 
primary products and 21 . 6 percent in manufactures, in contrast to 
5 . 3 percent and 13 . 3 percent for respective ASEAN imports of the 
DC's as a group (see Appendix Table 3). The rapid growth of Japan's 
income and trade , the structure of her import growth, and geographi-
cal proximity all point to the increasing importance of the count-
ry's role as a determinant of the region's export expansion . 
Export Performance 
To summarize the discussion above, four inter-related factors 
can be identified in order to assess export growth : the world trend, 
the compositional effect, the direc tional effect, and the share ef-
fect . The quantitative assessment of these effects for Southeast 
Asian exports is, however, confined to the DC's market because of 
the data limitation posed by intra-regional trade . 9 But factors in-
9
Trade data used are import statistics or the developed countries 
consisting of the U.S ., Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the 
EEC, the U.K., and other Europe (combining Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
Sweden and Switzerland) . Their imports from the developing count-
ries are treated as LDC exports to DC . Based largely on the 3-
digi t SITC with major export items from Asia identified separately, 
total trade is classified into 29 primary commodities , 22 manufac-
tured items, and Unclassified (SITC 9) . The trade values of two 
years, 1968 and 1962, are used . Because of the tremendously high 
grqwth rates of some specific exports (e . g ., of Korea) during this 
period, the average annual growth rates are calculated with the 
average value of the two periods as the base and 1968 as the end 
period. 
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fluencing trade performance in these two markets should not differ 
much. 10 
As the method of analysis , the actual growth rate of ASEAN's ex-
ports to the DC's, (A), is compared with the world trend measured 
by the average growth rate of DC's imports from the World (W) . The 
difference, (A-W), which indicates how A has deviated from the world 
trend, is referred to as export performance . This is decomposed 
into three effects11 so that (A-W) = (HC- HD) + (HD-W) + (A-HC) . 
The three effects are defined here : 
(HD-W) Commodity Compositional Effect . HD refers to a hypothe-
tical or projected growth rate of total exports measured by assum-
ing that , for every given product , exports have risen as rapidly 
as the average import growth of all DC . Since thi s difference (HD-
W) would show the effect of one ' s commodity mix differing from that 
of DC ' s imports from the world , it is defined as the compositional 
effect . 
(HC-HD) Directional Effect . HC is another hypothetical growth 
rate based on the assumption that , for every commodity , exports 
directed to a given DC rose as rapidly as imports of this DC . In 
this projected rate, the export share of each commodity remains the 
same in a given DC market wh e reas in HD a similar share in the com-
bined DC market is held constant . The difference between HC and HD 
would show the effect of export expansion accounted for by the dire-
ctional difference of e xport products . 
(A-HC) Share Effect . In HC , the effect of favorable or unfavor-
10suggestive evidence of this is the very high correlation between 
the growth rates of exports to DC and intra-Asian exports ; those 
countries which perform wel l in DC ' s market also do well in the 
regional market , and the same is true for countries which perform 
poorly . 
11HD and HC of a given e xporting country are : 
HD I r M. /I M. and 
WC lC lC c c 
cj 
II r. 
JWC 
M .. /II M . . 
J lC cj J lC 
HC 
where r is the average annual rate of export growth; and M, DC ' s 
imports in the average base year . To illustrate what the subscript 
denote , r. refers tor of jth DC from the world (w) in commodity 
]WC 
c and M. . denotes M of j from country i in C. When j is not giv-
J lC 
en , the reference is to a l l DC as a group. 
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able corrunodity composition (hence stagnant or buoyant world demand) 
is taken into consideration. Thus, given the corrunodity composition , 
the difference between A and HC would show whether or not a country 
has been able, on the average, to expand its exports of individual 
corrunodities to DC more rapidly than competing exporters. Since this 
difference would reflect the effect of changing export shares of in-
dividual commodities in DC's market, this is defined as the share 
effect . 
Although factors responsible for export performance are complex 
and difficult to identify , it is reasonable to suppose that the com-
modity compositional (HD- W) and the directional (HC-HD) effects are 
affected more by external than internal conditions, and vice-versa 
for the share effect (A-HC) . It is thus assumed that the commodity 
mix and concentration of LDC ' s exports , as well as the countries to 
which they are directed , are not readily changeable in the short 
run and that factors affecting them are often beyond their control . 
On the other hand, the share effect (A- HC) reflects the extent to 
which LDC have or have not kept up with the import demands of indus-
trial countries . Thus , their own economic conditions and policies 
to encourage or discourage (directly or indirectly) their exports 
become quite relevant to this effect . 
Since the total export expansion of all Southeast Asian countries 
(with the exception of domestic exports of Singapore) is overwhelm-
ingly determined by primary corrunodities , their performance in this 
corrunodity group is analyzed separately first , followed by manufactur-
es and total exports . Table 3 presents surrunary findings on the ex-
port performance for primary products of individual Southeast Asian 
countries and also other Asian countries and groups for comparative 
purposes . 
In the 1960's, the annual growth rate of these exports to indust-
rial countries ranged from 15 percent for Korea to -5 . 2 percent for 
Burma and - 19 . 8 percent for South Vietnam . All ASEAN countries , ex-
cept Malaysia, show an annual growth of about 7 percent or more in 
primary product exports . Although sev eral As i an countries , e . g . 
Ceylon and Pakistan, hav e had v ery unfavorable compositional effects 
deterring their export g r owth in primary commodities , this effect 
for Asia as a grou p is expectedly smal l s ince on ly primary products 
are considered . On t h e o t her hand, t h e share effect has had a great-
er influenc e on the inter - country dif fe r ence in the gr owth rate 
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among Asian countries than has the compositional effect. In general, 
the larger the effect of maintaining their commodity market shares , 
the greater has been the rate of export expansion of their primary 
products. For example, for 14 Asian countries listed, the (rank) 
correlation coefficient between the share effect and export expan-
sion is as high as . 80 and highly significant. The commodity com-
positional effect is also positively correlated with export growth , 
but the correlation coefficient is lower ( . 54) and only barely dif-
ferent from zero . at the 95 percent level . The share effect, then, 
is important as it suggests that exports of primary commodities can 
be made to increase more if suitable policies are followed and ex-
ports are encouraged. 
Countries such as Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand have been 
able, to a large extent , to offset their unfavorable commodity com-
positional effect by their positive share effect . But a large ne-
gative value in share effect for most Asian countries suggests that 
they have not exploited the market opportunity for primary products 
as fully as possible . For example, Southeast Asian exports earnings 
from primary commodities could have been greater by 2 . 3 percent an-
nually , had the share of each product been kept in individual DC. 
As mentioned previously , Asian countries , especially Southeast 
Asia, direct a large proportion of their exports to Japan . The po-
sitive directional effect shown for most ASEAN countries primarily 
reflects their heavy reliance on exports to Japan and the rapid im-
port growth of Japan compared with other DC . For ASEAN countries, 
export expansion of primary goods to Japan has been considerably 
greater than to other DC (Table 4) . At the same time, the largest 
negative value shown in the export performance as well as the share 
effect of the region's exports to Japan suggests that ASEAN countri-
es have not fully exploited the market opportunities available in 
this country . 
The commodity distribution of the negativ e share effect for ASEAN 
is highly concentrated in several select commodities , e . g . rubber , 
iron ore, sugar, wood and lumber , and rice . 12 For various reasons, 
rubber, sugar and rice (largely of Malaysia , the Philippines, and 
12 . 
Of these items , only exports of wood and lumber rose rapidly , 
whereas the export value of the remaining items ei t her grew l i ttle 
or declined . 
TRADE POLICY AND PROBLEMS OF EXPORT EXPANSION 16 5 
Table 4 Export Performance of ASEAN's Primary Products 
in Developed Countries (Annual average in %) 
Growth Rate Difference 
Accounted for by 
World 
Actual Average Difference Composition Share 
(A) (W) (A-W) (HC- W) (A- HC) 
Total DC 5 . 35 6 . 14 -0.79 l. 05 -1. 84 
5 Pacific Basin DC 7 . 06 7 . 67 -0 . 61 l. 43 -2.04 
U. S . 4 . 45 4 . 82 -0.37 0 . 01 - 0 . 38 
Japan 10 . 20 12 . 86 -2.65 0 . 81 -3 . 46 
All Europe l. 21 5 . 29 -4 . 08 -2.71 -1. 36 
EEC 3 . 02 6 . 60 -3 . 59 -2.46 -1. 13 
UK -3 . 01 2 . 14 -5 . 15 -4 . 29 - 0 . 85 
Thailand respectively) can hardly be regarded as items for which 
shares can readily be increased in DC ' s markets . The market share 
of rubber, for example, is already so large that a vigorous attempt 
to raise the share even further may induce a reduction in price ra-
ther than an increase in share . The large deterring effect that 
these few major traditional products have had on ASEAN exports indi-
cates that the problem of increasing their primary products is ex-
tremely difficult . 
Turning now to a brief analysis of manufactured exports , a summa-
ry finding on export performance is given in Table 5. The impres-
sive rate of Asian export qrowth is clearly revealed . Unlike prima-
ry products, the world trend factor w,which is 11 . 9 percent, has play-
ed an expansionary role . Not surprisingly, the East Asian group 
came out on top again in growth rate . But the difference in the 
growth rate between this sub-group and many other Asian countries 
is far smaller than it was for primary products . In fact, manufac-
tured exports to DC by such ASEAN countries as Thailand , Singapore 
and Malaysia grew at the remarkable rate of 15 percent or more per 
year. For Malaysia (and a few others, e . g . Pakistan) there is a 
striking contrast between its favorable export performance of manu-
factures and its unfavorable performance of primary goods . 
It i s interesting to note that the commodity mix of manufactures 
has been favorable for the export expansion of all Asian countries 
(with the notable exception of India and Pakistan) . The varying 
abilities of individual countries to be able to keep up with world 
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demand or maintain the market share of individual manufactured com-
modities appears to be the important factor behind the different 
rates of growth. For example, the rank correlation of coefficient 
between (A) and (A-HC) for 13 countries listed is found to be . 97 
in contrast with a low and negative coefficient of -.21 between (A) 
and (HD-W) . 
Having treated primary and manufactured exports separately, we 
now look at their combined performance . After all , the pessimistic 
view concerning export prospects is generally related to the cont-
rasting growth trend of these two commodity categories . And the 
relative unimportance of the commodity effect may have been incor-
rectly and unduly influenced by the separate treatment . 
To do this, all individual commodities of the two product groups 
are included in the computati on, the summary result of which is pre-
sented in Table 6 . The adverse influence that the commodity compo-
sitional effect has on LDC export expansion is now sharply revealed . 
The large negative value of this effect is shown for all Asian coun-
tries with the notable exception of East Asia . For example , this 
effect pulled the growth of ASEAN exports down by an average annual 
rate of 3 . 6 percent . 
Notwithstanding the deterring influence of an unfavorable commodi-
ty mix, the share effect is still shown to be very important in ex-
plaining export performance, inasmuch as it can also offset the "un-
lucky" compositional effect . For example, the rank correlation co-
efficient for the actual growth (A) and share effect for 14 Asian 
countries is found to be 0 . 89 as compared with 0 . 61 for (A) and the 
commodity effect (HD- W) . Hence, to explain why the export perform-
ance of individual countries deviates from the a verage (A-W) , it is 
as relevant to examine how their market share changes as to look at 
the composition of their exports . 
III . Institutional Factors Affecting Export Growth 
Domestic Industrial Policy 
The export performance of the Southeast Asian countries as evalu-
ated by the share effect cr i terion is not very encouraging and , as 
suggested earlier, it is the domestic conditions and policies that 
could adversely affect the performance in this respect . 
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Among the domestic economic policies that can significantly af-
fect export performance in both primary goods and manufactures is 
the development policy that emphasizes the manufacturing sector . 
Such policy is especially prevalent among the ASEAN countries with 
the exception of Singapore . The most distinctive feature is the 
practice of import substitution behind a tariff wall . 
Tariffs are high on most items of finished products , some of 
which are agricultural inputs . The tariffs, therefore, directly 
raise the cost of production in the agricultural sector. The high 
input cost not only makes the processed primary exports of the ASEAN 
countries less competitive in the world market ; in the long run , it 
also delays the introduction of modern technology to agriculture 
since technological progress generally involves the use of new i n -
puts that have to be purchased from the manufacturing sector . Al-
though in all ASEAN countries tariffs on agricultural machinery 
and insecticides are relatively low, tariffs on fuel and transport 
equipment are still high . The relatively slow spread of the Green 
Revolution could be partly explained by the high cost of inputs 
necessary for the cultivation of the new varieties of rice . 13 
The over-valued exchange rates designed to keep down the cost of 
imported industrial capital and material penalizes primary exports 
by raising their prices in the foreign market . 
Another way of protecting domestic industries is through the 
operation of a multiple exchange rate system under which the rate 
for export is over-valued and the rate for import is under-valued 
the difference between each rate and the free market rate is the 
implicit tax on exports and imports respectively . This is to make 
imports relatively expensive . Until 1970 Indonesia had a multiple 
exchange rate system under which 90 percent of foreign exchange pro-
ceeds from primary exports were required to be surrendered to the 
monetary authority. This system was replaced by a 10 percent ex-
change tax levied on foreign exchange proceeds from exports and 
settled in foreign exc hange. 
The Thai rice export is subject to a tax, the rate of which var-
ies, according to quality grades , being higher for higher grades . 
13 H. S.H . Prince Sithipo r n Kridakara , Some Aspects of Rice Farming 
in Siam (Siva Phorn , Bangkok , 1970), p . 14) 
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The purpose is to maintain a low domestic price of rice as a form 
of indirect subsidy to the manufacturing industry . In effect, the 
tax has hampered exports by both raising the price of Thai rice in 
the world market and lowering the price received by rice growers . 
A policy of granting tariff concessions on imports of industrial 
raw material is widely adopted by ASEAN countries. This type of 
incentive encourages expansion of the finishing stage , assembly 
plant-type industries relying on imported material. Forward and 
backward linkages are, therefore , extremely weak. There is no 
spread of external economies to the primary sector , delaying the 
pace of modernization in the primary sector thereby reduces the com-
petitiveness of the ASEAN countries ' products in the world market . 
When we consider the manufacturing industry itself , the inward-
looking protective policy can be said to have an adverse effect on 
export performance also ; the high protective tariffs and , in some 
cases, the maintenance of over- valued foreign exchange rates create 
a sheltered market in which several inefficient producers can sur-
vive . Producing at high cost , they cannot compete ef~ectively in 
the world market . The industrial development policy based on 
tariff protection also discriminates against e xport industries . It 
has been pointed out that the system of protection in the Philip-
pines during the 1950 ' s penalized exports heavily . Export indus-
tries were not protected from world competition but had to pay high 
prices for imported inputs . 14 Furthermore , over- valuation of the 
peso distorted the rate of return on investment in favor of indus-
tries producing for the domestic market and penalized those who pro-
duced for exports . 
The combination of high tariffs on finished products and low 
tariffs Qn imported material can lead to the development of indus-
tries in which the country does not have an inherent comparative 
advantage; yet the country may manage to export, if there exist 
other distortions in the domestic economy which make it appear as 
if the country had a compa,.rative advantage in certain l i nes of in-
dustry . Under such circumstances, the export of manufactures may 
lead to a reduction in welfare compared with no trade al all . 15 
14 
John H. Power, "The Structure of Protection in the Phil i ppines" 
in B. Balassa and Associates , The Structure o f Pr otec tion in 
Deve l oping Countries (Johns Hopkins Press , 1 9 71) , p. 2 84 . 
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This type of phenomenon can become widespread in Southeast Asia un-
less the industries that are to be granted tax privileges are care-
fully selected, since in practically all ASEAN countries, the em-
phasis now is on export industries; for example, tax incentives are 
given only to industries that export a certain portion of their out-
put. 
Trade Barriers 
Among the external factors that may account for the relative 
lack of export performance of the ASEAN countries during the past 
decade are the trade barriers in developed countries and in the 
Southeast Asian countries themselves . In general, developed coun-
tries tend to rely more on quantitative restrictions while ASEAN 
countries use tariff protection almost exclusively . . 
The most heavily protected industry in the developed countries 
is the textile industry . Most developed countries have one or more 
forms of quantitative restriction , ranging from the least restric-
tive liberal licensing to the most restrictive bilateral quotas 
and export restraint. 16 Australia employs a relatively less res-
trictive global quota but heavily supplements this with tariffs. 
Germany has the most comprehensive system of restriction on the 
imports of textiles and clothing articles ; some of the quotas dis-
criminate in favor of associated members of the EEC. Canned fruits 
are also subject to strong restrictions; Germany is the most rest-
rictive while Denmark is the most liberal . It is also worth men-
tioning that most commodity items subject to strong quantitative 
restrictions in developed countries fall under SITC Section 6, the 
resource intensive basic manufactures, a group in which the ASEAN 
countries tend to have a comparative advantage. Also subject to 
restrictions are some labor-intensive manufactures such as footwear, 
tablewares and cuttery, and electronic equipment. 
Tariff protection in the ASEAN countries usally takes the form 
of high rates across the board rather than a systematic escalation 
of tariffs that is generally practiced in developed countries. 
Among the developed countries, Japan and Australia have relatively 
15 
H. G. Johnson, "Optimal Trade Intervention in the Presence of 
Domestic Distortions," in Baldwin et . al . Trade, Growth and the 
Balance of Payments (Rand McNally, Chicago , 1965) . 
16 See , for example, GATT Document L/3391/Rev. 1 , 15th March 1971 , 
Report of the Joint Work ing Group on I mport Restrictions , Ann-
exes I , II , and v . 
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high tariff barriers; these two countries are of special signifi-
cance to ASEAN countries because of their proximity and rapidly 
rising income . Within the ASEAN group, Thailand and the Phili-
ppines have the highest tariff barriers, especially on resource-
intensive basic manufactures and on labor-intensive miscellaneous 
manufactures. Countries that are least protected by tariffs are 
Sweden and Singapore. 
IV Concluding Remarks 
The analysis of this paper suggests that the course of the South-
east Asian countries' export performance is very much in their own 
hands . Although the ASEAN countries have introduced a number of 
rapidly growing items to their total basket of exports (e . g . vege-
tables , fruits , wood , and fabrics) , they have not generally taken 
full advantage of the market opportunities available to them . This 
suggests that export ear nings could very well be raised if these 
countries wou ld adopt a shift from an inward to an outward- looking 
development strategy and increase their ability to keep up with 
world demand . As Hla Myint points out , half the battle for export 
expansion is won if various distortions and rigidities from import 
substitution are corrected . 17 
Korea's and Taiwan ' s policies of selective and moderate import 
substitution and vigorous export promotion almost certainly account 
for their large positive share effect and rapid export growth of 
manufactures . But , setting aside Singapore, a shift in strategy 
for the Southeast Asian countries raises special problems and con-
straints. And, surely, the application of East Asian experiences 
must necessarily be tailored to fit the conditions of Southeast 
Asia. 
Although manufactured exports of many Southeast Asian countries 
have been growing rapidly and are promi sing , they are sti ll small . 
Obviously, these countries will have to continue relying on primary 
and processed primary commodities as their mainstay ; even promising 
17 
He goes as far as to say : " ... the pessimistic assumption concern-
ing the declining trend in the world market demand for primary 
exports is not applicable to Southeas t Asia, and t h a t the region 
should continue to enjoy rapid economic growth t h r ough e xport ex-
pansion during 1970 ' s provided it adopts to the changes in the 
pattern of demand for its exports . " Hla Myint, "Over - a l l Report ," 
Southeast Asia ' s Economy in tl1e 1970's , p . 30 . 
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manufactures tend to lean on their abundance of resources and labor . 
Thus, domestic policies and efforts designed to rectify biases a-
gainst primary exports induced by import substitution measures and 
to increase the productivity of their huge but largely dormant ag-
~iculture can serve as a major im~etus for export expansion . A 
policy mix that stimulates exports of both manufactures and primary 
products would be more appropriate and effective than that which 
promotes manufactures alone . 
After a decade or more of import substitution, Southeast Asian 
countries are turning more toward export orientation . How rapidly 
exports of these countries actually expand depends not only on the 
strengthening of their competitive position but also on the extent 
to which the developed countries' economic policies inhibit exports 
from them . In this regard, it is regrettable that DCs have been 
slow in opening their markets and still impose considerable trade 
restrictions. A number of external factors contribute to sluggish 
world demand for some major Southeast Asian export items, yielding 
unfavorable commodity compositional effects. Such commodities as 
rubber and jute often meet with severe synthetic competition. DC ' s 
agricultural policies, their protective barriers against agricul-
tural policies, their protective barriers against agricultural com-
modities (e.g. rice) and their escalated tariff and non-tariff st-
ructure are some of the other restraints on the export expansion of 
Southeast Asian countries. 
Finally, as previously pointed out, the favorable directional 
effeGt of Southeast Asian countries has largely been due to their 
exports to Japan. Japan has played an increasingly important role 
in the export expansion of Southeast Asia , and economic interdepend-
ence between the two has become greater. But the fear of Japanese 
economic domination, whether real or imagined , has beensubtlybuild-
ing up . The student demonstration and protest against her economic 
domination staged in Thailand recently does not appear to be an 
isolated incident. But two crucial questions remain. How rapidly 
will Japan be willing to alter its economic structure and open its 
market more to accommodate imports from Asian countries? Also, 
what will the social and political impact on Southeast Asian count-
ries be with growing economic ties with Japan? 
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APPENDIX NOTE BY UDOM KERDPIBULE 
Projections of Demand and Capacity to Export Manufactures 
by ASEAN countries 
Projections for the demand for the ASEAN countries' manufactured 
exports have been made for two groups of importing countries; the 
developed countries and ASEAN itself (for intra-trade) • 18 The pro-
jections are based on the values of income elasticities of demand 
for different commodity groups . The elasticities were, in turn, es-
timated by the least squares method, based on a single-equation de-
mand function of the following form: 
E .. 
lJ f(Pj' Y) 
The E .. is the per capita value for exports of commodity j from lJ 
country i, in terms of the population of the importing countries 
taken together. The value at constant prices was used. This value 
was estimated by deflating current price figures with the index for 
the unit value of exports of developing countries to the world for 
commodities under SITC Sections 5 to 8. 
For the price variable P. , two separate series of indices were 
J 
used depending upon the main destination of the exports . For com-
modity groups that are absorbed mainly by developed countries, an 
adjusted index for the unit value of exports of developing countries 
to developed countries was used . The wholesale price indices in the 
developed countries were used for the adjustment . For commodity 
groups in which developed countries do not dominate the market, the 
index for the unit value of exports of developing countries to the 
world was used . In both cases, only the index for the aggregate of 
commodities under SITC Sections 5 to 8 is available and it was used 
in the demand function for every commodity groups . The price vari-
able is assumed exogenous. 
The income variable Y is the per capita income of the importing 
countries taken together, also valued at constant prices. 
18 
The developed countries include the u. s., EEC, EFTA, Australia, 
Hong Kong and Japan . The ASEAN group consists of Malaysia, 
Philippines , Singapore and Thailand only; Indonesia is left out 
because of the lack of data . 
TRADE POLICY AND PROBLEMS OF EXPORT EXPANSION 175 
The model was fitted with time series data covering a period be-
tween 1954 to 1969. The statistical fit for most of the regressions 
are quite good with the R2 values range from 0.84 to 0 .96. The co-
efficients of the income variable show acceptably high degree of 
significance, i.e., at 0 . 02 level but the significance levels of the 
price variables are not as good. It could be that there was an 
identification problems inherent in the use of the single equation 
method. The failure to use the more precise indices for the price 
variable for the individual commodity groups separately could also 
bring the same effects. It is the lack of separate price indices 
that prompts the author to choose the single equation model rather 
than the simultaneous equation model. 
The values of elasticities derived from the regressions are sum-
marized in Table 1 . 
The price elasticities of the demand for exports of ASEAN as a 
group appear to be quite high, especially for commodities under 
SITC Sections 7 and 5, machinery and chemical products. This could 
have certain implications for possible trade expansion through tar-
iff preferences or tariff reductions among ASEAN countries. 
The income elasticities are also quite high, ranging from 3 . 75 
to 6.60, the highest being that for machinery and transport equip-
ment. This reflects the dominance of the ASEAN countries among the 
buyers of these commodities . 
Based on the value of income elasticities of the demanct in con-
junction with a priori information on the income growth in the im-
porting countries, projections of the demand for exports of the 
ASEAN countries were made for the years 1975 and 1980. Upon the 
projected value of exports, the compound rates of growth over the 
period 1969 to 1978 and 1980 were calculated . The results show 
varying growth rates for different countries as well as for differ-
ent commodity groups (see Table 2) . 
Among the most rapidly growing demands for exports of different 
countries are basic manufactures of the Philippines, chemical pro-
ducts and machinery for Malaysia and machinery and transport equip-
ment for Singapore . These reflect the intra-ASEAN demand rather 
than the demand from o u tside . For the total S ITC 5 to 8, the coun-
try that could expect the most g r owth i n expor ts is the Philippines; 
however , the largest a b s olute inc re a se i n exp ort s woul d occur to 
Singapore a nd Ma lays ia . 
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Table 1 Elasticities of Demand for Manufactured Exports 
of ASEAN Countries (percent) 
Commodity A SEAN Philippines 
West 
group Malaysia al 
SITC 0 ~I 
price elasticity n . a. n.a. -0.0923 
income elasticity n.a. n.a. 1. 5882 
SITC 5 
price elasticity - 1. 7740 -0.2051 -2 . 7362 
income elasticity 4 . 2220 1. 4486 5.4173 
SITC 6 
price elasticity - 1. 5377 -2 . 0274 n.a . 
income elasticity 3,7550 5 . 4609 3.6747 
SITC 7 
price elasticity \-4 . 1030 n . a . -1. 0386 
income elasticity 6 . 5980 n . a . 4 . 0197 
SITC 8 
price elasticity -1.1602 n . a. -1. 6296 
income elasticity 3 . 8715 n . a. 4.0016 
SITC 5 to 8 
price elasticity -2.0316 -2.2768 -2 . 1374 
income elasticity\ 4.3762 4.7008 4 . 8051 
All Groups 
price elasticity n.a. n . a . -1. 7427 
income elasticity n.a. n.a. 4.1820 
al Without Singapore and Thailand's SITC 6. 
bl Includes reexports . 
Singapore 
:el 
n.a. 
n.a. 
-1. 8730 
2 . 1387 
n . a. 
n . a. 
-2 . 5022 
2 . 3112 
-1. 7980 
2 . 6680 
-1.1632 
1. 0213 
n.a. 
n . a . 
cl SITC Sections 013, 032, 052, 055, 0713 and 0723 . 
ii Includes tin. 
Projections of the Capacity to Export of ASEAN Countries 
Thailand 
-1. 9793 
4.5548 
n . a. 
n . a 
-1. 9222~1 
8 . 1007~1 
n.a. 
n.a 
n.a. 
n.a. 
-1. 5114~1 
7.3037~1 
-1. 6983yj 
6 . 4114~1 
As an indication of the growth of export capacity over the same 
period, an extrapolation of the past trends has been made . It would 
be more satisfactory if the projections were based on the value of 
parameters on the supply side but data problems prevented this . The 
projections based on the time trends are not very satisfactory either 
since some of the ASEAN countries have begun to export manufactures 
only recently with a very rapid growth during the second half of the 
1960's. 
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Table 2 Projected Rates of Growth of Demand 
for Manufactured Exports of ASEAN Countries 
1969-1975, 1975-1980 and 1969-1980~/ 
(percent per annum) 
Country and 
period 
ASEAN£/ 
1969-1975 
1975-1980 
1969- 1980 
Philippines 
1969-1975 
SITC 
o!:'/ 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n . a . 
n . a . 
1975-1980 n . a . 
1969-1980 n . a . 
!West Malaysia! 
1969-1975 7 . 5 
1975- 1980 
1969-1980 
. d/ Singapore-
1969-197 5 
1975-1980 
1969-1980 
Thailand 
6 . 7 
17 . 1 
n . a . 
n.a. 
In.a. 
SITC 
5 
13 . 8 
9 . 7 
11. 9 
7 . 2 
6 . 5 
6 . 9 
16 . 5 
10 . 6 
13 . 8 
10 . 5 
8 . 3 
9 . 5 
SITC 
6 
12 . 9 
9.4 
11. 3 
15 . 2 
10 . 1 
12 . 9 
10 . 4 
8 . 3 
9 . 5 
n.a . 
n.a. 
n . a . 
SITC 
7 
18.0 
11. 0 
14 . 7 
n . a . 
n . a . 
n . a . 
14 . 2 
9 . 8 
11. 2 
12 . 4 
9.2 
10 . 9 
SITC 
8 
12 . l 
9 . 0 
10 . 7 
· n . a . 
n . a . 
n . a . 
13 . 0 
9 . 4 
11. 3 
11. 5 
8 . 8 
10 . 2 
SITC 
5 to 8 
13 . 9 
10.0 
12.0 
14 . 3 
10 . 7 
12 . 6 
13 . 0 
9.4 
11. 3 
11. 7~/ 
6 . 8~/ 
10 . 4~/ 
1?? 
All l 
Group sj 
n . a . 
n .a . 
n . a. 
n .a . 
n . a. 
n . a. 
1 2 . 3 
9 . 1 
10 . 8 
n . a . 
n . a . 
n . a . 
1969-1975 14 . 9 n . a . 12 . 2!/ n . a . n . a . 11 . 8 12 . 6 
1975-1980 10 . 1 n . a . 9 . 1 n . a . n . a . 8 . 9 9 . 2 
•~-1_9_6_9_-_1~9_8_0~_,_1_2_._7~~n_._a_·~~~l~0 . 7_-_f/~~~n~·~a~·~~n_._a_.~~-l_0~· -5~~-l_l_._o_, 
~/ Compound rates of growth , bas ed on values at 1964 constant pric-
es. 
b/ SITC Sections 013 , 032,052 , 055 , 0713 and 0723 . 
c/ Without Singapore a nd Thailand SITC Section 6 . 
d/ Including re- exports . 
e/ SITC Sections 5, 7 and 8 only . 
fl Including tin. 
Results shown in Ta b l e 3 are likely to be underestimated be-
cause they were based on. the "long period " time trends , excluding 
the years in which the exports increased r apid ly . An interesting 
feature is that the capacity to export labor intensive miscella-
neous manufactures (SITC 8) of the ASEAN countries would be growing 
much faster than the demand for them , even with the underestimated 
figures . The capacity to export machinery and transport equipment, 
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Table 3 Projected Rates of Growth of Capacity to 
Export Manufactures of ASEAN countries~/ 
(percent per annum) 
Commodity group 1969-1975 1975-1980 1969-1980 
SITC 5 13 . 0 13. 0 13.0 
SITC 6 £/ 12 . 2 11. 4 11. 8 
SITC 7 8 . 3 6 . 2 7 . 4 
SITC 8 
I 
16.7 16 . 7 16 . 7 
SITC 5 to 8 12 . 4 10 . 9 12 . 2 
~ Based on time trends over the period 1954-1964, excluding Singa-
pore . 
£1 Excluding Thailand . 
on the other hand , is likely to be lagging behind the growth in de-
mand. This suggests the need for ASEAN countries to develop new 
markets or expand the existing ones for labor-intensive manufactures, 
and the possibility of developing a large-scale machinery industry 
on a regional basis . 
The projections discussed above were made under the assumption 
that prices, industrial development policies and trade policies of 
the countries involved remain unchanged . In view of the fact that 
the emphasis of the industrial development policy of the ASEAN coun-
tries is changing from import substitution to manufactures for ex-
port, the growth of the capacity to export would be higher than the 
figures indicate . On the demand side, the growth of the demand for 
the export would also be somewhat different from what the figures 
indicate . On one hand , it is likely that Japan would gradually re-
lax its restrictions of imports from developing countries . This is 
because of the mounting foreign exchange reserves from the persis-
tent trade surplus which prompts pressure for the revaluation of 
the yen. Besides, political pressure in Southeast Asia is also call-
ing upon Japan to play a more active part in the development of 
Southeast Asia. It could therefore be expected that trade restric-
tions on exports of developing countries, would be gradually libe-
ralized, especially on items for which the ASEAN countries have a 
comparative advantage . On the other hand the tariff preferential 
arrangements between Lhe Philippines and the U. S. are due to ter-
minate in 1974 . The termination will adversely affect the demand 
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for exports of the Philippines and , of course, our projected figure s . 
If the export- oriented industrial policy of the ASEAN countries 
is successful and Japan agrees to liberalize the trade policy , we 
could expect a substantial e xpansion of trade beyond what the pro-
jected figures indicate . If , on the other hand , the growth of de-
mand is not so favorable , the ASEAN countries would face a problem 
of over- production with a consequent deteriorating terms of trade . 
The ASEAN countries would have to rely on themselves to absorb the 
surplus . Regional cooperation and mutual tariff reduction may be-
come necessary . 
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COMMENTS AND DISCUSSION OF 
NAYA AND KERDPIBULE'S PAPER 
Chong-ki Choi offered the following conunents: This paper is im-
pressive and offers much valuable information about Southeast Asia's 
trade policies and the problems of trade expansion. 
The authors have explained the characteristics of the Southeast 
Asian region's economic structure and placed particular emphasis on 
the abundant supply of skilled and semi - skilled labour . Southeast 
Asian countries also have similar climatib and topographic condi-
tions and therefore tend to have similar economic structures . But 
the authors did not mention their past colonial experience. As most 
of them attained independence only recently, they are very sensi-
tive about national sovereignty. Also in this area their political 
situation tends to be unstable and the political and social systems 
are not homogeneous . Racial strife and the heterogeneity of socio-
cultural traditions also lead to a lack of mutual confidence. But 
.most of them eagerly desire to promote economic development and ex-
port expansion. 
During the past decade Southeast Asian countries witnessed two 
major events : one is the so-called Green Revolution; and the other 
the deliberate attempt to accelerate the pace of industrial develop-
ment. The Green Revolution is a dynamic force; a reduction in the 
price of rice is equivalent to an increase in real income which can 
be spent on manufactures . The lower price of rice also helps keep 
down the cost of living and money wages and these two factors toge-
ther help accelerate industrialization . 
I agree that the adoption of industrial development policies by 
the Southeast Asian countries based on import substitution is a pat-
tern shared by many less developing countries . Such a policy is 
considered desirable in helping to develop both the manufacturing 
sector and to lighten the burden of deficit in the balance of trade . 
Industrial output has grown rapidly, but it may soon reach its limit 
because of the shallowness of the domestic market . 
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Southeast Asian countries are now realizing the defects of import-
substi tution policy and have been gradually shifting their emphasis 
to export-oriented industries. The authors point out that the shift 
to export-orientation may be more difficult for the Southeast Asian 
countries than East Asian countries since there has been relative 
little pressure in this direction in the past, and their relatively 
abundant natural resources have been absorbed in catering for mini-
mum subsistence . It seems to me that industrialization efforts in 
Southeast Asian countries are lacking. I think, there needs to be 
more investment in industry . Without such industrial activities , 
we cannot expect the trade expansion of the Southeast Asian countri-
es to progress rapidly . 
The authors seem to have neglected the effect of the climatic 
conditions on the economic development effort. Also level of the 
education and the technical know-how of the population in the South-
east Asian region is lower than in East Asian countries . 
Finally, I think more importance should be given to political 
leadership and political and social stability . East Asian countri-
es seem to have more political and social stability and strong lead-
ership than Southeast Asian countries . 
In Part Two of their paper the authors described clearly South-
east Asian countries' export performances . Note should be taken 
of the fact that intra-regional exports grew more slowly than trade 
with developed countries. Japan and the United States are the re-
gion's largest trading partners . I wonder how those countries can 
maintain their trading relationship with Japan and the United Stat-
es forever? 
The author says that in order to promote trade expansion in the 
Southeast Asian region , there is a need for regional economic in-
tegration. I can fully understand this from the political point 
of view . But there is a question : what kind of economic co-opera-
tion and economic integration can be implemented and what benefits 
will be brought to the Southeast Asian countries? It seems to me 
that Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines have more extensive 
trade relations than other Southeast Asian countries , but why in 
the past decade has the movement towards economic co - operation been 
so slow and ineffective? 
I would also welcome some explanation of the role of foreign 
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capital and domestic saving for economic development in the South-
east Asian countries . 
Professor Kojima has suggested that East Asian countries, includ-
ing South-North Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong should form an economic 
bloc and jointly approach Mainland China . What do you think of this 
idea, and do you think it feasible to have economic co-operation be-
tween Southeast Asian countries and East Asian countries, for ex-
ample, economic co- operation within the ASEAN and ASPAC group of 
countries? 
Discussion focussed on the reconstruction and development of the 
Indonesian economy, the problems of an increasingly protectionistic 
policy , t h e dependence of Southeast Asia on Japan , the authors ' re-
plies to questions raised by Chong-ki Choi . 
First, Seiji Naya pointed out that it was difficult for Southeast 
Asian countries to shift to export-oriented policies because of the 
important revenue considerations behind tariff policies; the size of 
the agricultural sector and its organization ; and the slow growth of 
traditional export commodities . More detailed study would reveal 
fast growth commodities such as maize, shrimps , and wood products, 
but rapid growth has to rely heavily on the ' share effect '. Another 
problem has been the failure of such countries as Thailand and the 
Philippines to introduce export promotion measures to complement im-
port substitution programs from the beginning . And there has also 
been heavy reliance on protectionistic measures to solve balance of 
payments problems . 
Foreign investment appeared to be more of a social than an econo-
mic problem for most Southeast Asian countries . 
As for the scope for regional integration, although intra-regio-
nal trade in Southeast Asia has been high by the standards of other 
less developed areas , it has been declining , especially among ASEAN 
countries . This has resulted from regional protectionism, over-
valuation of currencies vis a vis developed countries, and data pro-
blems . However , the authors felt that co-operation was possible and 
would lead to increased stability in export earnings, rationaliza-
tion of regional industrialization , and stronger bargaining power in 
trade and other economic relations . 
Important changes in the Indonesian economy, not discussed in the 
paper , were elaborated by one participant. ~ irst, the recent census 
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seems to suggest maintenance of a high rate of population growth . 
secondly, the rate of growth of regional exports has been 5 percent 
since 1966 , but for Indonesia the growth rate has been 10 to 13 per-
cent. This is partly a recovery factor but, oil, timber and food~ 
stuffs exports to Jap~n, notably, have continued rapid growth . Per-
haps the size of the Indonesian market recommends some inward look-
ingness in development policies , although the excesses of import 
substitution are being avoided by Indonesian policy makers. Two 
major problem areas are the growth of labour availability and the 
heavy dependence on foreign investment , especially from Japan . But 
the extent to which rising domestic demand is being met from local 
industry, such as textiles , construction, and petroleum , is encourag-
ing . 
Another participant suggested that this represented an excessive-
ly optimistic view of the success of Indonesian policies . Indonesia 
was one: of the worst examples of industrialization without employ-
ment, it was suggested , and income distribution worsened this dis-
tortion . 
The same participant accused Southeast Asian countries of a fa i l -
ure to respond to the best advice in correcting protectionist poli-
cies , and fragmenting markets t hrough licensing and manufacturing 
arrangements with foreign firms . This combination of wrong policies 
induces persistent b a lanc e of payments problems . 
Finally , several participants raised the problem of over depend-
ence in trade and investment on Japan . The assymetry in dependence 
was noted as, too , was the effect , or potential effe ct , of J apan ' s 
attempts at diversification in trade and investment . A Japanese 
economist suggested a ' peril point ' approach to the trade depend-
ence problem by Japanese policymakers . 
6 
LATIN AMERICAN GROWTH AND TRADE STRATEGIES 
IN THE POST~WAR PEKIOD 
Miguel S . Wionczek 
The terms of reference of my paper - as I understand them - call 
for the general assessment of the Latin American foreign trade per-
fornance in the recent past and particularly of the role of the ex-
port growth in the present and the future economic development of 
that region, because as the prospectus for this Conference distribut-
ed last summer postulated the economic growth of the developing 
areas depends very much upon their export expansion . Under present 
conditions of the world economy and trade this expansion in turn 
poses problems both of shifts in policies from import substitution to 
export prorrotion and determination of proper industrial priorities 
for export. Moreover, whatever shifts are made and priorities de-
fined on a country or a region level , the final results of the new 
trade and development volicies will largely depend upon trade poli-
cies and structural adjustments in advanced countries . 
Covering these topics for the Latin American subcontinent as a 
whole is not an easy task . Seen from the other side of the Pacific, 
Latin America may look as a more or less homogenous unit, considerably 
more developed than either Africa or the eastern and southeastern 
rim of Asia extending from Korea to Pakistan .. But a closer look at 
the subcontinent strongly suggests that Latin Arrerica is hardly rrore 
than a geopolitical and geoeconomic concept . Twenty five economic 
indicators for Latin American republics (that exclude Cuba and four 
ex-British colonies in the Caribbean that have gained the independ-
ence recently - Jamaica, Trinidad, Guyana and Barbados), contained 
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in Table I, disclose that the regional quantitative averages hide in 
practically every respect trerrendous differences within the region. 
Sane exanples are here in order. As shown in Table I population-
wise the region comprises giants like Brazil (90 million people in 
1969) and mini-states like Panana (1.4 million); the annual demogra-
phic growth rates vary from 3 . 8 percent in Costa Rica to 1.1 percent 
in Uruguay; the average annual GDP growth oscillated in the sixties 
between 8 percent in Panana and -0.3 percent in Haiti; the per capita 
product ranges (1969) between US$980 in Argentina and US$98 in Haiti; 
population employed in agriculture accounts for close to 67 percent 
of labor force in. Honduras and only 15.6 percent in Argentina; annu-
al prices increases differed in the sixties from 47.5 percent in 
Uruguay to 0.4 percent in El Salvador, investment coefficients as per-
centage of GDP were in 1969 as high as 23.7 percent in Paraguay and 
as low as 5 percent in Haiti . Fina1ly in respect to the importance 
of foreign trade for the individual economies, one witnesses on the 
one end of the spectrum countries such as Brazil with about 6 percent 
of exports and imports as the ratio of the GDP and on the other -
Panana with export coefficient of 39 percent and Honduras with import 
coefficient of 32.6 percent. 
Traditionally, one looks at the subcontinent as a conglonerate, 
composed of three large and semi-developed economies (Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico), a half a dozen intermediate developing coun-
tries (like Venezuela, Colombia, Peru or Chile) and about a dozen re-
publics that inspite of the large territorial size of so:rre (Bolivia 
or Paraguay) represent the hard core of Latin American underdevelop-
rrent. In fact, however, the picture is rrn.ich more conplicated. The 
region includes semi-industrial and also heavily agriculture-based 
economies rapidly growing in conditions of relative financial stabili-
ty and nore or less solid structural balance of payrrents position;· 
stagnant semi-industrial and agricultural economies with high degree 
of inflation and increasing external sector constraints; economies 
with similar productive structure but highly dependent in sone cases 
on public dorrestically-f inanced investrrent and in others - on private 
foreign capital; dynamic as well as stagnant economies with different 
degrees of dependence on foreign trade; economies with fairly deve-
loped financial structures along with those lacking rudirrentary net-
work of financial interrrediaries, etc. 
If additional economic indicators at national level were inc luded 
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in Table I , one would face a whole universe of socio-economic deve-
lopment nodels , starting with highly centralized socialist or semi-
socialist economies , passing through those with the large degree of 
state intervention and participation and ending with almost free -
market economies . Combining the characteristics of economic st-
ructures, political and economic policy instruments and social ob-
jectives one would discover in Latin Arrerica an even nore impressive 
array of socio-economic perfornance . In terms of historical corrpari -
sons and using such indicators as literacy and incorre distribution , 
one finds in the area the societies clearly still at the beginning of 
the present century , side by side with those whose degree of noderni -
zation is sorrewhat similar to that reached by the industrial coun-
tries between the two world wars . Moreover , even in the most adva nc -
ed in respect to the leve l of per capita income Latin Arrerican repub-
lics it is easy to detect the soc i o - economic intra- regional and intra-
sectoral dualism - the presence of dynamic growth poles and the de -
pressed areas together with the coexi stence of rrodern and traditional 
low productivity activi ties in each of the najor economic sector . 
Only once these deep differences present arrong and within Latin 
Amirican republics are clearly established , one can search for the 
similarity of their economic development patterns in the past quarter 
of centry with parti cular stress upon the behaviour of the external 
sector . Between 1945 and 1970 Latin America as a whole - but with 
the different intensity and degree of success reflecting the inequali -
ties in development l evels - tried successively three development 
strategies : import substituting industrial policies on national 
level , regional trade integration , and developing rranufacturing for 
the extrazonal markets . The instruments , rrechanics and results of 
each of these stages will be commented upon briefly in the remaining 
sections of the paper . 
I. Inport-Substitution Oriented Industrialization : Policies and 
Problems 
Modern quantitative economic history is a very recent social dis -
cipline largely cultivated in the advanced countries , where the 
wealth of long-term statistical data series have been discovered , 
processed and analyzed lately . 1 Such economic history has not been 
written yet for Latin Arrerica as a whole although the first valiant 
attempts that go back to the colonia l times of the region and of 
najor countries and end with the analysis of the post- war develop-
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2 ments have seen light in the past few years . The difficulties of 
writing an economic history of the modern Latin Arrerica can be deduc-
ted from the introductory remarks of this paper. Fortunately enough, 
the literature of the import- substituting industrialization period is 
fairly abundant and of relatively high quality, al~hough as a rule it 
covers only the 1945-1970 period experiences. 3 
This does not mean - as some believe - that import substitution in-
dustrialization started in Latin America during the Second World War. 
Its beginnings can be traced back in Brazil to the third quarter of 
XIX century and in Argentina and Mexico to the 1880 's. Thus , it 
l The rrost outstanding exanples of this literature are represented 
2 
by the contributions of Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth -
Rate, Structure and Spread (Yale University Press, New Haven , 1966); 
W. G. Hoffnann, The Growth of Industrial Economies (Manchester Uni-
versity Press, Manchester 1958) ; Alexander Gerschenkron , Economic 
Backwardness in Historical Per~ective (Harvard· University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1962); Charles P . Kindleberger, Economic Growth 
of France and Britain, 1851-1950 (Harvard University Press , Cam-
bridge, Mass . 1964) and E . J . Hobsbawn, Industry and Empire (Weiden-
feld & Nicholson, London, 1968) . 
For exanple, Stanley J . and Barbara H. Stein - The Colonial Heri-
tage of Latin Arrerica - Essays on Economic Dependence in Perspec-
tive (Oxford University Press, New York, 1970) and various authors 
Lah"istoria economica en Arrerica Latina, Vol . I -Situaci6n y rreto-
Q.Q.2_, Vol . II, Desarrollo, perspectivas y bibliografia (Collection 
of essays presented at the 39th International Americanist Congress, 
Lima, 1970 , SEP/SETENTAS, Mexico , 1972) . 
3 The major contributions in this field are represented by ECLA , The 
Process of Industrialization in Latin America (New York , 1965); 
ECLA , Economic Survey of Latin America, 1970 (New York , 1971) ; 
Keith Griffin, Underdevelopment in S,Eani.sh America - An Interpre-
tation (George Allen and Unwin Ltd . London , 1969) ; Santiago Maca-
rio, "Protectionism and Industrialization in Latin America, Econo-
mic Bulletin for Latin America, (Santiago, Vol. x, No . 1, Ma~ 
1965); Albert O. Hirschmann, "The Political Economy of Import Sub-
stituting Industrialization in Latin America" in A Bias for Hope 
- Essays on Development and Latin America (Yale University Press, 
New Haven, 1971 , pp .8 5-113); S . Sideri, "The Industrial Develop-
ment Deadlock in Latin America : From Import Substitution to Ex-
port Promotion?", Development and Change, (The Hague, 1971-72, 
Vol. III, No.2, pp.1-17) and Werner Baer, "Import Substitution 
and Industrialization in Latin America : Experiences and Interpre-
tations", Latin American Research Review (Austin, Texas, Vol.VII, 
No . l, Spring 1972, pp . 95-122). 
For analysis of import substituion experiences of major Latin 
American republics, see among others , recent books and articles by 
Carlos F . Diaz-Alejandro, David Felix and Aldo Ferrer (on/ Argen-
tina); Werner Baer, Paul G. Cl ark , Nathaniel Leff and Mar~a Con-
ceicao Tavares (on Brazil) and Roger Hansen, Leopoldo Solis and 
Clark w. Reynolds (on Mexico) . References to some studies of the 
same problems in Central America, Chile, Colombia and Peru can 
be found in fl erner Baer's review essay quoted above . 
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followed by some 25-30 years the import-substituting industrializa-
tion model adopted in Europe and the United States in the middle of 
the past century, transfigured there after a period of initial in-
dustrialization ended, around 1900, into industrial specialization 
arrong all advanced countries. The "early-comers" in the import- sub-
stituting industrialization (continental Europe, the United States 
and later British white dominions and Japan) aimed at breaking the 
hold of the British industrial empire over the world economy. The 
"latecomers" like Latin America attempted in turn to break out of 
the world division of labor that become consolidated in the early 
part of the present century, leaving for this subcontinent, Asia and 
Africa the role of suppliers of foodstuffs and raw rraterials and im-
porters of rranufactured goods from North Atlantic area. 
While the long-range historical analysis falls beyond the scope 
of this paper, it may be pertinent to recall that while Latin Ame-
rican industrialization in the 1880-1914 period did not amount to 
nuch, it received strong impetus from the First World War, the Great 
Depression and the Second World War when because of the severe dis~ 
locations of the international economic system the subcontinent fac-
ed concurrently extreme stortages of imported consumer rranufactures 
and the slow but constant demand for sucu goods, particularly in the 
rapidly growing urban areas. It is of conunon knowledge, however, 
that the import-substituting industrialization became in Latin Ame-
rica a deliberate and principal policy tool only after the end of 
the last World War . As the ECLA literature of the fifties has been 
insisting4 and the later studies have proved, 5 after 1945 Latin Ame-
rica together with the rest of the underdeveloped world faced rela- _ 
tively slow growth o~ world demand for its traditional exports and 
cons~quently was forced into alternative economic strategies promis-
ing nore dynamic growth, particularly in face of demographic explo-
sion and large migrations of labor force from rural to urban areas. 
4 
5 
See on this point, arrong others, ECLA, The Economic Development of 
Latin America and Its Principal Problems (United Nations, 1950); 
ECLA, International Cooperation in the Latin American Development 
Policy (United Nations, 1954) and Raul Prebisch "Commercial Policy 
in the Underdeveloped Countries", American Economic Review. 1959, 
Vol. 49, pp. 251-273. 
Among abundant literature on this subject, see, for example, Don 
Humphrey, American I:rrports, (The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 
1955); Bela Balassa, Trade Prospects for Developing Countries 
(Richard Irwin Inc., Homewood, Ill., 1964) and UNCTAD, Trade Pros-
pects and Capital Needs of Developing Countries (New York, 1968) .-
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For the purpose of creating nodern industrial structure that was 
to diminish Latin American dependence upon the world economy a sur-
prisingly large number of policy instrurrents were put to work in 
Latin America in the fifties . In his critical appraisal of the im-
port-substituting industrialization experiences of the subcontinent 
Werner Baer mentions protective tariffs and/or exchange controls; 
special preferences for dorrestic and foreign firms importing capital 
goods for new industries; preferential import exchange rates for in-
dustrial raw naterials, fuels and intermediate goods; cheap loans by 
public development banks for favored industries; the financing by 
the state of infrastructure designed to forrent industrial activities ; 
and the direct participation of governrrent in certain industrial sec-
tors, especially the heavy ones , which in sorre cases were considered 
"politically strategic " and , in others, where no private financial 
resources, dorrestic or foreign , were availa ble . 6 While this list of 
policy instrurrents is far from conplete , it is interesting to note 
first, that it contains alnost exclusively financial, fiscal and 
nonetary rreasures; second , that it look s very similar to the array 
of policy instruments used by the " earlycomers " in the United States 
and continental Europe one century ago, and third, that while it 
puts emphasis on capital accumulation in the private sector (by effe-
cts of protection and open and hidden State subsidies to the nanu-
facturing sector) , very little has been done in respect to improve-
rrent of domestic hurran capital and technological infrastructure . 
According to leading students of the present economic growth perform-
ance in the advanced countries these two factors are largely respons -
ible for the acceleration of growth rates in the developed world in 
7 the past quarter of centu ry . 
In the light of the unequal development levels and the varying 
6 Werner Baer, "Import Substitution and Industrialization •.. " , op . 
cit . p . 98 . 
7 Simon Kuznets, op . cit . Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth of Nations ; 
Total Output and Production Structure (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass . , 1971); Edward F . Denison (assisted by Jean-
Pierre Poullier); Why Growth Rates Differ : Post War Experience in 
Nine Western Countries (The Brookings Institution , Washington, D. 
c . , 1967); Angus Maddison , Economic Growth in the West - Conpara-
tive Experience in Europe and North Arrerica (The Twentieth Century 
Fund , New York, 1964), anong others . While Kuznets is widely 
known for his statement that "the cause of economic growth is know-
ledge" , the Maddison ' s study postulates that " ... the basic problems 
of an economic growth policy ... are not technical but political 
and institutional", op . cit . p . 22 . 
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size of domestic markets the results of import- substituting indust-
rialization differed considerably in Latin America. While no clear 
pattern of the coherent economic development strategy can be discern-
ed even in the major countries of the area, the pronotion of new in-
dustries was in nost, if not all, cases indiscriminate, the mix of 
policy instruments largely improvised, and the appearance of new 
rranufacturing activities reflected as a rule the existing demand pro-
file defined by two najor non-economic factors - inherited income 
distribution patterns and the demonstration effect of the consump-
tion patterns in the advanced high-income countries upon the upper 
and middle-income sectors of Latin American societies . 
In respect to the overall import-substituting industrialization 
performance three major patterns can be discerned in the region. In 
the small and nost of the intermediate underdeveloped republics im-
port substitution has never passed the consumer industries stage; 8 
in others , like Argentina, Chile and Venezuela - in David Felix 
words-
•.. the initial industries are generally consumer goods or 
building :rraterials products with a relative simple technology 
and a low capital requirement per worker and per unit of out-
put . Then they are followed by consumer goods industries re-
quiring a nore sophisticated technology and larger capital out -
lay, shading subsequently into industries producing relatively 
complex c~nsumer durables , steel, engineering and chemical 
products . 
Only in Brazil and Mexico some kind of strategy was adopted by 
the State aimed at maximum vertical integration : the simultaneous 
pronotion of final consumer goods industries (generally in the pri-
vate hands) and intermediate and capital goods (owned or heavily sub-
sidized by the State) . 
8 In the Caribbean and Central AJTerica even that stage has not been 
reached . Imports of consumer goods were substituted by and large 
by assemblying activities with fractional domestic value added . 
For analysis of this "spurious" industrialization process see , 
anong others , Miguel S . Wionczek, "The Central American Comnon 
Market" in Peter Robson (ed . ), International Economic Integration, 
(Penguin Modern Economic Readings , Penguin Books , Ltd, London, 
1971) and Philipp C . Schmitter, Autonomy and Dependence as Region-
al Integration Outcomes (University of California Institute of In-
ternational Studies, Berkeley, 1972) . 
9 
David Felix , "Monetarists , Structuralists and Import - Substituting 
Industrialization : A Critique ", in Werner Baer and Isa ac Kerst-
enetzky (editors),. Inflation and Growth in Latin America, Richard 
Irwin Inc . , Homewood , Ill ., 1964 , p . 183) . 
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In face of heavy protection , faulty fiscal systems , high consunp-
tion coefficients of the upper and middle-level incone sectors and 
the haphazard allocation of resources anong new nanufacturing ac-
tivities , it can hardly surprise anyone that the political , welfare 
and financial price of the Latin Anerican import substituting strate-
gy of the fifties and the sixties was ITR.lch higher than expected by 
the ECLA ideologists of the early post-war period who had clained 
then that import-substituting industrialization would bring to Latin 
Arrerica greater economic and ipso facto political independence from 
the advanced world . 
The ECLA ' s early position could be defended by pointing out that 
that regional "brain trust" did not postulate autarkic industriali-
zation on national level that eventually prevailed in the region , 
and that ECLA was not in the position to foresee the changes in the 
world industrial production structure due to the intensity of techno-
logical progress and the successful emergence of giant transnational 
industrial corporations . According to the ideological father of 
that development strategy, Raul Prebisch it was about to be exhaust-
ed by the late sixties: 
The possibilities of intensifying the rate of substitution 
in recent years exclusively on the basis of domestic narket de-
pends in large part upon the costs which each country would be 
willing to incur . This cost has been generally very high in 
the past . And also speaking in the general terms, it is quite 
possible that it will be very ITR.lCh higher when it involves the 
internediate and capital goods industries in which import sub-
stitution will be based in the future . 10 
Did any substantial changes occur in the position of the manufac-
turing sector in the Latin Arrerican economies between 1950 and 1970, 
if one assunes that, inspite of efforts in the field of regional 
trade cooperation in the sixties and the most recent attempts (after 
1965) to produce manufactures for exports to the advanced countries, 
the main post- war strategy concentrated on import-sustituting indus-
trialization? Available data do not suggest such deep changes . 
The content of Tables II and III strongly suggest that the prog-
ress of import-substituting industrialization run i nto heavy diffi-
10 Raul . Prebisch, Transfornaci6n_y desarrollo (Fonda de Cultura Eco-
n6mica , Mexico, 1971), p.101. 
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Table II Latin America : Participation of Manufacturing in GDP, 
1950 - 1970 
1950 1960 1970p 
Argentina 28 . 9 31. 3 35.7 Bolivia 12 . 0 10 . 7 13 . 2 Brazil 
Colombia 
16.5 23 . 4 24.7 
Chile 
14.2 17 . 0 18 . 9 
Ecuador 
16.7 18.8 25 . 5 
Paraguay 16.0 15 . 7 16 . 9 
Peru 
19 . 4 17 . 3 18 . 6 
U:cuguay 
14 . 6 17 . 7 22 . 9 
Venezuela 17 . 4 21. 2 22 . 3 
Mexico 9 . 6 11. 6 11.9 
Panama 18 . 4 20 . 5 23 . 2 
Costa Rica 8 . 2 12 . 6 17 .3 
El Salvador 12 . 1 12 . 9 19 . 6 
Guatemala 5 . 7 7 . 3 17 . 1 
Honduras 10 . 0 10 . 6 14 . 0 
Nicaragua 8 . 5 12.l 15 . 7 
America Latina c 8 . 0 9 . 8 15 . 9 18 . 9 21. 8 25 . 6 
p Preliminary 
c Includes estimates for Haiti ; excludes Cuba and Dominican Rep . 
Source : for 1950 and 1960 ECLA , Economic Survey of Latin Anerica, 
1964 , Table 161. 
for 1970 - ECLA , ECOrlomic Survey of Latin Anerica, 
1970, preliminary individual 
country data . 
Table III Changes in the Industrial Sturcture in Latin 
America, 1955 and 1968 (Percentages) 
1 9 5 5 1 9 6 8 
Consuner Consumer 
non-durables Others~ non-durables Others~ 
Argentina 52.2 41. 8 39 . 8 60 . 2 
Bolivia 82 . 5 17 . 5 71. 4 28 . 6 
Brazil 52 . 5 41. 8 41. 9 58 . l 
Colombia 69 . 3 30 . 7 63 . 2 35 . 8 
Chile 57.1 32 . 9 47 . 5 52.5 
Ecuador 75 . 8 24 . 2 65 . 5 34 . 5 
Paraguay n . a . n . a . n . a . n . a . 
Peru 66 . 7 3.3 57 . 3 42 . 7 
Uruguay 62.3 37 . 7 61. 3 38 . 7 
Venezuela 52 . 6 47 . 4 48 . 0 52 . 0 
Mexico 52 . 9 47 . 1 41. 2 58.8 
Panama 75 . 8 24 . 2 73 . 7 26 . 3 
Costa Rica I n . a. n . a . I n . a . n . a . El Salvador n.a . n . a . n . a . n . a . 
Guatemala 94 . 2 5 . 8 91. 9 8 . 1 
Honduras n . a. n . a . n . a . n . a. 
Nicaragua n . a . n . a . n . a . n . a . 
Dominican Rep . 94 . 6 5 . 4 85 . 7 14 . 3 
a Others = consuner durables, internediate and capital goods. 
Source: ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin America , 1970, Table 14. 
I 
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culties in Latin Arrerica rather rapidly. Between 1950 and 1970 the 
manufacturing output participation increased from about 19 percent 
to only 25.6 percent of the region's GDP. Only in five countries 
(Argentina , Chile, Brazil, Mexico and Peru) it e xceeded 20 percent 
by 1970, while in the rest of the region it hovered on the average 
around 16 percent of the GDP. The annual growth rates of the indus-
trial product, while obviously higher than those of the growth of 
the whole econo!l!l', declined perceptibly in the past three decades -
from 6.8 percent i~ the forties to 6.3 percent in the fifties and 
5 .4 percent in the sixties, suggesting the Prebisch-rrentioned ex-
haustion of import-substituting industrialization on the national 
level. As should have been expected, because of its concentration 
on final consumer non-durables that strategy debilitated rather 
than strengthened the Latin Arrerican position in the world trade and 
created serious pressures on trade balance with the outside world. 
Latin Arrerica's participation in the world exports declined from 
10.6 percent in 1950 to about 5 percent in 1970, while import coeffi-
cient continued unchanged: the value of imports of goods and services 
represented 10.2 percent of GDP in 1948-1949 and 9.9 percent twenty 
11 years later. 
Moreover, there are reasons to believe that import-substituting 
industrialization did not help to any extent to solve or even alle-
viate socio-economic problems facing Latin Arrerica in the post-war 
period. Its costs were paid in part by the agriculture and in part 
by the urban consurrer, leading to the further deterioration of intra-
country incorre distribution. 
Furtherrrore, the import-substituting industrialization was unable 
to contribute in a tangible way to the improverrent of the employnent 
problem. While the industrial product of Latin Arrerica expanded in 
the fifties and sixties at the average rate of 6 percent, industrial 
employrrent grew between 1950 and 1968 by only 2.8 percent, resulting 
in the accentuation of these major socio-economic difficulties: the 
growing unemployment and underemployment in the rural areas, large 
and growing migration of a part of the surplus of agricultural labor 
force to the cities, and the tremendous expansion of the urban under-
employrrent in the low-productivity traditional service activities. 
11 
For details see Joseph Grunwald and Phillip Musgrove, Natural 
Resources in Latin American Developnent (Johns Hopkins Press, 
Baltimore, 1970). 
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on the other hand, the import-substituting industrialization 
created or strengthened rronopolistic rents accruing to "dorrestic " in-
dustrial firms , nany of them owned by foreign interests . Moreover , 
it increased the international indebtedness of the region . The 
total external debt of Latin America (public debt and foreign direct 
investment) grew between 1950 and 1969 from US$9,600 million to 
US$35,000 million and the service of that debt in the same period in-
creased from 18.5 percent to 37 . 0 percent of the total foreign ex-
12 
change income originating in Latin Arrerican comrrodity exports . 
Finally, the expected technological rroderni zation of Latin American 
productive structure did not take place . Instead the "prenaturely 
old" industrial sectors had emerged . 
One of the nany recent atteJ1lltS to evaluate the success and fail-
ures of the import substituting industrialization in Latin Arrerica, 
and particularly in Brazil offers the following verdict 
Hindsight nakes it easy to point out specific mistakes, even 
to suggest some rrodifications in policy that clearly would have 
avoided the greatest inefficiencies . It is rruch harder to com-
pare actual results with those that might have come from some 
totally different policy that would not have included industria-
lization . 13 
Such a statement, however, begs the question since it would most 
probably have been impossible to postulate for the post-war Latin 
America or any other part of the developing world an economic policy 
that would have totally excluded industrialization . Not only indus -
trialization has been part and parcel of economic growth everyplace 
since the first Industrial Revolution in Great Britain in the mid 
XVIII century , but any alternative development policy would have 
been rejected in Latin America not only on economic but also on poli -
tical grounds . Thus, the question cannot be reduced to postulating 
ex post other development venues but should try to ascertain why the 
import substitution industrialization efforts spent t he mselves so 
. dl . th b . . 14 rapi y wi out ringing the results expected ex ante . 
12 
13 
This rephrasing of the issues involved forces us to resume the 
For details see ECLA, Economic Surve y of Latin America , 1971 , Vol . 
I , Latin American and World Econo ny : Some Prospects and Trends , 
(New York , June 1972 , mimeo) . 
Joel Bergsnan and Authur Candal : " Industrialization , Past Suc-
cesses and Future Problems ", Howard S . Ell i s (ed . ) The Economy of 
Brazil (University of California Press , Berkeley and Los Angel e s , 
1969 , p . 47) as quoted by Werner Baer, op . cit . 
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lTU.lltiple criticisms of the Latin American post-war quasi- autarki c 
. d . l' t' 15 h . th b ' t k in ustria iza ion . T e abundant literature on e su Jee ma es 
it possible to distinguish between the two groups of critics whom 
Baer classifies conveniently in two categories - "rmrket critics " 
and "structural critics" . 
Leaving aside the particularly conservative economists within the 
first school that have seen anything wrong in the region ' s post-war 
industrialization because it has been running against the principles 
for world-wide comparative advantage, the "narket critics" see the 
following drawbacks in the import-substituting industrialization 
IIDdel : 
14 
15 
al the across-the-board proIIDtion of manufacturing activities 
without regard even to potential co:rrparative advantages and 
the e:rrphasis on autarky ; 
b) the disregard of economies of scales; 
c) the abuse of the "effec t ive" rates of protection; 
d) a ttempts - in the case of major countries - to foster and 
and maximize vertical industrial integration; 
e) i:.he anti-economic allocation of investment resources , par-
ticularly by the State, at CQSt to the agricultural sector; 
f) the failure to stimulate traditional exports and diversify 
the export structure along with the progress of industria-
lization process, and 
g) the negative impact of price distortions between the sec-
tors upon the industrial employment due to the fact that 
no incentives were created to adopt labor-intensive produc-
tion techniques . 
Not all the literature on the subject is outright pessimistic . 
While insisting that " the fact that import- substituting i ndust-
rialization can be accomIIDdated r e latively easily in the existing 
social and political environnent is probab ly responsible for the 
widespread disappointment with the process " , Albert . a . Hirsch-
rrann concludes that his exploration "has inade it possible to Gl.is -
cern avenues toward continued industrial growth that remain open 
to the late latecomers" , !2p . cit . p . 123 . 
Particularly useful in that respect are Ba er and Sideri review 
articles referred to earlier, and various cha pters of ECLA, E£.Q:: 
nomic Survey of Latin America, 197.0, and Economic Survey of J"a t in 
America , 1971 that introduce into the analysis of the Latin · Ame~ 
rican post- war industrializati on strategy two earlier neglected 
factors : world-wide technological change and transnational indus-
trial corporations . 
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The ~structuralist critics" , on the other hand, stress the follow-
ing negative aspects of the model : 
a) its effect upon the incorne distribution already very bad -
except in few southernmost Latin Anerican republics- result-
ing in the increase of the incorne concentration and putting 
a severe brake upon the growth of the demand for industrial 
products after the import substituting industries have been 
established; 
b) the neglect of the potential donestic denand in agriculture 
and low- income groups employed in the service sectors due, 
among others, to the implantation of import-substituting 
industries that produced goods saleable only to high and 
upper-middle income groups; 
c) a strong regional concentration of industry and income for 
the sake of the external economies, not only in the three 
major republics (Argentina , Brazil and Mexico) but else-
where as well increasing regional income inequalities and 
reinforcing economic dualism; 
d) the indiscriminate inputs of advanced technologies from the 
industrial countries without any serious attempts t:o adjust 
them to factor proportions prevailing in Latin America and 
thus introducing "technological" unernployrnent in the socie-
ties cursed by an almost unlirni ted supply of labor, and 
e) the absence of clear policy toward foreign private invest-
rnents that resulted in foreign investors' accumulating nono-
polistic rents from industrialization fostered , under high , 
if not excessive, protection in the small-size markets in-
viting oligopolistic practices . 
Sarne of the criticisms of the two schools represent the formula-
tion of similar drawbacks and deficiencies of the model in the dif-
ferent conceptual languages . But, in general terms , one is tempted 
to acknowledge that the " narket school" shows particular preoccupa-
tion for the resources allocation results of the import-substituting 
industrialization, while the "structuralists" criticize the model 
for its following alnost blindly industrialization policies of the 
other societies in earlier periods . Practically no consideration 
was given - they insist - to the socio-economic peculiarities of 
the Latin American region in second half of the XX century and to 
the social welfare objectives . As a growing number of Latin Arne-
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rican economists were willing to admit in the late sixties, the soci-
al cost of the postwar industrialization rrodel was very high; the 
results arrounted to a quantitative economic growth instead of the 
economic development, and the region as a whole found itself facin g 
the "structural lock" situation, characterized, among other things, by 
high excess productive capacity, intra-sectoral and intra-regional 
imbalances, extremely high prices of industrial goods and the stagna-
tion of demand closely related to the low absorptive capacity of 
labor by the manufacturing sector . Consequently, sorre "structural 
critics" add, after two decades of industrial efforts, Latin America 
found itself rrore dependent than at any previous time on the outside 
advanced countries both financially and technologically . The at-
tempt to diminish that dependence became largely aborted . 
While considering fairly convincing the "structural School " cri-
tique it is only fair to state that Latin Americans realized rather 
lately, perhaps as late as in the mid-sixties that there is no such 
a thing as "easy industrialization". 16 As Bruton , Sideri and other 
writers point out, import sub stitution as a strategy of Latin Ame-
rican development was to a very large extent arrived at by default; 
could harcly be described as a development strategy in the sense of 
a selection of alternative policies airred at awell-definedoLjective ; 
and, rroreover, was based upon somewhat theoretically shaky assump-
tion that the import structure of a country was the best indicator 
of what the country should startproducing , given the composition of its 
factors of production and the available technology. This last assum-
ption left aside two importan t question s : what kind of socio-econo-
mic reality the import structure reflected a nd whether the available 
technology - mo s t l y trans f erred indiscriminately from abroad - was not 
only the adequate but the only available in the international tech-
no logy narket . In the early ECLA literature that represented theore-
tical underpinning of the import-substituting industrialization as 
practised in Latin America since the fif~ies these issues have hard-
ly even been raised . 
As this paper will attempt to demonstrate in its final part the 
neglect of those two issues : the backwardness of social structures 
and the lack of technological policies on national and regional 
16 For more details see Sideri, op. cit .,particularly pp . 2- 8, and 
Henry J . Bruton, "The Import-Substitution Strategy of Economic 
Development : A Survey " , The Pakistan Development Review, Vol . 
10, No . 2, Sumner 1970 , pp . 125-140 . 
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level have been largely responsible for the very meager results of 
not only the Latin American import-substituting industrialization 
of the post-war period, but also of the two following development 
models, based first in the sixties upon the regional economic and 
trade integration rrodel, and in the past few years upon the indust-
rialization for export to the more advanced parts of the world. 
II - Regional Economic and Trade Integration: The Disappointing Re-
cord of the Sixties 
In the mid-fifties ECLA technocrats and nany economists and re-
formist politicians started having second thoughts in respect to the 
longer-term results of import-substituting industrialization strate-
gy followed by the individual La tin American countries since 1940 . 
Consequently , a s a corollary to that deve lopment strategy regional 
economic integration bas ed upon trade liberalizatio n was postulated 
. th 17 A d' ' in e area . ccor ing to this new strategy a Latin American Com-
non Market would stimulate the abandonment of the patterns of tra-
ditional primary comnodity trade with industrialized countries, the 
17 In addition to nountains of ECLA, LAFTA and SIECA technical docu-
mentation, made public in the sixties, persons interested in the 
subject might find it useful -C.o consult, arrong others , the follow-
ing studies of the Latin American economic integration process : 
Sidney Dell, Problemas de un mercado conlin en Am2rica Latina , 
(CEMLA, Mexico , 1959) ; Victor L . Urquidi, Trayectoria del mercado 
comdn latinoamericano , (CEMLA, Mexico, 1960) : Sidney Dell Trade 
Blocks and Comnon Markets, (Alfred A. Knopf, New York , 1963) ; 
Bela , Balassa , Economic Develo£!llent and Integration , (CEMLA 
Mexico , 1965) ; Donald B . Baerrensen , Martin Carnoy, Joseph Grun-
wald, Latin A1nerican Trade Patterns (The Brookings Institution , 
Washington, D.C ., 1965) ; Miguel S . Wionczek , (ed . ) , Lat i n Ameri-
can Economic Integration , (Frederick A. Praeger , New York, 1966) ; 
Sidney Dell , A Latin American Comnon Market? (Oxford University 
Press, London, 1966) ; Miguel S . Wionczek , (ed . ) , Economic Coope-: 
ration in Latin America , Africa and Asia (M . I . T . Press , Cambridge , 
Mass . 1969) ; Roger D. Hansen , Central America : Regional Integra~ 
tion and Economic Development , (National Planning Association, 
Washington , D. C . , 1967) ; James D. Cochrane, The Politic s of Re~ 
gional Integration : The Central American Case , (Tulane Univer -
sity Press, New Orleans , 1969) ; William G. Demas , The Econo~ics 
of Development in Small Countries wi th Special Reference t o the -
Caribbean, (McGill University Press , Montreal, 1965); Havelock 
Brewster and Clyve Y. Thomas, The Dynamics of West Indian Econo-
mic Integration , (University of Janaica Press , Kingston , Janaica, 
1967); Osvaldo Sunkel , (ed . ) Integraci6n y politica econ6mica, 
(Universidad de Chile , Santiago de Chile, 1970); Joseph Grunward, 
Miguel S . Wionczek and Martin Carnoy , Latin American Economic In-
tegration and US Policy , (The Brookings Institution , Washington , 
D. C. 1971) and Christopher Garbacz , Industrial Polarization under 
Economic Integration in Latin America (Bureau of Business Research , 
The University of Texas , Austin, 1972) . 
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argument used earlier by the import substituting industrialization 
proponents, and, noreover, that it would help to nodernize the Latin-
American economies by forcing them to specialize within the frame -
work of an expanded and protected regional narket . The general ECLA 
proposition was phrased convincingly : 
Latin America's basic long-run development problems can be 
solved only if the following fundamental fact is recognized : 
Latin America, however great assistance it receives,"however 
high the rate at which its exports expand - and they cannot do 
so very rapidly - will be unable to carry out its development 
plans, will be unable even to reqain the rate of qrowth achiev-
ed in the ten post-war years, unless it makes a sustained 
effort to establish within its own territory the capital goods 
industries of which it is in such urgent need today, and which 
it will require on a large scale during the next quarter of the 
century •.. In order t o produce these capital goods and develop 
all the intermediate goods industries required to launch these 
highly conplgx dynamic industries ... Latin America needs a com-
non narket . 
While accepting ECLA ' s general development thesis, some indivi-
dual political figures also saw in economic integration an important 
vehicle that would permit them to redress somewhat the lack of bal-
ance in hemispheric political relations . 
Beset by foreign trade problems, lacking external capital assis-
tance and moved by the idea of spiritual and cultural unity , Latin 
Americans found the proposals for regional economic cooperation at-
tractive . Between 1958 and 1960 the Central Americans established 
their conuron market . At the same time , in a parallel but giographi-
cally broader novement , six South American republics (Argentina, 
Brazil , Chile , Paraguay , Peru and Uruguay) and Mexico opted for a 
free trade zone scheme that would -it was hoped- evolve dur ing the 
1970s into a comnon narket cov ering t he whole subcontinent . Draw-
ing upon the exanple of Western Europe , both schemes put an accent 
upon trade liberalization as a vehicle for regional division of 
labor . The Central American arrangement provided for the creation 
of a comnon narket by 1966 for all but a few conrrrodities . The Latin 
American free trade zone was to be set up by 1972, through annual 
product-by-product tariff negotiations . 
The Central American regional cooperation scheme provided not 
18 
ECLA, The Latin American Comnon Market, (United Nations, New York, 
1969, p . l) . 
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only for comrrercial but also for financial, monetary, fiscal and in-
dustrial cooperation . In the early 1960s, an impressive array of in-
stitutions supporting the comrron market emerged in the area, among 
them a regional development agency (the Central American Integration 
Bank) , a rnonetary council, a clearing house, and an industrial re-
search institute. While these agencies worked with relative effi-
ciency , coordination of major economic policies, particularly in res -
pect to the siting of new industries and the comrron treatment of 
foreign investment , has proved very difficult . The inalibity t o 
reach agreements in the key field of industrial cooperation , partly 
because of an absence of national economic planning mechanisms in 
Central America and partly because of the opposition of powerful ex-
ternal political and economic interests , proved in the late 1960s to 
be the major source of CACM ' s difficulties . 
The LAFTA agreement (known as the Montevideo TreaLy) was less spe-
cific in respect to non-commercial cooperation mechanisms . However , 
it did commit the participating countries - whose initial number of 
seve n increased to eleven by 1968- "to facilitate increas i ng econo-
mic integration and complementary economies" by making "every effort 
to reconcile their import and export regimes , as ' well as the treat-
nent they accord to capital, goods and services from the outside the 
Area" . Furtherrnore , the Montevideo Treaty envisaged "progressively 
closer coordination of the corresponding industrialization policies" 
through agreements "am:mg representatives of the economic sectors 
concerned" . Very little, however, has been achieved in these fields 
during the first ten years of LAFTA ' s life . No regional agreement 
about the coordination of foreign trade and industrialization poli-
cies has been reached and none is in sight . Neither was it found 
possible to agree upon a conu•.on treatment for private foreign capi-
tal . Only some agreements designed to make industrial developments 
complementary , by specialization of produc tion in individual indust-
rial branches with concommitant freeing of trade for their output, 
have been signed . While some degree of cooperation was achieved in 
respect to the multilateral clearing of regional trade b a lances and 
maritime transport, t hese agreements h a.a very little impact upon 
the expansion of intra-LAFTA trade and no effect whatsoever upon 
the acceleration of regional economic growth . 
The achievement of CACM and LAFTA have been measured to date 
mainly by the growth of trade within their respective areas . 
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sequently, in the mid-sixties it appeared that the Central American 
Comnon Market was an unqualified success, whereas the Latin Anerican 
free t r ade zone was making slow and hesitant progress . In fact , 
trade within Central Anerica responded to the establish·nent of a com--
non narket with amazing dynamism. Regional trade flows , neasured in 
terms of imports , increased from U. S . $37 million to U. S . $250 million 
between 1961 and 1970 , or by about 35 per cent a year . About two-
thirds of intra-Central American trade consists of manufactured , 
mainly consuner goods, suggesting - o n the surf a ce - a significant 
diversification of zonal comnerce and the progressive although limit~ 
ed impact of the comnon market upon the region ' s production struc-
ture . 
LAFTA ' s trade achievements are much less impressive . The signing 
of the Montevideo Treaty was followed by sev eral years of a relative-
ly rapid intra-regional trade expansion , partly in response to early 
progress in tariff negotiations -70 percent of all bilateral tariff 
concessions granted between 1961 and 1970 corresponded to the first 
thre e years of LAFTA existence (1961-1963) . By 1970 intra-LAFTA im-
port trade exceeded U. S . $1 , 300 million (11 percent of the member 
countries' total import trade) as compared with U. S.$600 million 
(8 percent) in 1961 . The regional trade of sane newconers in intra-
Latin American trade -Mexico, Peru and Ecuador- grew very rapidly 
from the low levels registered at the end of the 1950s. The bulk of 
comnercial exchange continued t o be concentrated in the three south-
ern republics -Argentina, Br azil and Chile which had a long tradi-
tion of reciprocal trade and still accounted in 1970 for close to 
two-thi r ds of intra-LAFTA comnercial exchange . In spite of the im-
pressive number of tariff reductions (exceeding 11,000 by the end of 
1970) , very little was achieved in respect to regional trade-product 
diversification . In 1967 foodstuffs and the other primary products, 
traditionally exchanged by South Anerican republics prior to the 
LAFTA appearance, still represented sonething like 70 percent of in-
tra-LAFTA trade . But the biggest setback to LAFTA was that while 
regional trade continued to grow and exceeded 11 percent of the 
total of LAFTA's fore i on trade in 1970, the trade expansion did not 
affect in a tangible way the productive .structures of the member 
countries . They continued to be dominated (in respect to primary 
activities) by the traditional trade relations with the outside 
world; while on the national level , in manufacturing and in indus-
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try supporting sectors (energy , transport and infrastructure) the 
road of inward-directed and import-substitution-based policies has 
largely been followed by all LAFTA nembers . 
Thus, it seems that while the rapid setting up of a comrron rrarket 
in Central America helped to accelerate trade and growth within that 
small area (until the issue of the equal distribution of integration 
benefits broke the CACM's back in the late sixties) , the trade libe-
ralization measures of the Montevideo Treaty were too weak to pro-
duce a similar effect within LAFTA . But it is not only LAFTA which 
became progressively paralyzed at the close of the 1960s ; the CACM 
run into even Jrore serious difficulties as the result of the 1969 
Honduras - El Salvador was with Honduran withdrawing from the common 
market arrangement in late 1970 and Costa Rica facing presently the 
most serious paynents problems with the rest of the area . 
A. An Overview of the CACM ' s Drift into Disaster 
A close analysis of CACM ' s experiences suffices to suggest that 
the positive impact of comrron rrarket arrangements of a traditional 
type upon the economies of its underdeveloped member countries has 
been heavily overrated . In the absence of joint or even national 
long-term development policies, particularly in industrial and fis-
cal fields , the establishnent of a comrron rrarket brought relatively 
little real growth t o Central America , all the impressive figures 
on intra- area trade notwithstanding . Sane sources estimate that 
only 1 percent of the annual 7 percent average growth rate in Cen-
tral America in the s i xties r esulted from comrron-market- induced ac-
tivities . 19 The setting up of a regional trade barrier cons i derably 
higher than the previous tariffs of the individual countries did no t 
lead to serious industrialization but rather to the rapid expansion 
of various types of ' final - touch ' i ndustr i es i n the integrated area . 
Many con sumer goods imported in finished form before 1960 are now 
imported in parts or at internediate stages of production . After 
undergoing final processing (only bottling or packing in some ex-
treme cases) they circulated in the whole region as "Central Ameri-
can " manufactures until the El Salvador- Honduras crisis and continue 
to do so , with the exception of the trade flows suspended between 
19 
Donald H. McLelland , "The Comrron Market ' s Contribution to Central 
American Economic Growth : A First Approximati on ," in Ronald Hil -
ton (ed . ) , The Movement Toward Latin American Unity (Frederick 
A. Praeger , New York , 1969) . 
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these two countries since the sunurer of 1969. 
The high regional protection offered to finished goods, the low 
tariffs extended to raw ma.terials and intermediate products, the 
race of CACM rrember countries for "new industries", together with the 
oligopolistic structure of the market, led to a statistically impres-
sive expansion of intra-regional trade in ma.nufactured goods -from 
U. S . $18 million in 1961 to U. S.$225 million in 1970- at a consider-
able economic and social cost to the area . Arrong the economic costs 
of this particular type of regional integration are a rapidly grow-
ing bill for imports of capital and intermediate goods from third 
countries at "administered transfer prices"; a steep decline in fis-
cal revenues; high prices of new regional "manufactured goods", and 
exorbitant profits accruing ma.inly to foreign-owned ma.nufacturing 
enterprises which moved ma.ssively into CACM once they became aware 
of the profitability of the new ventures under that scheme . To ma.ke 
matters worse, the haphazard industrialization that followed the 
emergence of CACM led to political complications by accentuating dif-
ferences in intra-regional development levels. Most of the new 
"final-touch" industries settled in the more advanced countries -
Guatemala and El Salvador - which, followed by Costa Rica, became 
the principal exporters of manufactured goods to the area. Since 
the liberalization of agricultural trade proved an intractable is-
sue, the two least developed members - Honduras and Nicaragua -
found themselves in an uncomfortable situation . They became mar-
kets for expensive manufactures from the rest of the region while 
being unable to increase tangibly their intra-regional exports of 
traditional non-competitive agricultural comrrodities . 
As long as the over-all balance-of-payments position of Central 
America was satisfactory, relatively few complaints about the grow-
ing imbalance in regional development and trade were heard . But by 
the mid-sixties the area found itself facing a najor payments prob-
lem vis-a-vis the outside world . The rapidly growing import bill 
was due both to CACM industrialization and to the high level of im-
ports of luxury goods. The latter reflected the extremely unequal 
income distribution in the area, symptoma.tic of its social backward-
ness. Subsequently, the CACM scheme ran into heavy criticism from 
its less-developed members . The unequal distribution of benefits 
accruing from integration became the key issue, and Honduras and 
Nicaragua began to press the rest for special concessions. The con-
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flict became exacerbated when the attempts to deal with the regional 
balance-of-payments difficulties, through tariff surcharges on most 
imports from third countries and an equalized consumption tax on a 
large list of luxury conurodities of regional origin , met with oppo-
sition from Costa Rica, dictated by purely domestic political con-
siderations . In early 1969 Nicaragua , which had accunulated a siz-
able commercial deficit within the region and was unable to export 
agricultural goods to neighboring countries, introudced - without 
warning and in clear contravention ot the CACM treaty- levies on re-
gional imports. It lifted them only after the other members rati-
fied the pending regional protocols . The most important of these 
was a protocol for the equalization of fiscal incentives , its ab-
sence in the original treaty having permitted the initial free-for-
all fight aimed atattractingforeign industrial investment at alrrost 
any cost to the economy . 
Shortly after the Nicaragua-induced crisis had been resolved , a 
war that broke out between El Salvador and Honduras in the summer of 
1969 put the entire future of the CACM into question . Although sonE 
sort of political peace has been restored to the region by the early 
1972 , the CACM stopped functioning, although trade flows in the area 
continue except between El Salvador and Honduras . Honduras formally 
withdrew from the market and the continuing long-simmiering conflict 
of economic interests between the more developed CACM members (Guate -
nala, El Salvador and Costa Rica) and the poorer ones (Honduras and 
Nicaragua), have been reinforcing lately nationalist attitudes in 
the individual countries . Negotiaions e ven to keep CACM alive do 
not seem to lead anywhere . 
While the issue of equal benefits for all CACM member countries 
nay somehow be resolved one day, yet another one continues to over-
shadow the area . Both the Central American left and nany local con-
servatives insist with growing vehemence that whatever gains from 
CACM nay accrue to the region, foreign industrial investors are the 
principal beneficiaries of the common narket arrangement . Given the 
force of nationalism in the underdeveloped countries, such a frame 
of mind can hardly be considered conductive to an orderly future for 
the Central American scheme for economic integration, especially in 
view of the fact that , ten years after the setting up of the common 
narket, the area is socially and politically as backward as before . 
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B. LAFTA 's Irrelevance for Latin American Development 
LAFTA has not been a success story either . Disenchantment with 
its performance began even before the rate of growth of intra-re-
gional trade started declining in the second half of the sixties . 
From 1964 onwards a number of attempts to accelerate the implementc. -
tion of the non-comrrercial commitments of the Montevideo Treaty mem-
bers were made by the main proponents of regional integration, in-
cluding the then President Eduardo Frei of Chile, Raul Prebisch, and 
Felipe H,2rrera, the head of the Inter-American Development Bank . 
These initiatives led to the establishment of LAFTA ' s Council of 
Ministers and indirectly to the conference of American presidents, 
held at Punta del Este in the spring of 1967 . But after two meet-
ings, the Council of Ministers ran apparently out of ideas, while 
the Punta del Este presidential declaration calling for the estab-
lishment of a Latin American comrron market by 1980 was quietly shelv-
ed . External and regional political and economic difficulties prov-
ed stronger than the superficial idea of Latin American solidarity . 
LAFTA ' s inability to proceed on schedule with the original com-
mitments of the Montevideo Treaty was finally admitted openly in 
mid-December 1969 at the Ninth Annual Conference of LAFTA's Contract-
ing Parties held in Caracas , Venezuela . The protocal singed on that 
occasion postponed, from 1973 to 1980 , the establishment of a free 
trade area between eleven Latin American republics; it slowed down 
the pace of tariff negotiations by committing each LAFTA member coun-
try to making annual tariff cuts equivalent to only 2 . 9 percent 
(formerly 8 percent) of the weighted average of duties applicable to 
all imports; and it suspended the implementation of the so-called 
comnon list of products freely traded until at least 1974, the date 
by which negotiations toward a "new stage" of LAFTA are to begin . 
It is no secret in Latin America that the Caracas Protocol represent-
ed a victory for the three major countries (Ar gentina, Brazil and 
Mexico), who have lost interest in all but the purely commercial as-
pects of regional economic i ntegration and who assume -perhaps cor-
rectly- that the point reached in tariff cuts assures them enough 
room for export expansion in the area for some time without forcing 
them to undertake any non-commercial commitments toward the less-de-
veloped LAFTA members . Significantly, the Caracas Protocol made 
only a token reference to a comrron market by resurrecting two rather 
nebulous articles of the Montevideo Treaty that called for "creating 
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conditions favorable to the establishment of a Latin American Comm-
rron Market" and "adapting [LAFTA] to a new stage of economic integra-
tion". The Protocol fixed no deadline for the setting up of a Latin 
American comrron narket . 
While there are many reasons for LAFTA's disappointing perform-
ance and the clear lack of enthusiasm for a comrron narket, sorre of 
them are particularly important . One is the ambitious geographical 
scope of LAFTA . In the name of a Latin American comnunity of inter-
ests, economies of all sizes and levels of development were put 
under one roof . In spite of highly publicized declarations of re-
gional solidarity, the events of the last few years have proved that 
each of the three groups within LAFTA (the industrial "giants" -
Argentina , Brazil and Mexico ; the middle group led by Chi le , Colom-
bia and Venezuela; and the most backward republics- Bolivia, Ecuador 
and Paraguay) faces specific problems which hardly Jend themselves 
to joint action . All the major conflicts that arose in LAFTA involv-
ed the economic relations arrong these three groups . The poor rrem-
bers and the middle group insisted, quite correctly, from the begin-
ning that they were getting little, if anything, from the regional 
free trade scheme and were , in fact, running the risk of becoming 
narkets for the industrial surplus of the "big three" . And while 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico are obviously interested in rrarkets in 
neighboring countries , their dependence on exports to the rest of 
LAFTA is not large enough to force them to grant these unilateral 
cororrercial and other concessions for which the less fortunate repub-
lics have asked persistently . Recently Argentina rnade it clear that 
its interest in LAFTA and any future regional comrron market is st-
rictly limited by considerations of domestic economic developments . 
Although Brazil and Mexico abstain from rnaking public statements on 
their future LAFTA policies, their position is basically similar . 
It is interesting to note that in the most recent past Brazil shift-
ed its interests in Latin American outlets for its manufactures to 
Africa. 
While the differences in economic development levels between the 
LAFTA subgroups may be the main reason for its disappointing perform-
ance, a second obstacle has its roots in the flaws in the ECLA doct-
rine that served as the rationale for the establishment of a Latin 
American free trade zone in 1960 . ECLA claimed that the Latin Ameri-
can countries had to integrate because import-substitution on a 
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national level had run its course by the mid-1950s. But the post-
LAFTA experiences of the "big three" have shown that inward-directed 
national industrialization programs can continue in sorre parts of 
Latin Arrerica for a considerable time without an increase in the 
level of protection but not without additional political and econo-
mic costs . In response to the differentiation of dorrestic demand 
for industrial inputs and final goods, new manufacturing establish-
rrents continue to spring up in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico ten 
years after ECLA's warning that this type of industrial growth was 
running into a blind alley . It may be mentioned in passing that 
this vertical integration is heavily controlled by foreign direct 
investrrent . 20 Eventually , perhaps within another decade, these 
large republics may encounter the difficulties predicted by ECLA, 
but as long as the constraints upon industrialization for the home 
market are not too severe and some outlets for manufacturing ex-
ports are found elsewhere none of these three countries will see a 
manifest necessity to support LAFTA fully . 21 
22 A recent very incisive survey of LAFTA's problems points out 
that the nationalist ideology present in the three major LAFTA coun-
tries does not explain fully their aims-length attitudes vis-a-vis 
that regional integration scheme. Ibarra correctly stresses that 
any expansion of the trade liberalization program beyond the limits 
reached by 1967 would have in fact affected negatively vested inter-
ests of large dorrestic industrial sectors that rr~ght have becorre ex-
posed to co:rrpetition both from other larger LAFTA rrernbers and the 
less-developed republics as well . To avoid such corrpetition, local 
industrial interests (and many foreign-owned manufacturing firms) 
opted for so-called "industrial corrplerrentary agreerrents" that have 
sorre characteristics of sectoral cartels . The attractiveness of 
20 
21 
22 
For details see ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin Arrerica, 1970, 
Part IV, Special Studies, The Expansion of International Enter-
prises and their I:rrpact on the Latin Arrerican Developrrent , and 
Miguel S. Wionczek, Inversion y tecnologia extranjera en Anerica 
Latina, (Joaquin Mortiz, Mexico, 1971 . · 
The potential conflict between the UNCTAD scheme for preferential 
treatrrent of manufactures produced by semi-developed countries 
and the regional trade integration schemes among the developing 
countries has been pointed out in Joseph Grunwald, Miguel s. 
Wionczek and Martin Carnoy, Latin American Economic Integration. 
op . cit. -
David Ibarra, "Notas sobre la integracion latinoarrericana" ~-
cio Exterior (Mexico, Vol. XXI, No. 11, October 1971). 
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these agreements from the viewpoint of the industries involved con-
sists of the fact that they include only some countries, are exempt 
from the application of the most-favored-nation clause to other 
LAFTA members (with the exception of the least-developed ones that 
cannot offer any competition) and, finally, can be denounced on a 
short notice if the gentlemen's agreem~nts among the participants 
are broken by some party . Such deviation from the original program 
of regional trade liberalization to sectoral cartel-like arrange-
ments suggests that the rationalization of productive structures 
through regional competition is further away than many think . The 
progress along the alternative route of industrial specialization 
throughregional industrial planning is even less probable in view 
of the complete absence of interest of the major LAFTA members in 
regional economic planning . 
The possibilities of continuing inward-directed industrialization 
in the middle group of countries are considerably rrore limited . 
This may explain in part their interest in an Andean subregional 
comrron narket , a project under negot iation since 1966 and translated 
into a formal treaty, signed at Cartagena , Colorrbia , in July 1969 by 
Bolivia , Colombia , Chile , Ecuador and Peru . At the last rronent 
Venezuela opted out of the Andean scheme , proving that the private 
sector in that republic believes that national industrialization pro-
grams are still feasible in most places regardless of the market 
size, extent of natural resources, and the high cost of rrodern tech-
nology . Industrial entre preneurs in Venezuela have been very vocal 
in their opposition to the Andean scheme, predicting a rrajornational 
disaster if Venezuelan borders were to be opened to the "cheap labor " 
products of neighboring coun~ries. There is little reason why indus-
trial interests in Venezuela should have thought otherwise in 1969/ 
70 . After all , they were reaping very handsone profits behind high 
protective barriers, and , in traditional and conservative Latin 
Arrerica, profits and national interest are easily equated . Only re-
cently, after the abrogation of the U. s . -Venezuela trade treaty 
under which in e xchange for special treatrrent for Venezuelan oil in 
the U. S . , Venezuela was granting special tariff concessions to U.S . 
goods , Venezuelan interest in the Andean comrron rrarket increased . 
It is quite possible that during 1973 it will translate itself into 
Venezuela's adhesion to the Andean scheme . 
Paradoxically , the third m~jor obstacle to regional economic co-
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operation arose from sorre improvement in the international comrrodi-
ty trade picture, registered in the second half of the sixties un-
der the impact of conditions of economic boom in the advanced count-
ries . Contrary to the pessimistic ECLA predictions in that respect, 
the external demand for Latin Arrerica's traditional comrrodities 
improved considerably in the past decade. Although the rate of ex-
pansion of the region's exports lagged behind that of trade airong 
industrial countries, the results were better than expected . Be.:... 
tween 1963 and 1970 Latin America's comrrodity sales increased by 25 
percent from US$9,200 million to US$13,700 million . If Venezuela's 
oil exports, which behaved sluggishly over the period, are excluded, 
the seven-year increase in export revenue of the region aIIDunted to 
alrrost 50 percent . The improvement of the export picture made in-
ternal industrialization efforts much rrore easy in domestic politi-
cal terms than the alternative regional trade liberalization or a 
negotiation of regional industrial cooperation schemes that might 
have affected certain powerful dorrestic and foreign interest groups 
in individual countries . As at other tirres and in other places , 
once the atrrosphere of the external sector crisis that was hanging 
over Latin America in the fifties and the early sixties seemed to 
23 dissipate, longer-term problems were conveniently forgotten . 
The priority given by the capital-exporting countries for the 
practices of tied public loans and of private suppliers ' credits 
in lieu of united public foreign aid only strengthened the propen-
sity of Latin Arrerican countries to think in terms of national in-
ward-directed development and industrialization . Whatever their 
external payments situation might have been, Latin American repub-
lics were swamped in the 1960s with offers of external credit for 
individual industrial projects involving imports of capital goods . 
These offers were readily taken up, with the result that the dupli-
cation and overlapping previously characteristics of primary acti-
vities in the region was extended to the industrial sector . With 
23 Th . . . h e improvement of the Latin American external sector in t e late 
sixties was largely an illusion. The public foreign debt of the 
region doubled between 1961 and 1969 from US$8,800 million to 
US$17,600 million and the cost of servicing that debt grew in the 
sarre period from US$1,250 million to US$2,200 million . In 1969 a 
number of Latin American countries (including the three major 
ones) was spending over 20 percent of their gross revenue on cur-
rent account on servicing external public debt . See UNCTAD, Debt 
Problems of Developing Countrie.§_, (Santiago, Chile, TD/118/Add . 6, 
December 1971, mimeo) . 
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new high-cost, foreign-financed, self-contained industrial plants 
springing up even in the most backward countries, economic and in-
dustrial regional integration became more, rather than less diffi-
cult, to attain during the past decade . 
The absence of coordinated aid policies toward Latin America 
arrong the donor countries, and the US 's lack of interest in support-
ing LAFTA politically and financially created another important 
1 . . 24 h . . d . th s obstac e to integration. Throug its ai agencies e U .. gave 
financial support to the CACM from the very start . CACM members 
agreed in turn to accept the "proper" rules of the garre by abstain-
ing from any interference with "free market" forces and foreign in-
vestment . Moreover , the possibility of a political challenge to 
the United States from the Central American scheme for integration 
was virtually nil , while the acceleration of growth within the area 
was considered by the U. S . as a possible means of lessening socio-
political tensions in a strategically important part of Latin Ameri-
ca. 
The United States attitude towards LAFTA has been considerably 
nore ambivalent . In the 1950s the U.S . gave no support to Latin 
American integration efforts , even if only because the initiatives 
came from the ideologically suspect ECLA . With the emergence of 
the Alliance for Progress in 1960, the U.S . position began to fluc-
tuate between a "hands-off" policy and one of "neutral benevolence". 
Only in 1965 did the U.S. begin to express qualified support for 
Latin American integration . In the winter of 1966-67 and prior to 
the conference of American heads of state , President Johnson offer-
ed aid for the readjustment of those economies that might be affect-
ed in the process of the gradual establishment of a regional comrron 
narket. But the U. S . Congress refused to support the executive's 
offer , and in any case the arrount of aid offered wa s considered by 
roost Latin Americans to be ridiculously small. 
This aid, infornally promised, has never naterialized. The U. S . 
claimed that Latin America ' s lack of interest in the implementation 
of the Punta del Este agreement made any external financial help 
24
For details, see Miguel s . Wionczek, "Latin American Integration 
and United States Policies," in Robert w. Gregg (ed . ) , Internati o-
nal Organization in the Western Hemisphere (Syracuse University -
Press , Syracuse, N.Y . 196 8 ) , and Joseph Grunwald , Miguel S . Wion-
c~ek and Martin Carnoy , Latin American Economic Integration ... op. 
cit. 
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superfluous. The Latin American countries, in turn, were pointing 
out that they would perhaps be ready to take Punta del Este comrron 
rrarket proposals rrore seriously if only the U.S . had not backed 
out of its promises . Obviously, this was mere verbal shadow-boxing . 
Both the U. S. and Latin America put the matter of broad and serious 
regional economic integration low on their list of priorities, and 
both were fairly satisfied with the traditional, bilateral methods 
of hemispheric aid distribution. Given the attitudes prevalent in 
the U.S . Congress in the late sixties, the Executive Branch could 
hardly ask - even if he would have like to - for additional funds 
for supporting integration . Moreover, in a period of declining aid , 
the maintenance of bilateralism was not at all unattractive to the 
aid-receiving countries . Each of them hoped that it would somehow 
get rrore than others because of its "special" relation with . the 
powerful donor. Moreover, since the earnarking of certain funds 
for integration might have affected the amount of bilateral aid 
available, no Latin American country was willing to press for finan -
cial assistance for integration . Thus , traditional aid distribution 
patterns continued, while both Latin Arrerica and the U.S . found 
themselves in the comfortable position of being able to blarre each 
other for the failure of the agreements arrived at by the heads of 
state in 1967 . 
The final major obstacle to LAFTA's efficient functioning and to 
its evolution toward a regional comnon narket arose from the grow-
ing conflict between Latin American middle classes and intellectuals 
and foreign private investrrent, particuiarly the giant nn.iltinational 
corporations . 25 In nany Latin American quarters fears are felt 
that, because of their nanagerial and technological power, these 
corporations would reap the major benefits from integration, and in 
th d k . . d . 2 6 . . l e process estroy many wea dorrestic in ustries . In pr1nc1p e, 
25For details see Miguel S . Wionczek, Inversion y tecnologia extran-
jera en America Latina, op.cit. 
26
There is a growing evidence that these fears are well founded. 
For the latest findings see Fernando Fajnzylber, Estrategia indu~­
traial y empresas internacionales - Posici6n relativa de Arrerica 
Latina y Brasil (ECLA, Rio de Janeiro , November 1970 , mimeo), 
Hector Vazguez Tercero (ed . ) Inversiones extranjeras directas en 
Mexico (Comite Bilateral de Hombres de Negocios Mexico-Estados 
Unidos , Mexico , 1970); Roland E . Muller, Fore ign Investrrent in 
Latin America (The American University, Dept . of Economics , Wash-
ington , D. C. , 1971, mimeo . ), Carlos F . D{az Alejandro, "Direct In-
vestment in Latin America ," in Charles P . Kindleberger, The Inter-
national Corporation - A Symposium (The M. I . T . Press , Cambridge , 
Mass . 1970 , pp.319-344) . 
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these probl~ms might have been solved by regional harmonization of 
policies toward foreign private capital, and by special financial 
and technical assistance on a regional scale to domestic industries. 
In practice, the harmonization of such policies on a regional scale 
seems a forbidding task. Less-developed LAFTA members claim that 
the introduction of equal regional treatment for foreign investment 
would result in its concentration in the few large countries. The 
latter, in turn, insist that offering the poorer republics the 
right of more liberal treatment for foreign capital, on the top of 
unilateral regional trade concessions, would result in swamping of 
Latin America with rnanufactured goods assembled by foreign firms 
in the less-developed republics . Unable to resolve this particular 
regional dilemrna, LAFTA members - with the exception of the Andean 
group - continue to maintain highly varied national foreign invest-
ment policies geared rnainly to individual industrialization needs . 
Thus, on the regional level a curious argument emerges : While each 
country talks about the dangers of foreign domination of the free 
trade zone or a future common rnarket, only foreign investment locat-
ed outside one's own national territory is considered to constitute 
a threat . And once local foreign-owned enterprises become somehow 
the extension of national economic power, negotiating battles are 
fought by the host-countries to give them access to neighboring 
rnarkets . Under such conditions , the elaboration of a regional 
foreign investment policy is more than a forbidding task. It ap-
pears an impossible exercise. 
C. The Andean Comrron Market : Achievements and Prospects 
It nay well be that the Cartagena Agreement of May 1969, that 
set up the Andean Common Market with the participation of Bolivia, 
Chile, Colombia , Ecuador and Peru, offers the way of difficulties 
that are blocking the progress of LAFTA and CACM . The Agreement 
is considered to be an extension of the Montevideo Treaty and not a 
separate international legal instrument . It is built around an 
assumption, proven correct by the experiences of the two previously 
launched schemes, that efficient progress towards economic integra-
tion among developing countries cannot be based on more or less 
autornatic trade liberalization , but must attempt to solve from the 
very beginning such important issues as, among others, the problem 
of equal distribution of benefits arising from industrialization 
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(i.e., provide for harrronized distribution of new important indust-
rial projects), that of comrron trade and investment policies vis-~­
vis the rest of the world, and also that of a strong regional insti-
tutional framework with some degree of supernational power . 
In respect to a trade liberalization program the subscribers to 
the Cartagena Agreement took the middle way between the complicated 
system of annual negotiations of trade concessions product-by-pro-
duct, embodied in the Montevideo Treaty, and the imrrediate freeing 
of rrost of the subregional trade - at the price of considerable in-
crease of external protection - provided by the CACM treaty of 1960. 
After prolonged and sometimes dramatic negotiations , the five Ande-
an countries opted for a flexible, albeit firm in respect to the 
timing of subsequent liberalization moves, program with rather few 
and rroderate escape clauses . Complete freedom for rrost intra- Andean 
trade is to be achieved within ten years or not later than before 
the end of 1980 . Freedom of intra-regional trade means the elimi-
nation of not only tariff barriers but quantitative restrictions 
as well, including those that might arise from exchange controls 
and import licensing measures practiced by rrost of the members' 
countries . 
The trade liberalization program starts with the adoption of the 
stand-still principle that prohibits the introduction of new rest-
rictions of any kind in regional trade after the entry into force 
of the Cartagena Agreement by the end of 1969. Furtherrrore, it 
provides for the following positive steps toward full trade libera-
lization within the 10-year period : Trade in goods included in sect-
oral complementation agreements, such as those governing the petro-
chemical industry and other heavy manufacturing, will be freed at 
the pace specified in such agreements, involving as the rule new 
industrial activities . Trade in sorre 100 products orginally includ-
ed in LAFTA's Comrron List, covering rrostly agricultural goods with 
some degree of processing, was freed shortly after the entry into 
force of the Cartagena Agreement, and trade in goods not produced 
in any member of the common market was freed totally in February 
1971 . Duties on all other commodities entering intra-Andean trade 
are to be reduced every year by 10 percent of the starting duty, 
defined as the lowest duty for each product in force at the end of 
1969 in Colombia, Chile or Peru, but in no case exceeding 100 per-
cent ad valorem . During 1970 all duties were brought down to the 
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lowest duty applied in either of the three "major" countries, with 
the 10 percent cuts from that level starting at the end of 1971, 
so that by the end of 1980 they would reach zero. The Cartagena 
Agreement provided for quite limited in scope exception clauses 
that principally took form of rather rrodest lists of exceptions in 
respect to trade in manufactures. Agricultural trade liberaliza-
tion also provided for some escape clauses . Finally, the problem 
of the less-developed countries, Bolivia and Ecuador, has been 
resolved by postponing their obligations to introduce annual across-
the-board tariff cuts until 1975, although their own exports to the 
more advanced Andean countries will benefit from a program of lib-
eralization started by Colombia, Chile and Peru by the end of 1971 . 
Moreover, the production of some goods under sectoral complementa-
tion agreements may be reserved fGr Ecuador and Bolivia by conuron 
agreement . The Andean Development Corporation, established as ear-
ly as January 1968, is also expected to give some preferential 
treatment to the two poorer countries in respect to the provision 
of financial resources for infrastructure and manufacturing . 
A cormron external tariff is to be established in two steps : By 
the end of 1975 a minimum cormron external tariff should be establi -
shed, and five years later all the member countries are expected 
to complete the transition to the same tariff, whose level has not 
been , however, set by the Cartagena Agreement . As in the trade 
liberalization programBolivia and Ecuador will have more time to 
fulfill their obligations in respect to a comrron external tariff . 
While the Andean agreement committed the member countries to 
harmonization of industrial and agricultural programing , integration 
of physical infrastructure , and financial and rronetary cooperation, 
the elaboration of adequate measures was left to the comrron narket 
authorities , composed of a Ministerial Commission and a technical 
secretariat (known as Junta de Cartagena) , made up of three members 
with their own staff and charged with acting only on behalf of the 
Andean community interests . Most of the Commission's decisions 
require the affirmative vote of four out of five members . The dras-
tic limitation of the veto power within the Commission, together 
with the obvious need to arrive at decisions agreeable to all parti-
es concerned, led to the introduction into the work of the Andean 
market authorities of a healthy practice of continuous negotiations 
between the Junta and the respective governments in advance to the 
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formal meetings of the Andean Conunission . 
Within the first three years of their existence, the Andean Com-
rron Market authorities did not run into any major difficulties in 
agreeing - within the time schedules provided by the Cartagena 
Agreement - upon a number of important regional decisions . The 
agreements relate to the first stage of trade liberalization , includ-
ing that of setting the level of duties in the region from which 
-
automatic reductions started at the end of 1971, - the minimum com-
rron external tariff, and immediate freeing of trade in comrrodities 
- contained in LAFTA's Comrron List . They cover also a list of in-
dustries to be affected by regional industrial programing (including 
petrochemicals, steel and automotive industry) . The Comrron Code 
for Foreign Capital and Technology is in force in the region since 
the end of June 1971 and in mid-1972 the first industrial agreement 
has been reached in the field of metal working industry . 27 
For many outsiders, it may look strange that the Andean Comrron 
Market seems to be making substantial progress in spite of growing 
disparities in the political and economic structures of the member 
countries . At the time of the negotiations of the Cartagena Agree-
ment in 1967-1969, all of the present members of that comrron market 
scheme were governed by liberal or left-of-center political groups 
conunitted in varying degree to laissez-faire economic policies . To-
day, the group comprises at least two rrajor countries (Chile and 
Peru)that chose leftist, although somewhat different, political and 
economic policies . The fact that these developments do not seem to 
affect the workings of the common market may be explained in two 
opposite waya: the "socio-political" innovators do not want to burn 
bridges to the rest of the embryonic Latin American-Pacific economic 
community; or, alternatively, the steady deterioration of world con-
ditions for the developing countries , as perceived by Andean politi-
cal and economic elites, creates a new cohesion independent from 
the respective ideologies practised on national level. 
Each of these two hypothesis seems to work in favor of the Andean 
CoJ1UT0n Market, although it is too early to indulge into prophesies 
about its long- term success . The hardest decisions related to im-
27
The longer-term objectives and strategies of the Andean Comrron 
Market are analyzed in Junta de Cartagena, Bases generales para 
una estrategia de desarrollo subregional, 3 Vol . (Lima , March 
1971, mimeo . ) 
2 24 MIGUEL S. WIONCZEK 
plementation of regional industrial policies and harmonization of 
national policies in fiscal and monetary fields still lie ahead . 
But if the Andean Corruron Market scheme fails, it will become evident 
that no economic integration program in Latin America or some parts 
of that subcontinent is possible. 
III. New Strategy: Exports of Manufactures to Advanced Countries 
In the light of obstacles facing the import-substituting indust-
rialization and meager results of regional economic integration, 
described in the main body of this paper, Latin American region 
started playing around 1965 with another strategy putting emphasis 
upon production of manufactures for sales in the advanced countries . 
This most recent strategy, in the words of an ECLA study just re-
leased, 
would reflect the emergence of a new "international division 
of labor" this time in the field of manufactures . Latin Ame-
rica would export those products in which the developed count-
ries would be losing their interest in the light of evolution 
of demand and technological change. Latin American nanufact-
ured exports would thus complement other more technologically 
sophisticated goods produced by the advanced countries28 
Latin American manufacturing export performance, stimulated by 
the recent entry into force - except in the U. S . - of an UNCTAD-
sponsored general preference scheme for the entry into the advanced 
countries of the less developed countries' manufactures and semi-
nanufactures - has not been yet evaluated in detail, although some 
29 literature on the subject has been available lately. The scant 
existing evidence suggests that a) Latin American nanufactured ex-
ports grew during the sixties m~re rapidly than the region's exports 
as a whole; b) these exports were concentrated in the three major 
republics (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) and c) their participation 
in the GDP and total trade of the region has been still below that 
of many countries of similar or even lower development level in Asia . 
28
ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1971, Vol.III, Special 
Studies (New York, 1972, mimeo). p.87 
29
rn addition to ECLA's document quoted in the previous footnote, 
see ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1970 (New York, 1971); 
UNCTAD, Study of Manufacturing Trade of Developing Countries, 1970 
(Report of the UNCTAD Secretariat) (Geneva, December 1970, TD/B/C . 
2/102, mimeo), and R. Banerji and J .B . Donges, Economic Develop-
;qent and thePatternsof Manufactured Exeorts, (Kieler Diskussion-
beitrage 16, Institut fur Weltwirtschaft, Kiel, January 1972) . 
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Between 1962 and 1968 the total manufactured exports of Latin Ameri -
ca (excluding petroleum produ cts and semi-processed non-ferrous 
metals) increased threefold : from US$280 million to US$905 million . 
Their destination and origin are shown in Tables IV and V: 
Table IV 
Exports of Latin American Manufactures, 1962 and 1968 
(million dollars) 
1962 
1968 
Total 
279 
905 
Developed rrar-
ket economies 
176 
444 
Socialist 
countries 
5 
20 
Latin 
Arrerica 
79 
421 
Other 
LDC's 
12 
20 
Source : UNCTAD, Study of Manufacturing Trade in Developing Countri-
es, 1970 . 
Table V 
Exports of Manufactures by Selected Latin American Countries, 
1962 and 1969 
(million dollars) 
1962 1969 Annual percentage increase 1962-1969 
Mexico 107 . 1 379 . 7 19 . 8 
Brazil 85 . 5 244 . 2 16 . 2 
Argentina 95 . 6 207 . 7 11. 7 
Colombia 7 . 5 26 . 3 19 . 6 
Chile 12 . 9 22 . 7 8 . 4 
Uruguay 14 . 8 20 . 2 4 . 5 
Paraguay 14 . 4 18 . 3 13 . 5 
Honduras 5 . 3 17 . 9 15 . 1 
Cuba 6 . 3 10 . 5 7 . 5 
Source : The same as in Table IV . 
Additional estimates for 1970 for such countries as Brazil , Colom-
bia , Mexico and Peru ind i cate that these trends continued in the 
last two years and that the rate of acceleration increased, parti-
cularly in Brazil and Mexico . In these two countries manufactured 
export s (excluding petroleum products and semi-processed raw rrateri-
als) arrounted in 1970 respectively to US$580 million and US$405 mil-
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lion . Available projections for 1971-1975 suggest the growth rate 
in manufacturing sales abroad of Brazil at the average of 30 percent 
30 and of Mexico at 20 percent a year . 
The statistics cited above should be taken, however , with neces-
sary caution . Because of the heavy participation of the transna-
tional corporations in this trade , there is a partial evidence to 
the effect that a large part of these exports is considerably under-
priced . 31 Moreover, in the case of Mexico the data most probably 
include exports of the US-ownded assembly plants located in the 
Mexican northern border zone . As long as the information about 
local value added in Latin American manufactured exports are not 
available , it is hard to judge the degree of their real impact upon 
the changes in productive structure of individual countries and 
their respective balance of payments position . Comments made in the 
previous section upon the growth of " trade in manufactures" within 
CACM make such studies imperative . 
An interesting policy-oriented study about the manufacturing 
export potential of Latin American countries suggest that the room 
for additional expansion is considerable . 32 Starting from the as -
sumption that to device such policies , it is necessary to understand 
whether and how the share of manufactures in a country's total ex-
ports is related to certain supply characteristics , a survey was 
made of the actual and "expected" export performance of some 70 ad-
vanced and developing countries with the use of multiple regression 
analysis on the basis of cross-sectional data . While the weakness 
of the study consists of not taking into consideration world-wide 
demand characteristics and trade policies of advanced countries 
30 . . . . . 
For Brazil estimates see IBRD , Current Economic Position and Pros-
pects of Brazil, Vol . III , Brazil ' s Exports of Manufactures (Wash--
ington , D. C. 1971) and for Mexico - local unpublished data . 
31
According to the survey of over 100 Latin American fore i gn-owned 
manufacturing firms , mostly subsidiaries of transnational corpo-
rations, their exports - within the respective c orporate systems 
- to other Latin American countries and the rest of the world are 
underinvoiced by average 50 per cent in comparison to prices ob-
tained by other Latin American firms exporting on the open market . 
For details see Ronald E . Muller and Richard Morge nstern, The Im-
pact of Multinational Corporations on the Balance of Payments of 
LDCs : An Econometric Analysis of Pricing of Export Sales (Washing-
ton, D. C. 1972, unpublished manuscript) . 
32R B .. • anerJi and J .B . Donges , _£E . ci.!_. 
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(especially non- tariff trade barriers), it shows that over the peri -
od of 1960-1968 only in three Latin American republics (Chile , Peuru 
and Nicaragua) actual shares of manufactures exceeded the "expected" 
shares . In twelve others, including Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, 
rranufactured exports were below the "estimated" shares . 
As both actual and "expected" shares of rranufacturing exports 
include in the study semi-processed metals and considering that 
Chile and Peru are major exporters of these commodities, one arrives 
at a conclusion that, in fact, in all Latin Anerica manufacturing 
export potential has been used only fractionally . The study admits, 
however, its limited value : alnost 40 percent of variations between 
actual and "expected" manufacturing exports could not be explained 
by that sort of analysis and "a large part of 'unexplained' varia-
tions may reflect aIIDng other factors , (like endownent of natural 
resources), the various forms of impediments and trade stimuli that 
are in existence of national and supranational leve1 11 :: 3 
An attempt to explain some of these impediments related to import-
substi tuting industrialization policies and regional economic inte-
gration difficulties was made in the previous sections of this paper . 
A thorough analysis of obstacles to exports of Latin American manu-
factures arising from trade policies of the developed countries 
would imply writing another paper . Hopefully assuming that these 
policies affect in the similar way other less developed countries 
of the Pacific region and that the subject will be covered in detail 
in other papers presented at this Conference, they are not discussed 
here . 
Final Comments 
Some final comments are in order now . Whatever external obstacl-
es to rapid expansion of Latin American rranufactured exports exist, 
their presence does not invalidate this writer's general proposition 
that the absence of coherent internal and regional economic policies 
in the post-war Latin America resulted in the high cost of import-
substi tuting industrialization, the lack of acceleration of economic 
growth through regional economic integration, and the limited re-
sults of the latest strategy based upon the high priority for manu-
factured exports. While the conflict of the objectives between im-
33 rbid, p.16 . 
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port substitution and regional trade cooperation looks obvious, no 
such conflict seems to exist in the case of economic regionalism 
and manufacturing for world-wide exports . 
In fact, it has been demonstrated that regional industrialization 
policy would have helped irrunensely the objective of manufacturing 
34 for export strategy . A study of fourteen products in six indust-
rial branches, aimed at quantifying their costs under the conditions 
of working for a Latin American area in the optimum or near-optimum 
patterns of location, disclosed that in practically all the cases , 
such patterns of production would be competitive with imports from 
any developed country. The study suggests, furthermore, that "when-
ever output moves to the levels where economies of scale operate, 
as it would for many corrunodities in a Latin American corrunon market, 
and transportation costs are significant, production costs would 
permit competition with developed countries even without tariff pro-
tection11 . 35 
Given the fact that many Far Eastern developing economies, the 
less developed countries of Southern Europe and Israel did in the 
post-war period better in terms of economic growth and export trade 
than Latin America, 36 there are reasons to believe that the rather 
disappointing Latin American performance has largely been due to 
political, social and technological backwardness and not to tradi-
tional productive factors endowment . If it is true, as Linder post-
ulated that the export possibilities depend upon the size, the st-
ructure and the growth of domestic demand37 and as Georgescu-Roegen 
noted that without the changes in the domestic demand profile, an 
industrializing low-income country runs rapidly into "structural 
34
Martin Carnoy (ed . ), Industrialization in a Latin American Corrunon 
Market (The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., 1972) . 
35
Ibid, p . 69-70 . 
36Economic Corrunission for Europe, Some Aspects of Manufacturing De-
velopment in Southern Europe: Production, Trade and Transfer of 
Technology (Geneva, October 1971, TRADE/254 , mimeo) and Centre 
for Industrial Planning, Plan for the Development of Industry in 
Israel , 1169-1975 (Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Jerusalem, 
37 February 971). 
Staffan Burenstam Linder, An Essay on Trade and Transformation 
(Almqvist & Wiksell, Uppsala, 1961) . 
38 . h 1 Nie o as Georgescu-Roegen , "Structural Inflation-Lock and Balanced 
Growth", (Economies et Societes, Cahiers de l'I . S . E . A., Geneva, 
1970, Vol.IV, No.3.) 
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lock" dilemma ,
38 
then it is relevant to stress that all the Latin 
American post-war economic strategies studiously avoided making the 
internal socio- economic structural changes , including the improve-
ment of human resources quality and of the modes of social organiza-
tion . This would lead us back to the Simon Kuznets dictum that 
"the cause of economic growth is knowledge" and to Maddison ' s pro-
position that "the basic problems of an economic growth policy •.• 
are not technical but political and institutional" . 
As this paper has been written for an international economic 
meeting and not for a gathering of political scientists and sociolo-
gists let us leave the matter at this point . 
COMMENTS AND DISCUSSION OF 
WIONCZEK' s PAPER 
Ted English opened the discussion: Wionczek provides us with a 
clear and comprehensive treatment of Latin American development ex-
perience. He..reveals, especially in the first table, the great vari-
ety in that experience . As he states, no clear pattern emerges in 
the growth rates .. Size of country, system of economic organization, 
level of per capita income already achieved,- none of these appears 
as a consistent explanatory factor for the rates of growth in recent 
decades. 
The paper focuses on three development strategies - import sub-
stitution, regional integration and export encouragement. 
Import substitution is considered as nothing new, having been 
used in 19th century Europe, but some of the tactics for achieving 
import substitution by Latin American countries were not commonly 
employed in the last century, for example, preferential exchange 
rates for imported materials, and direct government participation in 
heavy industry. The Latin American countries have really "pulled 
out all the stops" in following this policy. Basically, I feel that 
the expression "import substitution" is not the best label for this 
policy option. The crucial point is that protection of domestic in-
dustry is involved. The import substitution that occurs as a more 
or less incidental consequence of other policies may have entirely 
different efficiency implications. But that which depends on pro-
tection clearly involves an economic cost and can be assessed in ac-
cordance with the size of that cost and the term over which it must 
be borne. 
Some other more specific points about the discussion in this part 
of the paper might be mentioned. Wionczek cites declining growth 
rates in Latin America as one moves from the 1940s to the 1960s, and 
appears to agree with Prebisch's view that this indicates exhaustion 
of import substitution possibilities. He also cites the decline of 
Latin America's share of world trade as evidence of the same trend. 
It is difficult to be fully satisfied with these broad statistical 
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indications since so many factors are involved in explaining overall 
growth rates and international trade shares. Changing trade shares 
for example were much affected in this period by the recovery of 
Europe and Japan and the creation of so many independent states in 
Africa . 
Some question may also be raised about the point that protective 
(or import substitution) policies result in larger monopoly rents 
for the multinational or other companies that grow up behind the pro-
tection. While this is true in some cases, especially in resource 
industries, in secondary manufacturing the effect is often merely to 
encourage the setting up of inefficiently small and diversified pro-
duction units . 
Finally , I find the two types of critics of import substitution 
- the 'market' critics and the ' structure' critics - really to be 
focussing on two related aspects of the same problem . One can cer-
tainly agree with Professor Wionczek that the Latin American coun-
tries should have made more effort to combine protectionist policies 
with redistribution , technological and other policies that might 
have made the choice of the resulting protected industries more ap-
propriate to socio -economic conditions of the countries concerned . 
Turning to regional integration, Professor Wionczek gave plenty of 
evidence that Latin American regional integration schemes have fall-
en well short of their goals . However , I think the criticism turns 
out to be more a criticism of the specific handling of LAFTA and the 
CACM rather than the basic idea of regional economic integration in 
developing countries . In LAFTA there was considerable rhetoric and 
limited serious effort to achieve substantive integration, especially 
by larger countries of the group . In the CACM, political s~uabbles 
arose, partly as a consequence of the high external trade barriers 
erected around the American market . This left much more scope for 
the building of small and efficient units . 
Prof . Wi.onczek rightly emphasises the failure of developed coun·-
tries, notably U. S . policies, toward the Latin American groups . 
There were many offers of loans and credits but these took forms 
which merely encouraged national and often competing units in small 
regional markets such as the CACM which could really only support a 
single unit in many industries. 
I would have added that the United States perhaps with Canada's 
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support , might have encouraged sounder industrial project choices if 
they had offered free access to their markets along with more co- ordi-
nated capital assistance . 
The Andean group , as Prof. Wionczek stresses , is a more promis-
ing scheme , having perhaps learned from the mistakes of its predeces-
sors . There is a greater uniformity in the stage of development in 
this group than in LAFTA and some indications of compatible develop-
ment plans . Wionczek calls for 'harmonized distribution of new im-
portant industrial projects' and ' common trade and investment poli-
cies '. I can agree that such a group would need to avoid providing 
excessive protection , to adopt a moderate external tariff ceiling 
(though not necessarily completely uniform policies , provided that 
no country could raise tariffs to levels promoting high cost units) . 
I can also agree that there should be some co-ordination of develop-
ment strategy for large scale industries and industries offering op-
portunities for achieving complementarity of specialized lines of pro-
duction among the partner states . I certainly favour harmonization 
of fiscal incentives. But I would caution against requiring a high 
degree of supranationality in the institution of the group if much 
of the same effect can beachievedby relying in part on internatio-
nal competition as a discipline , something which has apparently not 
been done to date in the Latin American regional gr0ups. 
Finally, Professor Wionczek introduces the strategy of promotion 
of manufactured exports , the newest emphasis from the Latin American . 
This has more appeal for precisely the reason just cited - it would 
require the Latin American countries to meet international market 
disciplines . However if promotion of manufactured exports means the 
adoption of a wide variety of export subsidies it may prove to be 
economically costly and to provoke retaliation in countries that are 
expected to import the subsidized manufactures . To encourage such 
countries to accept such products , they would have to be reassured 
that viability without subsidy was reasonably soon to be achieved . 
As Wionczek notes this strategy can be effectively combined with the 
previous regional integration strategy, thus to ensure the larger 
home market base for viable export activity. 
None of these comments is intended to detract from my general 
satisfaction which the useful and analytically stimulating paper. 
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Hiroshi Kitamura continued the c onunentary : This paper provides 
a ver y important a nd incisive discussion of the basic dev elopment 
issues in Latin America . Be i ng litt le qualified to discuss the deve-
lopment prob l ems specifi c t o Latin America , howev er , I shall try and 
put the issues into the context of gener alized observations on t he 
growth and trade strategies of present day developing countries . 
In the present paper , Dr . Wionczek discussed the three develop-
ment strategies whi ch were adopted successively by Latin American 
countries after the second World War : import substituting industria-
lization policy on the natinal level , regional trade integration, 
and more recently export-oriented industrialization strategy; and 
concludes that none of these strategies has thus far succeeded in 
accelerating the pace of economic growth planned . Nor have they 
brought about the structural changes hoped for . The root cause of 
this failure is , in Wionc zek's view , ' the lack of coherent internal 
and regional economic policies ', which has ' resulted in the high 
cost of import- substituting industr ialization, the lack of accelera-
tion of economic growth through regional economi c integration , and 
the limited results of the latest strategy based upon the high prio-
rity for manufactured exports .' (p . 227) 
I am a little concerned about the prevailing trend of Western eco-
nomic thought to lay the blame on ' inward-looki ng ' import substitu-
tion and protection policy for everything that has gone wrong on the 
development front . I believe Wionczek ' s is a message that should be 
taken to heart by everybody who is seriously concerned with the deve-
lopment policies of the less developed countries . It is a healthy 
reminder to those of us who tend to argue as if every inefficiency 
were caused by the ' inward-looking ' type of strategy, and as if a 
shift to ' outward- looking ' export orientation would solve all the 
complex problems of development at one stroke. In fact , the issue 
before us is not one of inward-looking versus outward-looking , im~ 
port substitution versus export promotion nor , for that matter , im-
port substitution on the national versus regional level . The choice 
among markets and activities is a general problem of resource allo-
cation. What is needed for efficient industrialization is a 'coher-
ent economic policy ' , both in domestic and trade spheres, meaning 
the setting up of carefully worked-out priorities and the formulat-
ing and implementing of policies geared to these priorities. 
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Let me briefly comment on each of the three strategies . 'In the 
historical perspective, it is .i mportant to remember , as Wionczek 
puts it, that the import substitution of the present- day developing 
countries is an exact replica of the development model adopted in 
Europe and North America in the 19th century and pursued in Japan 
further into the 20th century . (p . 196) Moreover , the policy instru-
ments being used are essentially of the same nature as those adopted 
in Europe and the United States a century ago . It is fair to say 
that, in ECLA ' s ideology , this policy did not have any autarkic con-
notation . (p . 199) Historically , however , it was Raul Prebisch ' s spe-
cific contribution to have established the rationale of import- sub~ 
stituting industrialization for the Latin American countries in the 
face of.the then prevailing American doctrine that comparative ad-
vantage would predestine them to be_ perpetual suppliers of primary 
products . 
Why has this development model which led to a successful indus -
trial transformation in the now developed countries failed to pro-
duce such structural changes in the developing countries in our time , 
with a few exceptions? I am particularly interested in what Wion-
czek calls the ' structuralist ' view of the critics who point to the 
social and economic regidity in Latin American societies which has 
often led to a kind of ' structural lock ' situation . Policies have 
not been sufficiently adapted to the changed environment of inter-
national trade , as analyzed by Ragnar Nurkse . In the absence of a 
development strategy ' in the sense of a selection of alternative 
policies aimed at a well-defined objective ' (p . 205) , it is no wonder 
that the policy failed to show the degree of rationality as implied 
in a coherent economic policy . The failure is not necessarily a 
proof of the alleged fallacy of the import-substitution strategy it-
self . 
As I understand it , ECLA ' s proposal for regional economic and 
trade integration was meant to aim at import substitution on the 
basis of a broader regional market which shouln be more efficient 
than that on the national level . Exports to a broader regional mar-
ket would, from the regional point of view , represent a production 
within the region in substitution for imports from extra-regional 
sources . There was obviously no dichotomy between import substitu-
tion and export expansion , and Wionczek's second strategy was nothing 
but a logical development of the first one in response to market ex-
pansion. 
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The sad story that Mr . Wionczek tells us of the past integration 
efforts in Latin America clearly suggests that efficient progress to-
wards economic integration among the developing countries cannot be 
based on the techniques of trade liberalization alone . In condi-
tions so different from those in Europe, there is no point in follow-
ing blindly the pattern of integrative arrangements of the tradition-
al Common Market or Free Trade Area type . The first requirement 
would be rather the establishment of common trade and investment 
policies, involving some degree of joint regional industrial plan-
ning, to deal with the problem of equitable distribution of benefits 
arising from industrialization . (p.221) The lessons Wionczek draws 
from the relatively successful experience of the Andean integration 
scheme are suggestive to policy makers in any sub-regional grouping 
in Asia or in other parts of the developing world . One would expect 
rather favourable prospects for intensified harmonization of trade 
and investment policies in the case of the ASEAN, for instance , in 
which a small number of like-minded countries with common outlook 
and at a similar level of economic development cooperate with each 
other . 
Finally, a few words of comment about the 'new' strategy of ex-
port-oriented industrialization , to which the usual reference to 
Hong Kong's success story is oc course as little relevant as the ex-
perience of limited export processing zones. Japan's experience 
seems to suggest that , provided that the size of the home market per-
mits and that the right kinds of industry are chosen, a successful 
export expansion would inevitably follow extensive import substitu-
tion . The essential point is again that import substitution and ex-
port expansion are both integral parts of the same industrialization 
strategy . 
Going one step further, it may be argued that in most countries 
with a sizeable domestic market import substitution must precede a 
successful export development . Many industrial activities are sub-
ject to important economies of scale, and for many of these products 
the development of a substantial home market may be an essential con-
dition of developing significant export markets. Thus, the success 
of the strategy of export-oriented industrialization will, in an im-
portant manner, depend on the efficiency of the process of import 
substitution. 
As Wionczek rightly points out (p .228 ), the regional market or , 
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for that matter, regional economic integration (his second strategy) 
may greatly facilitate the task of manufacturing for export strategy . 
Given the relatively crude nature of many exportable manufactures in 
the early stages of development , it stands to reason that the pros·-
pects for their exports are more favourable in the neighbouring mar-
kets of developing countries than in the sophisticated markets of 
advanced countries . Wionczek ' s data in table IV (p . 225) show that be-
tween 1962 and 1968 exports of Latin American manufactures to Latin 
American markets have grown twice as fast as those to the advanced 
country markets. This particular advantage gives an added import-
ance to regional trade integration in the context of export-oriented 
indsutrialization . Considering the important economies of large 
scale which can be fully exploited only on the basis of an assured 
larger market, it seems evident that the efficiency of the develop-
ment through export strat egy will crucially depend on the success of 
the first and second strategies. 
I cannot help referring back to Dr . Helen Hughes ' s important con-
tribution to the present Conference which forceful ly advances the 
thesis that the present world economy and the underlying internation-
al market prices are far removed from being optimal . It logically 
follows that there is considerable rationale for the developing 
nations to operate what Charles Kindleberger calls a ' disequili-
brium system '. Despite the prevailing trend of the typically Wes-
tern advice, there is in principle no doubt about the justification 
of the use of protection and subsidies forimport- substitutingand ex-
port- oriented industrialization, and economic logic does not allow 
us to dismiss totally the use of partially discri minatory devises i n 
regional integration schemes among the developing countries . The 
question for us is, however, how to make the operation of the 'dis-
equilibrium system ' more efficient in the long run . To take the im-
port substitution strategy for example , there are several ways in 
which the efficiency of the process may be improved , as Dr . Hughes 
suggests . In many cases the actual process of import substitution 
has not followed carefully worked-out priorities . Precisely this 
failure is to be blamed for the high social and economic cost in 
which the import-substitution policy of many developing countries 
has actually reEulted, rather than the strategy itself . This is, in 
my interpretation , an important lesson we can learn from Mr. Wionc-
zek' s valuable paper . 
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Subsequent discussion took up the questions of export subsidisa-
tion policies in developing countries , the conditions for successful 
integration , and lessons to be learned by other developing countries 
from Latin American experience . 
An American participant suggested that , as Wionczek ' s paper ex·-
plains, there has been a succession of extremisms in policy formula-
tion in developing countries . The latest in over-emphasis on ex-
port promotion policies. This extremism involves the danger that 
the developing country government might end up subsidising , through 
excessive export incentives, multinational corporations, or, in any 
case, consumer groups in foreign countries. There was another im-
portant danger that protectionist elements in developed countries 
had their hand strengthened by appeal to the moral argument that pro-
tection was required against dumping . This was an important factor 
in thinking in the United States . 
Another participant spelled out the conditions for successful in-
tegration, which he believed would only result if integration were 
motivated by a real desire to improve group efficiency in open com-
petition in world markets . Regionalism is likely to be successful 
as an economic strategy only if it is designed to serve as a means 
towards freer trade . 
This theme was taken further with a comment that Latin American 
attempts at integration t o date were not so motivated and largely 
based on verbalism and superficiality . There appeared no real com-
monality of intersts . Nor could one be optimistic about the pre-
conditions for successful integration emerging in Southeast Asia, 
except, perhaps, among the smaller group of ASEAN countries. 
